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THE NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAWeRoBiET A. KRSLm t

N April 24, 1961, L. 1961, ch. 855 was approved by
the Governor of New York. The statute is entitled
"An Act in relation to business corporations, constituting
chapter four of the consolidated laws." 1 It represents the
culmination of over four years of study by a joint legislative
committee and its advisory groups 2 "directed toward one
end-the ultimate preparation of corporate laws for legislative action that will give our State the best possible
statutes under which all who carry on activity in the corporate form may conduct that activity ... to their maximum
*This article is the first of two articles on the newly enacted New
York Business Corporation Law. The second article, which will follow in the
May issue, -will present a critique of the procedural aspects of the new law
from the viewpoint of the Honorable Abraham N. Davis, Executive Deputy
Secretary of State.

I-Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
Member, Research Advisory Subcommittee to the Joint
mittee to Study Revision of New York Corporation Laws.
pressed in this article are those of the author and do not
the opinions of the Subcommittee or the Joint Legislative
I The bill which thus became law was S. Int. 522, Pr.
885, Pr. 5310 (1961). The original versions of these bills
Pr. 522, A. Int. 885, Pr. 885 (1961),

School of Law;
Legislative CoinThe opinions exnecessarily reflect
Committee.
4061, and A. Int.
were S. Int. 522,

2The Committee was set up by Joint Resolution No. 27 of the New
York Senate and Assembly on March 22, 1956. 1957 N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 17,
at 9, JOINT LEGISLATIVW COMMITrTEE TO STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATE LAWS
-INTERIM
REPORT TO 1957 SEssloN OF NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE [hereinafter cited as 1957 N.Y. LFG. Doc. No. 17].
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benefit consistent with fairness to others with whom they
deal and the public interest." 3
The new enactment is a compreheisive revision of the
New York law with regard to business corporations, and
the first such undertaken in over thirty years. 4 On its
effective date, April 1, 1963, 5 it will replace, for such
corporations, the unique "trunk" system e of present New
York law under which a lawyer must consult a General
Corporation Law designed to apply to every type of corporation and at least one special statute applicable to his
particular kind of corporation (e. g., religious, cooperative,
banking, railroad, transportation, municipal, etc.).
In the
case of ordinary business corporations, this special statute
is, of course, the "Stock Corporation Law."
The new statute is designed, therefore, to supersede both
the General and the Stock Corporation Laws as they apply
to business corporations,7 substituting in their stead a
single "Business Corporation Law," 8 applicable to all ordinary business corporationsY Obviously the new statute is

3

1957 N.Y. La&. Doc. No. 17, at 10.
Doc. No. 15, at 9, JOINT

4 1960 N.Y. LEG.
STuDY REvIsION OF

LwisLATIVE CommrrTEE To
LAws-FouRTH INTERIm
REPORT TO 1960
SESSION OF NEW YORE STATE LFGIsLATURE [hereinafter cited as 1960 N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 15].
5 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1401.
CORPORA'r

6See note 4 supra.

71960 N.Y. LFo. Doc. No. 15, at 13.

See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 103.
The scope of
applicability is set out in § 103. The purposes of the new legislation are
set forth in § 201 and the definition of "corporation" within the meaning of
the statute is given in § 102(4).
9The obvious design of the new statute is to apply to business corporations, but only to those in that category for which no other special
statute (e.g., N.Y. BANXING LAW, N.Y. INS. LAW) makes exclusive provision. See 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doe. No. 15, at 13; Revised Comment to §§ 103,
201, 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 11, 14, JOINT LEGISLATIVE COmmiTFE
8 Section 101 of the new act designates this as its title.

TO STUDY

REvISION

OF CORPORATION

LAWS-REvISED SUPPLEMENT TO FnsTH

1961 SESSION OF THE NEW YORK STAT- LEGISLATURE
[hereinafter cited as 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12 (Rev. Supp.)].
The Revised Comment to § 103 of 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc No. 12, at 11,
states: "Upon its effective date, this chapter will automatically apply to
all existing business corporations and to those formed thereafter with the
exception of corporations formed under other statutes such as the Banking
Law, the Railroad Law, the Insurance Law, the Transportation Corporations
INTERIM REPORT TO

Law and the Cooperative Corporations

Law.

The latter and any other

corporation will be affected by this chapter only to the extent, if any, as
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designed to be both a simplification and modernization of
present law. 10
The Committee made a thorough study of the present
law through consultants who used as their research framework the sections of the A.B.A. Model Business Corporation
Act and compared The Model Act and current New York

provisions with those of ten other selected jurisdictions.
On the basis of his research and analysis, each consultant
made recommendations with regard to the particular topic,
e. g., "reserved name," which was the subject of his research

report.11
The complete research reports, or, at least, summaries
of the researcher's recommendations, were widely distributed
for comment by the Department of State, the State and

New York City Bar Associations, and a number of Advisory
Subcommittees. After criticisms by these groups, final research recommendations were framed, "Working Drafts"
of statute sections were prepared, further comment solicited
in writing and at meetings between the Joint Legislative
Committee and the Bar Associations, and "Tentative Staff
may be specified in any law governing such corporation. The effective date
of this chapter is April 1, 1963 (§ 1401).
"This chapter applies to interstate and foreign commerce and to federallyformed corporations only to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution and federal laws.
"Business corporations will no longer be governed by the Stk. Corp. L.
or the Gen. Corp. L. After the effective date of this chapter no corporation
may be formed under the Sti. Corp. L. unless a New York Statute other
than the Stk. Corp. L. permits its formation under the Stk. Corp. L., thus
barring the formation of business corporations under the Stk. Corp. L."
Technically, however, the statute only applies to corporations formed
for profit. (N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 103 must be read in conjunction with
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 102 (a) (4) and (7), which define "corporation"
as "a corporation for profit").
In any event, it is clear that the new statute will apply to all ordinary
business corporations, domestic or foreign, licensed to do business in New
York on its effective date, and to all such corporations which seek the right
to do business in New York thereafter.
10 See note 4 .spra.
11 See 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc No. 23, PART III, JOINT LEGISLATIVE CommiTnEE To STUDY REVIsONs or CORPORATION LAWS-SECOND INTERIM RLORT
TO 1958 SEsSIon OF NEw YORK STATE LEGisLATURE [hereinafter cited as 1958
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 23]; 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39, PART II, JOINT
LEUsLATnvE CommiTmE To STUDY REVISION OF CORPORATION LAws-THa
INTERIM REPORT To 1959 SEssIoN OF NEW YoRx STATE LEwIsLATuRE

inafter cited as 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39].
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Drafts" or revised forms of these statute sections were prepared. These were the subject of Committee hearings."2
Finally a Study Bill was drafted and filed,' 8 and public
hearings held in various places in the state. 14 The Study
Bill was accompanied by a Supplement, containing the "Revisers' Notes and Comments." 15
After these hearings the Study Bill itself was revised,
and a bill introduced for affirmative legislative action. It
too, was accompanied by a Supplement, containing revised
"Revisers' Notes and Comments." 16
As a result of additional recommendations by the
practicing bar a further revised version of this bill was
introduced, and this is the one which became law. 17 New
Revisers' Notes and Comments have recently been published 18 for the statute as finally enacted.
The project was an elaborate one, well organized, and
obviously demonstrates a painstaking effort on the part of
all concerned. It truly involved a great deal of studythe initial research reports alone total over 1750 pages 19
and a genuine attempt to produce a truly adequate statute
for the second most important corporation state in the
country. 20
1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39, PART IT.
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 39, PART III; S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316 (1960).
14 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc- No. 15, at 38-39.
12

13 1959

15 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, JOINT LEGIsLATrVE ComrirrEG To STUDY
RmsION OF CORPORATION LAWS-SUPP=LMNT TO FOURTH INTERIM REPORT
To 1960 SESSION OF NEw YoiK STATE 'LEGisLAuR, [hereinafter cited as

1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15 (Supp.)].
101961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, Joir LEGISLATIVE CommIi TE

RmsIo or CORPORATION
TO 1961 SEssioN OF NEW

LAws-SUPPLEMENT To FirtH INTERIM
YORK S+ATE LEGISLATURE [hereinafter

To STUDY
REPORT

cited as

1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12 (Supp.)].
IT The bill which thus became law was S. Int. 522, Pr. 4061, and A. Int.
885, Pr. 5310 (1961).
18 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12 (Rev. Supp.). This is a revised version

of the Fifth Interim Report to the 1961 Session of the New York Legislature, containing a Revised Supplement (also printed separately), composed
of Reviser's Notes and Comments on the Business Corporation Law. Undoubtedly, the Revisers' Notes and Comments to the new statute will be of
great utility in interpreting the new law. The language of these Comments
is almost as significant as the wording of the statute itself.
Therefore,
these Comments will be discussed extensively in this article.
's 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, at 29.
20 New York is second only to Delaware in the asset value of its corporations. 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17, at 18.
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Despite the fact that a great deal more work has gone
into the preparation of the bill than was employed by
most states which have adopted revisions of their corporation laws recently, if for no other reason than the
imperfection of man, the new law is, like every past law
in every jurisdiction, bound to contain some defects.
Although in a sense the "die has been cast" by enactment of the bill as finally submitted, the delayed effective
date 21 means that amendments are still possible prior
to the time the statute actually becomes operative.2 2
Since change is therefore still possible it is not too
late, and not inappropriate, to make whatever criticisms
the new law may inspire, and, as is only right, also to
bestow whatever kudos is merited.
Clearly, much more than a single law review article
would be required to discuss the entire act adequately.
Undoubtedly, more than one book will ultimately be necesmry
to do that. This discussion can therefore only touch upon
the highspots, or, more accurately, those aspects of the
new law which appear to this author to be the most
important.
The heart of any corporation law is its financial
section, that is, the article in the law which tells us how
the corporation is to get its assets, and what it may do
with them after it has gotten them, or in the more traditional
language of corporation law, the problems of stock, dividends
and repurchase of its own shares by the corporation. Not
even the most cursory discussion of any corporation law
would be complete without including some comments on
its financial provisions, even though this is certainly the
most difficult, and perhaps the dullest, part of any statute.
What other aspects of a corporation law are most
important? Opinions may differ. Here, however, it would
seem appropriate to take a functional approach. Although
it is as difficult to stereotype corporations as it is individuals,
21 "This act shall take effect April first, nineteen hundred sixty-three."
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1401.
22 This point is made in the Governor's Memorandum of Approval of
the new law.
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legal writers do recognize two polar types of corporation.
The one, the "close" corporation, is characterized by an
identity of ownership and management, 2 3 and is typically
small, the partnership which has attempted to wrap itself
in the cloak of limited liability, and unfortunately, has,
under many corporation laws, found that cloak to be in
reality a shroud. At the other pole is the "public-issue"
corporation. A picture of some industrial behemoth, like
U.S. Steel or General Motors, immediately comes to mind.
The new law, like every other corporation law in the
nation, contemplates only one statute applicable to both
polar types, and to every possible corporate variant between. 2 1 Most practitioners will want to know how this
new act deals with the problems of "close corporations":
what the proposed statute does, and does not do, to ameliorate
the condition of such corporations, which represent the
overwhelming majority of corporations in the nation. This
will, therefore, be the second major topic of this paper.
The principal legal problem with regard to public-issue
corporations today is probably in the field of fiduciary duties
of the management personnel, and in shareholder remedies
for enforcing good conduct by the people who, in theory,
are merely their representatives to run the corporation,
but over whose appointment and tenure they have, in reality,
very little to say because of management's control of the
proxy solicitation machinery, and the wide dispersal of
share ownership.
In most public issue corporations the
shareholders get the same choice as the citizens of a
communist country at election time: they may either vote
for the party or simply render an ineffectual protest by
refusing to do so. Under such circumstances, there is no
possibility of "turning the rascals out." The stockholders'
derivative suit is the only effective means for enforcing
fiduciary duties. The third topic which seems important
enough for this survey of the new law, therefore, is: the
23 ISRAF.S & GORMAN, CORPORATE PRACTICE 17
(7th ed. 1957).
probably the most satisfactory definition.

This is

24See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors:

A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. R ,. 696, 720 (1960).
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public issue corporation-fiduciary duties and shareholders'
suits. I shall call this section Public Issue Corporations
and Shareholders' Rights.
Before getting to these three main topics it is, however,
probably a good idea to take a bird's-eye view of the act
as a whole,
First, however, it is obvious that a law may be criticized
from two different approaches: the purpose, or end sought
to be accomplished by the provision in question, in other
words, its philosophy, or, on the other hand, the criticism
may be of its adequacy to achieve the ends which it has
avowedly set for itself by the verbiage used. The latter,
textual criticism, is, of course, simply an observation on the
quality of the draftsmanship.
Both a good end and good means are equally important.
Manifestly, even a statute with the ridiculous purpose of
making "litter-bugging" a capital offense, should at least
say so clearly. It is the opinion of this author that, by
and large, the draftsmanship of the new law is an improvement over the turgidity of the present law. There
were, of course, exceptions in the initial stages of the
drafting process. To take just one example, the provision
with regard to consideration for shares of stock in the
Study Bill ran:
Consideration for the issue of shares shall consist, in whole
or in part, of money or other property, tangible or intangible, or
labor or services actually performed for the corporation or for its
benefit or in its organization or reorganization .... 25
The provision (despite the fact that the reviser makes
no reference to the fact) 26 apparently changes the present
25S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316, §5.04(a)
(1960).
28 Neither the Comments to the Study Bill (1960 N.Y. Lro. Doc. No. 15,
at 24-25 (Supp.), Comments to §§ 5.04, 5.07) nor to the bill as originally
introduced (1961 N.Y. Lao. Doc. No. 12, at 26, 28 (Supp.), Comments to
§§5.04, 5.07) nor to the statute as enacted (1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12,
at 26, 28 (Rev. Supp.), Comments to §§ 504, 507), make any direct reference to the possibility of such compensation for services, although the
latter concedes that the provisions of N.Y. STocx CoRP. LAw § 69 "have
been expanded to cover the expenses of formation and reorganization."
(emphasis added).
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law to allow issuance of stock for promotional services. 27
Although

at least one

author

28

and numerous

cases

29

have disapproved the practice, and it is presently outlawed
in New York, 30 the change, if properly circumscribed,
would seem to be a sensible one. It still seems that "the
labourer is worthy of his hire," 31 and thus that even

promoters should be paid the reasonable value of their
services to the corporation they have helped to form. Stock
is perhaps the least obnoxious way of doing this, provided

that the amount is reasonableA2
Whatever the merits of the new policy, the section as

originally drawn was obviously inadequate on the simple
ground of poor draftsmanship, since by use of the phrase
"in whole or in part," it implied that stock might be issued

as fully paid even though the value of the money, property
and services received were less than the par or stated value
Such an authorization
of the stock issued in exchange.
for issuance of "watered stock" was undoubtedly not in-

tended.3 3
manship.

The section was simply a case of poor drafts-

27 Taken together with S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316, [hereinafter cited as Study
Bill], § 5.07 (1960), which permitted such services to be allowed as a "discount" on the consideration for its shares. This ambiguous provision might
well have allowed the full consideration to be made up of such services.
The corresponding section of the bill as finally enacted is hardly less ambiguous on this score. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 507 provides: "The reasonable
charges and expenses of formation or reorganization of a corporation, and
the reasonable expenses of and compensation for the sale or underwriting
of its shares may be paid or allowed by the corporation out of the consideration received by it in payment for its shares without thereby impairing
the fully paid and nonassessable status of such shares."
See also note 177, infra.
28
BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs 792-93 (rev. ed. 1946).
29 See cases cited, BALLANTINE, op. cit. jupra note 28, at 792 n.52.
See, e.g.,
302 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERY 795-96 (1937).
Herbert v. Duryea, 34 App. Div. 478, 54 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1898),
aff'd, 164 N.Y. 596, 58 N.E. 1088 (1900).
31LuRE 10:7 (Douay Rheims ed.).
32 See Kessler, Promoters' Contracts: A Statutory Solution, 15 RUTGERS
L. REv. 566 (1961).
33 In view of the New York attitude, which even prohibits issuance of
no-par stock gratuitously, clearer language would undoubtedly have been
See Stone v. Young, 210 App.
used if this result were really intended.
Div. 303, 206 N.Y. Supp. 95 (4th Dep't 1924).

1961 ]

N. Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW

Fortunately, the ambiguity was corrected in the final
bill. Section 504(a) of the Business Corporation Law
provides:
Consideration for the issue of shares shall consist of money
or other property, tangible or intangible, actually received or labor
or services actually performed for the corporation or for its benefit
or in its formation or reorganization, or a combination thereof.
In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the
board or shareholders, as the case may be, as to the value of the
consideration received for shares shall be conclusive.
The philosophy is unchanged, and it will be observed
there is no qualification as to reasonableness of the stock
compensation for promotional services.3 4 Thus the provision
may well be regarded as dangerous. It is not, however,
as ambiguous.
Although the author will attempt to point out important
ambiguities, the primary concentration will be on the
philosophy of the new law as revealed by its provisions,
rather than on a narrow textual criticism of its language,
and this for two reasons. The first is that most of the
obvious textual ambiguities of the earlier forms of the
statute have been corrected in the bill as finally enacted.3"
34 Section 69 of the Stock Corporation Law, therefore, seems better. It
also made clearer the corporation's right to grant stock options as a
reward for past services, by authorizing their issuance for "such consideration, vale or benefit .

.

. as may be fixed by the board . . ." (emphasis

added), and by making their determination of the value or benefit (as well
as the "consideration" received) conclusive in the absence of fraud. The
new law is more like DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1953), and thus may
not avoid the decision in Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69,
90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See Frankel v. Donovan, 35 Del. Ch. 433, 120
A.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
35See, e.g., the errors in S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316 (1960), Study Bill
§5.19(a), where the word "or" is inadvertently omitted before the second
and third numbered subdivisions (corrected by N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§515(a)); the overly cumbersome language used in Study Bill §5.19(c)
(corrected by N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 515(e)). Compare, however, Study
Bill § 5.09, which, following the Model Business Corporation Act, seemed
to allow a corporation to issue all of its shares fractionally and thus circumvent the limitations on share repurchases (S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316,
§§ 5.13, 5.14 (1960)), and which the bill as originally introduced for affirmative action attempted to correct (S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, § 5.09(a) (1960)),
but which in the bill as passed reverts to the earlier ambiguity. (N.Y. Bus.
Coap. LAW § 509 (a)).
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The second reason is the simple fact that the philosophy,
i. e., what the statute intends to do, must first be determined,
before the means adequate to achieve it can be found. To
take the earlier example, there is not much use in criticizing
the wording of a provision making "litter-bugging" a capital
offense where the critic disagrees with the whole idea of
such a severe punishment for the mere discarding of an old
candy-wrapper.
The primary concentration, therefore, in the bird's-eye
view and the three principal topics, will be on the wisdom
of the ends sought to be achieved rather than on the defects
in the language used to express that intent.
BIRD's-EYE VIE W OF THE NEW LAW
The first striking feature of the new law is its retention
of a large portion of previous law, albeit in a rearranged
and somewhat simplified form. This is in sharp contrast
with the revisions of many other states whose enactments
have been almost completely a repudiation of previous law,
and an uncritical swallowing of the overenthusiastic claims
of its drafters in favor of the so-called "Model Business
Corporation Act." 36
Of the fourteen American jurisdictions which have
revised their statutes since 1950, 7 ten have wholly, or
almost completely, succumbed to the seductions of that
38
overly-touted statutory paradigm.
The Model Act has, with good justification, been criticized as unfair to the public, and to the shareholders of
the corporation. 3 9 Fortunately, New York has not been

36 See Harris, The Model Butsness Corporation Act-Invtation to Irre-

sponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 1 (1955); Kessler, Share Repurchases
Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 637, 639 (1960).
37 See Kessler, supra note 36, at 639 n.6.
3' See Kessler, supra note 36, at 640 n.12. Colorado and Iowa should

be added to the eight states mentioned therein.

CoLo. REV. STAT. ch.

31

(Supp. 1960); IOWA CoDE ANw. §496 (Supp. 1960).
39 See Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia Stock Corpora-

tion Law and the Model Act, 42 VA. L. REV. 489, 532-33 (1956); Emerson
& Latcham, Law and the Future: Corporation Law, 51 Nw. U.L. Rav.

196, 199 (1956); Harris, supra note 36; Kessler, The Statutory Require-
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beguiled by the passion to "modernize"

11

into completely

casting aside the many worthwhile features of present New
York law, and "buying" the Model Act in its entirety.
A notable example of the retention of a desirable feature
of present New York law is the continuance of the liberal
appraisal rights given to shareholders who dissent from
proposed corporate actions. New York presently accords
a shareholder the right to demand payment for his shares
in six situations, 40 while the Model Act allows it in only
three of these; merger, consolidation and sale of assets not

in the usual course of business. 41 Although the new law
yields the right in the case of dissenters from employee
stock option plans, 42 it does retain the appraisal right
not only in the three Model Act (and old New York) 4
situations but also in the case of a dissent from a dissolution
sale and in the very important area of amendments to
the certificate of incorporation which adversely affect the
rights of shareholders. 44 One of the most unfair features
of the Model Act is the ease with which the par value

of shares may be cut,45 and even the preferred shareholder's

right to cumulative dividends already accrued be taken
merit of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. Cmi. L.
REV.0 696 (1960); Kessler, mipra note 36, at 644.
4 N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAw § 14 (Issue of stock to employees); N.Y.
STOCK COP. LAW § 20 (Voluntary sale of franchise and property and rights
of objecting stockholders); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §38(11) (Amendments affecting certain shareholder rights); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §85
(Merger); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §§86, 87, 91 (Consolidations); N.Y.
STOCK CORP. LAW § 105(9) (Dissolution sale).
4.MODEL
BUSINESS CoRPORATION ACT ANN. §§ 73-74 (1960).
42
N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 12, at 27 (Rev. Supp.), Comment to §505.
" Appraisal is not available: (1) to shareholders of the parent corporation merging with its 95% owned subsidiary; nor (2) to a stockholder of
any surviving corporation in a merger, unless the terms of the merger
alter or abolish a preferential right of his shares, change their redemption
rights, alter or abolish their pre-emptive rights, or exclude or limit their
voting rights; nor (3) on a shareholder-approved sale or other disposition
of assets wholly for cash, where the plan calls for distribution of the
proceeds of the transaction within a year and dissolution of the corporation.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910. The only innovation is with regard to the
cash sale. See N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW §§85(7), 87, 91(7) already imposing
the limitations found in (1) and (2) above. With regard to the cash sale
the Business Corporation Law follows
ANN.

§73(b) (1960).

44N.y. Bus. CORP.
BusiNEss

45 MODEL

LAw §§ 623,
CORPORATION

MODFL

BusiNEss CORPORATiON

806(b)(6), 910.
ACT ANN. §§ 53(e), 54(c) (1960).

AcT
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away from him through a two-thirds vote of the shareholders. 46 Since the new New York statute even outdoes
the Model Act by allowing these changes by mere majority
vote,4 7 the least that the affected shareholders deserve is
the right to be bought out if they so choose. Fortunately,
the new New York statute continues this right, while the
slavish followers of the Model Act give the minority shareholder no choice but to submit to whatever depredations his
fellow shareholders decide to inflict upon him. Thus in
a very important area, protection of shareholder appraisal
rights, the new statute has by and large retained the
advantages of present New York law, already the most
48
liberal in the country in this regard.
On the other hand, the revision has incorporated a
number of the worthwhile innovations of the Model Act,
and a few others that are improvements over both that
act and previous New York law.
One of these pleasant innovations borrowed from the
Model Act is the provision for reservation of a name prior
to incorporation. 4 9 Every practitioner has probably experienced the unpleasant discovery that the name chosen
by his clients has already been pre-empted by some other
corporation. Many others have had to face the even more
frustrating experience of being informed that a name which
was originally permissible has, in the interim between receiving the letter from the Secretary of State and the
actual drafting and mailing of the certificate, been snatched
46

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANN. §§53(k), 54(c)
(1960).
See Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28
FORDHAm L. REV. 637, 664 n.89 (1960).
Fortunately, approval of the class
affected is required. MODEL BusiNESS CORPORATION ACT ANN. §55(b) and
(j) (1960).
47 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§801(b)(12), 803(a).
4SAn unfortunate innovation in which the new Business Corporation
Law is more radical than the Model Act without the consequently necessary
appraisal right is in the field of reduction of the stated capital of no-par
shares. Under N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §516(a) such reduction may be
accomplished by mere directorial approval. Both MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRATION ACT ANN. §63 (1960) and the Study Bill, S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316,
§5.20(a) (1960), required the greater shareholder safeguard of majority
shareholder
approval.
49
MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. LAW § 303.

CORPORATION

ACT

ANN.

§8

(1960);

N.Y. Bus.
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by some other lawyer for his corporation which has managed
to file first. The Reserved Name provision is simply designed
to assure that a name once available will remain available
for the incorporators until the necessary papers can be
drafted and submitted. Certainly no one can disagree
with the philosophy of this section. It is an obvious
improvement over present law.50
Another worthwhile provision borrowed from the Model
Act is the new section on the defense of ultra vires.5 1 In
general, it removes the availability of the defense in all
contract actions except where the contract is still at least
partly executory, and, even then, only where the court
deems it equitable to allow it and under such conditions
as are equitable. The statute, properly, on the other
hand, allows the use of ultra vires as a sword where the
action is brought by the Attorney General to dissolve a
corporation for acting beyond its proper purposes, and
in actions brought against directors and officers for loss
or damage done to the corporation through their improper
acts. This is largely a codification of present New York
case law. However, it should avoid the further proliferation
of that already extensive case law.52 The statute should
finally lay to rest the ill-conceived doctrine which has been
used (fortunately in recent years, unsuccessfully) primarily
by persons seeking to avoid their just obligations under
otherwise legal contracts.
The Model Act makes a "registered agent" for the
service of process mandatory for both domestic and foreign
corporations licensed to do business in the state, and
allows service on the Secretary of State only where service
cannot be made on the designated agent.5 3 This probably
O0 The statutory language might, however, be better. The section conditions renewability of the reservation on "good cause shown by affidavit."
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 303(c). It might be wiser to allow free renewability, and to credit the cost of reservation on the filing fee for the
certificate.
51
'MODEL BusINmsS CowoRAPioN AcT ANN. §6 (1960); N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAW § 203.
52 See the extensive annotation in McKinney's N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 13.
53
MoDEL Busm-Ess CoPPORATi N AcT ANN. §§ 11, 13 (as to domestic
corporations), §§ 106, 108 (as to foreign corporations) (1960).
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represents the majority rule in the country. Although New
York has retained its requirement that the Secretary of
State be designated as an agent for service of process for
all corporations qualified to do business in the state, and
allows the plaintiff to make effective service upon him
whether or not another agent is available, 54 it has, in the
new law, allowed a corporation to designate an alternate
agent, if it so chooses, who will be empowered to receive
process if the plaintiff chooses to serve him instead of the
Secretary."
Such a provision is, although a departure
from present law, ironically, a return to the older New
York practice, 56 in addition to being a partial recognition
of the Model-Act's theory of the importance of the availability
of a local agent.
Corporate law provisions regarding agents for service
of process must have two aims: likelihood of prompt notice
of suit to the corporation, and convenience in securing
jurisdiction to the plaintiff who has a meritorious claim.
Since the likelihood of speedy notice is great where the
agent's continued employment depends on the efficiency of
his service, there can be no objection to having such an
alternate agent from the corporation's point of view. Since
it is also obviously to the plaintiff's advantage to have as
many ascertainable agents capable of receiving service as
possible, the provision represents a clear improvement over
present law, where as a practical matter the plaintiff can
ordinarily make service only on the Secretary of State in
57
Albany.
54N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§304, 306(b).
55 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 305.
56 See N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §213; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. Acr § 229(2).
57 The new statute might be improved, however, by allowing service on
the Secretary of State by certified mail or ;t one of his (presently her)
local offices. See N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 253 (This even allows
service by mail on the Secretary of State as "attorney" for the non-resident
driver.)
There are, of course, other persons upon whom service is permitted. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 228(8) as to domestic, and N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
Acr §229(1) as to foreign corporations.
However, because New York
does not require "Annual Reports" of its officers and directors (Compare
MODEL

BUSINESS

CORPORATION

AcT

ANN.

§ 118 (1960)),

the names and

whereabouts of these potential recipients of process are ordinarily not kno vn
to the plaintiff. The new law will aid plaintiffs in this regard, too. N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 718 provides:
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Also, following the Model Act, the new statute omits
all requirements for directors except that they be over
twenty-one.5 8 Although local law professors may thus be
deprived of a few trick questions on examinations, the change
seems a decided improvement over the present law, the
only effect of which was to create a trap for the unwary.
A further simplification, also based on the Model Act,
is the blanket permission granted to corporations to hold
their shareholders' meetings wherever they choose.5

9

Not

too long ago New York required that all domestic corporations hold these meetings within the state.60
The
present permission, granted only to corporations with over
five hundred shareholders, a majority of whom live out

of state,
York in
purpose
York.6 1

to hold no more than three meetings outside New
every five year period, seems designed for no
other than to discourage incorporation in New
The new provision is a clear improvement.

A number of other examples could be given.

However,

these should be sufficient to demonstrate that the revisers
have replaced a. lot of the New York "dead wood"

-ith

"If a shareholder or creditor of a corporation, in person or by his
attorney or agent, or a representative of the secretary of state, the attorney-

general, or other state official makes a written demand on a corporation to

inspect a current list of its directors and officers and their residence addresses, the corporation shall, within two business days after receipt of the
demand and for a period of one week thereafter, make the list available
for such inspection at its office during usual business hours."
The maximization of the number of responsible agents for service of
process is a desideratum for plaintiffs, since, as is often the case, one of
these agents will be locally available and thus less costly to serve. It is
also an advantage to the corporation to have agents of its own choosing
as the recipients of process in actions brought against it, since these persons
will presumably be ones upon whom it can count to give prompt notice.
Directors, officers and registered agents all fulfil these qualifications. Hence,
the new provisions are no disadvantage to a corporation, despite the fact
that 8they are also an advantage to the plaintiff.
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 701. Under present law at least one of the
directors must be a United States citizen residing in New York (N.Y.
GEN. Co"P. LAW §27), and all must be shareholders unless the certificate
otherwise provides (N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 55).
59
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANN. §26 (1960); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §602(a).
60N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW §45, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1942,
ch. 502, prior to amendment by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 141.
62N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §45, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957,
ch. 141.
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those provisions of the Model Act which are an indisputable
improvement over present law.
The new New York statute has also in a number of
instances gone beyond the Model Act in cutting out useless
formality or has surpassed the Model Act in genuine modernity. Four examples should be sufficient to prove the point.
One of such improvements is with regard to service
of process on the Secretary of State against unlicensed
foreign corporations in suits arising out of their transaction of business in New York.6 2 Certainly offended
New York residents should not have to pursue these corporations throughout the country to redress wrongs done
by them. Such a provision is a protection to legitimate
New York business as against fly-by-night out-of-state
competitors.
The Model Act, for reasons which the author has suggested elsewhere can only be magical,6 3 has retained the
requirement of three incorporators.6 4 Even the freshest
law school graduate realizes that incorporators are ordinarily
"dummies," flunkies in the lawyer's office who merely sign
the appropriate papers, people who have no interest in
the corporation and are merely used to satisfy the technical
requirements of outmoded corporation laws. The new statute
which requires only one, 5 as opposed to the previous three
dummy signatures, is a distinct improvement over both the
present law and the equally ridiculous Model Act provision.
Section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act defines a
partnership as "an association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit." Section 2
of the act defines "person" to include "individuals, partnerThus the
ships, corporations, and other associations."
Partnership law contemplates that a corporation may become
a member of a partnership.
62 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
ACT ANN. § 108 (1960).

§307.

Compare MoDEL

BUSINESS

CORPORATION

63 See Kessler,
The Statutory Reqirement of a Board of Directors:
Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. Rv. 696, 712 n.76 (1960).
A Corporate
4
8 MoDEL BUSINESS CoRpORATION ACT ANN. § 47 (1960).
65N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 401. The outmoded citizenship and residence
requirements of N.Y. STcK CoRp. LAW § 5(10) are also removed.
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Yet New York 6 6 and many other states 67 have nonetheless held that in the absence of an authorization in the
corporation law for it to do so, a corporation may not enter
into a partnership. The new statute corrects this defect:
it expressly empowers a corporation to become a partner.6 8
Such a privilege may be especially important in American
investment in underdeveloped areas to the benefit of those
69
countries and our own. For example, Abercrombie v. Davies,
a decision from the highest court of Delaware, a state noted
for its sympathetic treatment of corporations, involved a
syndicate composed of nine oil companies and two individuals
formed to develop an oil concession in the Kuwait-Saudi
Arabian neutral zone. The corporate form was chosen,7 0
probably because of fear that Delaware like most other states
would not allow a partnership composed of corporations, 7 1
although a good number of the stockholders (six) preferred
the advantages of partnership operation, and attempted to
secure a reasonable facsimile of one by their "Agents' Agreement." Their eight "agents," who were also the majority
directors were given voting control of the shares, and were
each to vote as seven of the eight determined, or, in certain
cases, as an arbitrator would decide, both as shareholders
and as directors. The agreement was held void by the
Supreme Court of Delaware.
The result is to discourage cooperative enterprises
entered into by a group of corporations no one of which
would be willing alone to undertake the risk involved in
a large scale international project. Each corporation will
probably want a veto power. If only the corporate form

66 People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E.
834 (1890); Frieda Popkor Corp. v. Stack, 195 Misc. 826, 103 N.Y.S.2d

507 (Sup. Ct. 1950).

67 Central R.R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582
(1869) ; Whittenton Mills v.
Upton, 10 Gray 582 (Mass. 1858); Mallory v. Hanour Oil-Works, 86 Tenn.
598, 8 S.W. 396 (1888); 13 Am. Jua. Corporations §823 (1938); 60

A.L.R.2d 917 (1958).
168N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §202(15).
69 130 A.2d 338 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1957).
70 The name of the combine was: "American Independent Oil Company."
71 See note 67 supra. There is apparently no Delaware case squarely in
point. But the rule that a corporation may not be a partner represents
the majority view. 60 A.L.R2d 917 (1958).
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is possible it can only secure this by representation on the
joint venture corporation's board of directors by obedient
"agents," subservient to the wills of the members of the
corporate combine which has set up the new entity. However, even under the laws of the state which has the best
reputation for realizing the needs of business and acceding
to them, the desired result is impossible. The new provision will correct this defect. It is a third advance over
the Model Act in real modernization, meeting the genuine
needs of business while at the same time protecting the
interests of all other parties involved. 2
The fourth example of superiority of the new law over
the Model Act is the provision regarding interested director
contracts."3 The Model Act has no provision whatsoever
on the subject despite the fact that it is a perennial one
in corporation law. The new New York section validates
a corporation's contracts with one of its own directors, or
another corporation having interlocking directors, under
any one of three circumstances:
(1) where there is disclosure and a disinterested majority approval by the directors
or an executive committee, or, (2) where there is disclosure
and majority shareholder approval, or, (3) even in the
absence of the first two conditions, if the contract is "fair
and reasonable."
In effect, therefore, the new provision
enacts the so-called "liberal" rule 7" not only with regard to
interlocking directors' contracts (present New York law),75
but also with regard to contracts between one of their own
directors and the corporation (not presently New York
law) 16 The general rule which makes all interested directors'
contracts voidable merely because the director participates
in their approval, seems, like the ultra vires doctrine, to

72

See STEvENs,

CORPORATIONS

73N.Y.

CORPORATIONS

182 (1959).

265

(2d ed. 1949).

Compare

LATTIN,

Bus. CORP. LAW § 713.
CORPORATIONS 173-75 (rev. ed. 1946).
7 Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
76 Munson v. Syracuse G. & C. R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
See also Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121
N.E. 378 (1918).
The interested directors provision does, however, have
some defects which will be discussed below under the section entitled Public
Issue Corporations and Shareholders' Rights.
74 BALLANTINE,
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be merely a way to escape just liability when changed
circumstances have rendered a contract no longer as profit-

able as was anticipated.

Where there is no possibility

of imposition, i. e., where there is corporate consent based

on full disclosure, or where the contract is objectively fair
despite the factor of self-dealing, there would seem to be
no justification for giving the corporation a right which

no other contractant enjoys when the bargain is a fair one,
a right to escape liability completely whenever it chooses
to do so. Although, as will be indicated below, the new
section has certain objectionable features, it does clarify
an improvement over both present
the law, and this at least is
7
Act.7
Model
the
law and

77 Other examples of changes which are probably improvements over the
present statute are N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 621, the Voting Trust Provision
which deletes the requirement of present N.Y. STocK CORP. LAW § 50 that
all shareholders must be allowed to join if they wish, an obstacle to the
utilization of the voting trust device in this state; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 706, 716, which spell out and clarify existing case law on the removal
of directors and officers; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §712, which expressly
authorizes executive committees and limits their powers.
Another provision which is a compromise between present law which
provides no method for determining who the current officers and directors
of a corporation are and where they live, and the Model Act, which assures
that such information is available at least yearly, by its requirement for
annual reports (MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION AcT ANN. § 118), is N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 718. See note 57 supra.
Local officers and directors are often more convenient to serve than
the Secretary of State in Albany (and, it will be recalled, even under the
new law a registered agent is not mandatory (N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw
§ 305(a)), and hence often the choice of agents for service of process will
still be the same as under present law) and, thus, who these local recipients
for process are and where they may be found is important to creditors
desiring to sue the corporation as well as to shareholders desiring to sue
the directors themselves. The addition is a good one. Presumably, a court
may enforce the demand, but why does the statute not say so, or penalize
the derelict directors and officers? (N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §719 fails to
impose personal or corporate liability.)
Another feature of interest is the omission of the requirement that
the initial directors be named in the certificate, and that the amount of
stock subscribed for by the incorporators be specified. N.Y. Bus. CORP.
Since the initial directors and incorporators were almost inLAW § 402.
variably dummies, who had no intention of actually investing in the corporation or of acting in its management, the only effect of the old requirement
(N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAw §5) was to cause unnecessary paperwork to
However, since the new
transfer their rights to the real participants.
statute, like present law, and unlike the laws of many other jurisdictions

(see, e.g.,

MODEL

BusINess

CORPORATION

ACT

ANt.

§51, adopted in a

number of jurisdictions) requires no minimum starting capital, and the new
bill does not require any stock subscriptions, it would seem possible under
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All is not bright, however, even in our bird's-eye view
of the new statute. For example, there is a serious question
as to whether the shareholders' right to examine corporate
books and records has not been seriously limited by the new
statutory provisions.1 8 Such a restriction would, to say
the least, be improvident. With the exception of their
right to examine the stock book, or record of shareholders
and their addresses, which is statutory under present law,7 9
the shareholders' right to examine corporate books and
records is regulated by the common law. Under this rule,
shareholders acting in good faith for the purpose of advancing
the interest of the corporation and protecting their rights
as owners have a right to examine the corporate books and
records at reasonable times.8 0 Such a right is essential
to shareholders. As the real owners of the corporation
they are entitled to know how their "stewards," the directors,
are managing its affairs. If the directors are doing a good
job they should be rewarded by re-election. If not, they
should be voted out, or if their derelictions are serious,
forced to account in a shareholders' suit. In either event

the new statute to have a completely "paper" corporation, i.e., one with
no assets at all.
Undoubtedly, in most instances stock subscriptions will be taken. The
new section (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503) requiring written subscriptions
and making preincorporation subscriptions irrevocable for three months is
a good one.
The change from N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 12(1) which made the filing
of the certificate only presumptive evidence of due incorporation into a
conclusive presumption, except in actions by the attorney general, is a
significant improvement based on section 50 of the Model Act, and should
lay to rest the problems of de facto corporations. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW

§ 403.

78 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(b) provides:
"Any person who shall
have been a shareholder of record of a corporation for at least six months
immediately preceding his demand, or any person holding, or thereunto
authorized in writing by the holders of, at least five percent of all its
outstanding shares, upon at least five days' written demand shall have the
right to examine in person or by agent or attorney, during usual business
hours, its minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and record of
shareholders and to make extracts therefrom.
Holders of voting trust
certificates representing shares of the corporation shall be regarded as
shareholders for the purpose of this section .....
" (Emphasis added.)
79 N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 10.
o See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 74, at 376-79; LATTIN, op. Cit.
supra note 72, at 286-87; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 72, at 487-88, and
cases cited therein.
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the stockholder has a right to know, and he cannot unless
he has access to the corporate books. On the other hand,
he should not have access to those books where his purpose
is an improper one, e. g, where his reason is to get
information to give to a competitor for use against the
corporation. 1
Legislatures have long wrestled with the
problem of drafting a statute which will adequately protect
the legitimate interests of shareholders while at the same
time preventing a shareholder from taking advantage of
his one share ownership to destroy the corporation from
which he claims information in behalf of another in which
his real interests lie.
Originally, impelled by a concern to insure adequate
shareholder knowledge, laws were passed purporting to grant
every shareholder an absolute right to examine all corporate
records, regardless of motive.8 2 Such statutes, of course,
could not be applied according to their terms. Courts had
to engraft common law principles in order to prevent corporate espionage. Thus, in the leading case of Slay V.
Polonia Publishing Co.,83 the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that a holder of a single share of stock in the defendant
corporation would not be entitled to see the corporate records,
despite the fact that the statute provided:
The books of every corporation containing its accounts shall
be kept, and shall at all reasonable times be open .
by any of the stockholders of said corporation ....

.

. for inspection
84

where it was established that the plaintiff was in the
employ of a competitor and sought the information merely
to help the competitor employer.8 5
81

This was the situation in Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co., 249 Mich.

609,8 2229

N.W. 434 (1930), discussed below.

See, e.g., in addition to Mich. Pub. Acts 1921, No. 84, Part II, ch. 1,

§ 11, which the court used in the Slay case, Wis. STAT. § 182.10
which was subsequently amended to qualify the right. Sie also
op. cit. spra note 72, at 289.

(1939),
LATriN,

s3249 Mich. 609, 229 N.W. 434 (1930).

"Id. at 611, 229 N.W. at 435.
85 The statute has been changed now to limit the right to inspection.
Micir. Comp. LAWS § 450.45 (1948).
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The new New York statute guarantees a shareholder
of a corporation the right to see the "minutes of the
proceedings of its shareholders" and the "record of shareholders" where the shareholder meets one of two alternative
standards: he may be a shareholder for six months, or
8 6
authorized by five percent of the shareholders.
Any shareholder also has the right, upon written
request, to receive the "most recent balance sheet and
profit and loss statement which have been distributed to
its shareholders or otherwise made available to the public." 87
The statute is significantly different from the Model
Act provision on which it was patterned 88 in omitting all
reference to "books and records of account" when referring
to shareholders' rights of inspection, although such records
are expressly required to be kept, under the first paragraph
of the section, following present law.8 9
The danger is that, although under present law there
is such an obvious omission with regard to inspection of
all other corporate records than the stock book that the
courts can easily conclude that the legislature did not
intend to say anything with regard to such matters, i. e.,
leave the subject to the common law, 90 under the new
statute, the greater specificity may be held impliedly to
exclude a shareholder's rights to any other information
than that actually provided for. The section is probably
not intended to do this, but its difference from present
law might lead courts to deny a shareholder the right
to see the corporate "books and records of account" even
where a proper purpose was shown for such examination. 9 1
8

,N.Y.

Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(b).
2

8 N.Y. Bus. CoRP.

LAW §6 4(e).
There is, however, no enforcement
provision. Furthermore, there is nothing to compel the corporation to
distribute the balance sheet and income statement, initially, and it is only
if it has done so that the shareholder is entitled to receive a copy. In
effect, then, the section merely gives a shareholder the right to secure a
second copy free if he happens to misplace the "annual report" originally
sent to him.
88 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANN. § 46 (1960).
89 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
9

§ 624(a).

See N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 10.

Application of Schnepf, 84 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
91 The court would be aided in this conclusion by the maxim of statutory construction: Expresuan facit cessae tacitun.

Fortunately, however,
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Another defect in the new statute is the carry-over
of the provisions of older law with regard to the mode
of service of process upon the Secretary of State.92 Clearly,
the Secretary of State should be preserved as an alternate
corporate "agent" for service of process, and the plaintiff,
not the corporation, should be allowed to make the election
as to whom he will serve. But there would seem to be
no good reason why the service must be made in Albany,

when the Secretary has local offices in other parts of the
State which are considered adequate to receive personal
service of process in motor vehicle actions."
There would
also seem no good reason to require the additional cost
to litigants of requiring the Secretary to mail the copy
of such process to the corporation by registered mail

94

when

certified mail, return receipt requested, was instituted by
N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw §624(f) adds: "(f) Nothing herein contained shall
impair the power of courts to compel the production for examination of the
books and records of a corporation."
The omission of Study Bill § 6.23(d) is probably also a help in interpreting
the statute as not being designed to foreclose the common law right of
inspection of all corporate hooks and records where a proper purpose is
shown, instead of confining inspection to the shareholder minutes and
record. Study Bill § 6.23(d) provided: "Any shareholder, irrespective
of the period of time during which he shall -have been a shareholder of
record, and irrespective of the number of shares held by him, upon proof of
a proper purpose, shall have the right to examine, in person or by agent or
attorney, such minutes and record of shareholders."
The elimination of this over-specificity may prevent the application of
the maxim. Without an appropriate Comment that the statute is not designed merely to allow inspection when collateral to a lawsuit the danger
always remains, however, that what was probably intended as a concession
to shareholders may be misinterpreted as a denial of their common law
right of inspection. 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 42 (Rev. Supp.), Comment to § 624, is silent on this point.
It has been suggested that legislative denial of the common-law right to
inspection would be unconstitutional. See HoRNsT N, CORPoRATION LAW
AND PRACTICE §611 (1959).
Unfortunately, the leading New York case
on the subject (In the Matter of Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103
(1899)) does not unequivocally support this result. In any event, it is
unwise that a shareholder seeking inspection be compelled to litigate constitutional issues before being accorded what should be a clear statutory
right.
92
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw §306(b).
9sN.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFTc LAw § 253.
94N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §306(b). See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW *§307(b)(2)
with regard to service on unlicensed foreign corporations, and N.Y. Bus.
CoaP. LAw §623(g) requiring the offer to dissenting shareholders to pay
what the corporation considers the fair value of their shares to be sent
by registered mail.
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the Post Office Department for just such types of mail,
and is, therefore, quite adequate and cheaper.
On bird's-eye view the most significant change, however, and one which, to those interested in shareholder
rights, will undoubtedly seem one of the principal defects
in the new law, is the reduction from two-thirds to a bare
majority of shareholders in the requirement for authorization
of certain significant corporate changes.
Thus, under the new statute although such important
corporate actions as mergers,9 5 consolidations 96 and sale of
corporate assets 97 still require the old two-thirds shareholder
approval, in the vital area of certificate amendments which
includes not only the right to change the corporate purpose,
to authorize new stock, and to change the rights of already
outstanding shares, for example, to pre-emptive rights, but
also to reduce the par value of such stock and even to
deprive preferred shareholders of their right to already accrued cumulative dividends, the vote necessary for approval
has been reduced to a mere majority.9 8
Of course, a good argument can be made that a minority
should not be allowed to hold up a "quasi-reorganization"

95 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW

96 Ibid.

§ 903(a)

(2).

97N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909(a) (3) provides: "The shareholders shall
authorize such sale, lease, exchange or other disposition and may fix, or
may authorize the board to fix, any of the terms and conditions thereof and
the consideration to be received by the corporation therefor, which may
consist in whole or in part of cash or other property, real or personal,
including shares, bonds or other securities of any other domestic or foreign
corporation or corporations, by vote at a meeting of shareholders of the
holders of two-thirds of all outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon."
N.Y. STocx CoRP. LAW §20 also required shareholder approval for a
sale (not in the regular course of business) of "an integral part" of the
corporation's property "essential to the conduct of the business of the
corporation."
The new statute's deletion of this provision seems unwise.
On the other hand, the characterization of a sale as including transfers
for securities of another corporation seems to guarantee shareholder appraisal
rights under N.Y. Bus. CoR.P. LAW §910 in a "de facto merger" (see
Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 440, 143 A.2d 25 (1958)), and hence
constitutes a desirable change.
98N.Y. Bus. Coai. LAW §803(a). There would, of course, seem to be
no objection to mere directorial approval, as the new statute also allows,
for such amendments as change of corporate office, addresses to which copies
of process will be mailed by the Secretary of State, and designation or
change of registered agent or his address. N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW §803(b).
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which may be essential to breathe new life into a corporation
which has managed to survive the storms of financial adversity, but cannot attract new funds necessary for growth
because of its inability to pay dividends on new common
investment as a result of an impossibly large burden of
accumulated preferred stock dividend arrearages. The only
question is how big the approving majority must be before
it can be fairly said that the people to be directly harmed
have consented to the deprivation of present rights in the
hope of future gain. The more appropriate analogy, if,
as is often the case in such matters, a comparison is made
between corporate and political affairs,99 would seem to be
that of the vote necessary to override a presidential veto,
or to propose a constitutional amendment by Congress.
Significant legislation in our country requires a two-thirds
approval.
There would seem no good reason why a
significant corporate amendment should require less.
An even more radical departure 100 from present law,
and one which seems even less justified is the change with
regard to corporate mortgages. The old requirement of twothirds shareholder approval is not merely dropped to a
majority. It is, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, reduced to none. The powers section
provides:
Each corporation, subject to any limitations provided in this
chapter or any other statute of this state or its certificate of incorporation, shall have power in furtherance of its corporate
purposes:

09See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors.
A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 696, 701-02 (1960).
100The Study Bill §9.08 provided: "The directors may authorize any
mortgage, deed of trust, pledge, hypothecation or other encumbrance of all
or any part of the corporate property, real, personal or mixed. Unless the
certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, no vote or consent of shareholders shall be required to authorize such action by the directors."

The

Comment to this section (1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, at 59 (Supp.))
conceded, as does the revised Comment to the enacted section (N.Y. Bus.
Coap.

LAw

1961 N.Y.

§ 911) that:
LEG.

"This section departs radically from existing law."

Do=. No. 12, at 62 (Rev. Supp.).
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(5)
To sell, convey, lease, exchange, transfer or otherwise
dispose of, or mortgage or pledge, all or any of its property, or
any interest therein, wherever situated. 01
The new law, unlike the bill as introduced, goes on
to make it clear that no shareholder consent will be required
no matter what type of mortgage 102 and no matter w'hat
assets are thus pledged, unless the incorporators are wise
enough to put a contrary provision in the certificate. Section
911 of the Business Corporation Law provides:
The board may authorize any mortgage or pledge of all or any
part of the assets of a corporation. Unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, no vote or consent of shareholders
shall be required to authorize such action by the board.
Every layman knows that if he fails to abide by the
conditions of his mortgage the mortgagee can take away
his property. As far as practical effect on the corporation
and its shareholders is concerned, therefore, the effect of
a mortgage may be quite as significant as an outright sale
of the property: the corporation may well lose its only
productive asset. The safeguards should, therefore, be the
same: a percentage of shareholders significant enough in
numbers to evidence the real will of the corporation should
be required. A reduction in this percentage to a bare
majority is perhaps arguable, a reduction to none is
0 3
indefensible.
So much for our bird's-eye view. Although there are
many other features of the new statute, both good and bad,
that might be commented upon, the three major aspects
of any corporation statute must now be dealt with. The
first of these is, of course, its financial provisions.
101 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §202(a) (5).
102 Present law distinguishes between purchase money and other mortgages,

requiring two-thirds stockholder consent for the latter.
LAW § 16.
103Undoubtedly,

N.Y.

STOCK

CORP.

also, no appraisal rights are intended to attach, since
there can be no dissenting shareholders where no shareholder vote is required. It is ironic that a mere lease of all or substantially all of the
corporate assets requires two-thirds shareholder approval (N.Y. Bus. CoRP,.
LAw § 909), and gives appraisal rights (N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a) (2)),
while a mortgage does not.

1961]

N. Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
Tia

27

FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 0o'THE NEW LAW

Although the financial provisions of the act are set
forth in Article 5,104 the terms used in those sections are
defined in Article 1.105 Any understanding of Article 5
therefore requires an understanding of its new terminology
from the Definitions Article.
Article 1 brings a number of new concepts into New
York law. Although there are some modifications which
apparently were felt necessary for greater clarity, this article
is basically an introduction into New York law of the
concepts of the A.B.A. Model Act.10 6 These concepts, as
they bear on corporate finance, are an attempt to engraft
accepted accounting principles on corporation law, 10 7 and
although they have been criticized, 10 8 are still a definite
improvement over present New York law.10 9
The terms "capital," "legal capital," and "capital stock"
have long proved ambiguous terms in the corporation laws
'"4N.Y.
Bus. Coap. LA w § 501-20.
05
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 102.
1 o6See MoDEL BUSINESS CopoRAnroN AcT ANN. §2 (1960); 1961 N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 12 (Rev. Supp.), Comments to §102(a)(2)" (defining
Capital Surplus), § 102(a) (6) (defining Earned Surplus), § 102(a) (8)
(defining Insolvent), § 102(a) (9) (defining Net Assets), § 102(a) (12)
(defining Stated Capital), § 102(a)(14) (defining Treasury Shares). In all
the Reviser acknowledges his debt to the Model Act.
107 See Preface to 1950 Revision, MoDEL BusiNEss CORPORATION Acr
(rev. 1953), at vii.
108 Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Buwiness Corporation
Act, 70 HAav. L. REv. 1357, 1393-99 (1957). Hackney considers the Model
Act Financial Provisions in certain respects overly restrictive. For reasons
expressed elsewhere, the author disagrees (Kessler, Share Repurchases Under
Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 637, 651-60 (1960)). If,
as Hackney claims (70 HARv. L. REv. at 1398) the Model Act is ambiguous
with regard to whether the corporation must first exhaust its surplus before
utilizing capital for the "extraordinary" share repurchases permitted under
that act (MoDEL BusINFss CORPoRAmTiO ACT ANN. §5 (1960)) and now
under the New York statute (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §513), at least the
New York law seems to make it clear that the exhaustion of corporate
surplus is not required before resort is had to capital (N.Y. Bus CRP. LAw
§513(b)). Even so the statute could be clearer, as was the bill as originally introduced (S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, §5.14(a) (1961)), and the rule
sounder, i.e., that earned surplus would have to be exhausted first, as was
also the case under the bill as introduced.
109These concepts are even more of an improvement over sud inherently
ambiguous provisions as those found in New Jersey. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. §14:8-19 (1939); Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73
N.J. Eq. 692, 69 Alt. 1014 (1908); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 582-84
(rev. ed. 1946).
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of the country. 110 The present New York provision is
fortunately one of the clearer ones in the nation. 1 1 Even
so, the Model Act definition of "stated capital" seems an
improvement if for no other reason than that it thereby
distinguishes the legal term "capital" from its financial
counterpart.
"Stated capital" is defined in the new New York statuie
as follows:
"Stated capital" neans the sum of (A) the par value of all
shares with par value that have been issued, (B) the amount of
the consideration received for all shares without par value that
have been issued, except such part of the consideration therefor
as may have been allocated to capital surplus in a manner permitted by law, and (C) such amounts not included in clauses
(A) and (B) as have been transferred to stated capital, whether
upon the distribution of shares or otherwise, minus all reductions
from such sums as have been effected in a manner permitted by
law.112

The definitions also make it clear that once this sum
is subtracted from the "net assets" (total assets less liabilities),113 the result is "surplus." 114
This is, of course, a codification of the present New
York law for determining the availability of a dividend
source, i. e., it is a clarification of New York's balance sheet
test. 11
Surplus is, however, broken down by the new statute
into two separate types, "earned" and "capital" surplus.
Generally, the "earned surplus" consists of the balance remaining from the totals of all the income statements of the
110See BALLANTINE,
rioNs

op. cit. supra note 109, at 588-89;

LATTIN, CORPORA-

469-72 (1959).

"'N.Y. STocx

CoRP. LAW § 13.
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 102(12).

112 N.Y.
The provision is almost identical to
that of MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr ANN. § 2(j) (1960).
113 "'Net assets' means the amount by which the total assets exceed the
total liabilities. Stated capital and surplus are not liabilities." N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 102(a) (9).
114 " 'Surplus' means the excess of net assets over stated capital." N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(13).
115 BA.KER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 974 (3d ed. 1959); LATTIN,
op. cit. supra note 110, at 469.
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corporation after such deductions as dividend payments
and losses have been made, from the beginning of the
corporation, i. e., its, accumulated and undistributed net
capital surplus is every other type
profits.1 18 Generally,
117
of surplus.
The distinction is a new one to New York law, which,
despite the fact that most of the corporation laws of the
country, 118 proper accounting practice," 9 and the SEC, for
corporations under its supervision, 120 require it, has never
segregated surplus into that which was the result of the
profitable operations of the corporation and that which was
a mere "paper" surplus created basically only by manipulation of the balance sheet.' 2 ' The new distinction is an
important one: the existence of an earned surplus is a sign
of corporate health, but a capital surplus, where there is
no earned surplus, 22 is usually a sign of corporate chicanery,
116 "'Earned surplus' means the portion of the surplus that represents the
net earnings, gains or profits, after deduction of all losses, that have not
been distributed to the shareholders as dividends, or transferred to stated
capital or capital surplus, or applied to other purposes permitted by law.
Unrealized appreciation of assets shall not be included in earned surplus."
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(6).
117 "'Capital
surplus' means the surplus other than earned surplus."
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(2).
I's See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-356 (1960); N.J. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14:8-19, 8-20 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50 (1960); S.C. CODE
§ 12-201 (1952); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.38 (1957). Often an alternative
source is also provided.
.19See A.I.A. ACcOUNTING REsEARCH Buu.. No. 39 (1949), which places
such importance on the distinction that it recommends discontinuance of the
term surplus altogether as tending to confuse what is really the shareholder's contribution with corporate earnings, the only genuine surplus.
120 SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-03 (1949).
121 See as to the confusion permitted and its disastrous effects, Randall
v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), af'd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d
43 (1942).
122 Capital surplus may result from sound financial policy (such as is
required by the New York Stock Exchange for listed companies, N. Y.
STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL at A-235) where a stock dividend is declared,
and the full market value of the share issued is transferred from earned
surplus. Where the market value is above the par value of the share the
balance of the transfer over par becomes capital surplus, since only par
need become part of stated capital. Such a capital surplus may thus be a
sign of corporate prosperity. Where there is a capital surplus and no
earned surplus, except perhaps in this situation (although even here it is
unlikely that a corporation would ever completely exhaust its earned surplus
for a stock dividend), a capital surplus is no true sign of corporate health,
hut rather is probably an indication of corporate manipulation to deceive
unwary shareholders. The Study Bill attempted to legislate the sound ac-
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an attempt to convince the public that a sick corporation is

healthy.

In short, where no distinction is made between

the two types of surplus the result is often a simple but
legal fraud on shareholders and creditors, through a mis-

leading appearance of prosperity.

Requiring a corporation

to distinguish between the two types of surplus is, therefore,

an advance toward full disclosure of the corporation's real
financial condition.
Surplus is, of course, not only important for the impression

of corporate prosperity which it creates but for the control
which it exerts over corporate distribution of assets. These
distributions take two principle forms:

dividends and re-

purchases of its own shares by the corporation.
Under present law both forms of distribution may be
made out of any kind of surplus. 1 23

Thus, not only may

corporate profits be used for dividends, but even a mere
paper surplus created by a writeup of the corporation's
fixed assets is available for such a purpose. 1 24 Whatever
may be used for dividend payments is also available for
share repurchases. In addition, under present law share
repurchases may be made under two circumstances even where
no surplus whatsoever exists, namely to pay the appraisal
rights of dissenting shareholders, 12 5 and to redeem redeemable
1 26
shares.

counting rule embodied in the Stock Exchange regulation by forbidding the
use of the term "stock dividend" or "share dividend" to describe a stock
distribution unless an amount equal to the fair value of the shares issued
was transferred from earned surplus to stated capital and capital surplus.
S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316, § 5.12(a) (5) (1960). Such a requirement is necessary
to prevent a corporation from giving the deceptive name of stock dividend
to a distribution which is, in reality, partially a stock split because the pro
rata share of assets of each share of stock is lessened. This is certainly a
de facto stock slit if not one in the technical sense. Cf. JOINT REPORT
OF NEW YORK STATE

BAR

AssocAToN, CoMMirEE ON CORoArATON LAW,

AND THE AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE
ON CORPORATE LAW ON PROPOSED NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
14 (1961).
The provision was unfortunately dropped from the law as
enacted.
123 See N.Y. PEN. LAw § 664(1),(5), which draw no distinction between
the two types of surplus. See also Randall v. Bailey, supra note 121.
124 Randall v. Bailey, supra note 121.
125 N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 21.
126 N.Y. STocK CORP. LAW §28.
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The new statute adds two other situations, in addition

to those presently available, under which a corporation may
purchase its own shares even where no surplus whatsoever

exists. They are: to eliminate fractional shares 121 and to
compromise an indebtedness to the corporation. 128 In this
the new law follows the Model Act.12 9
The provision with regard to retirement of fractional
shares is a concomitant to the express authorization for their
issuance, a complete turnabout in New York law, which in the
absence of any statutory authorization had by case law determined that such fractional shares were illegal.13 0 As the
author has argued elsewhere, 31 there is really no good reason
for the issuance of such fractional shares. For all legitimate
purposes scrip will be an adequate substitute where fractional
shares would otherwise be indicated. Furthermore, unless
the statute is corrected, there is a danger that a corporation
may issue all of its stock in fractional shares and thus be
at liberty to repurchase all it

chooses, despite the fact

32
that no surplus, not even a paper one exists.
The provision for accepting stock in compromise of
indebtedness to the corporation is not so dangerous even

' 2 N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAW § 513 (b) (1).
228 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 513(b) (2).
129 MoDEL BUSINESS CoRPoRAioN Acr ANN. § 5 (1960).
130

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 195 Misc. 220, 91 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup. Ct. 1949).

131 Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FoRDHAMf L. REv. 637, 659-60 (1960).
"A corporation may
132 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §513(b)(1) provides:

purchase its own shares, or redeem its redeemable shares, out of stated
capital except when currently the corporation is insolvent or would thereby
be made insolvent, if the purchase is made for the purpose of: (1) Eliminating fractions of shares; . . ." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 509(a) provides:
"A corporation may, but shall not be obliged to, issue certificates for fractions of shares which shall entitle the holder, in proportion to his fractional
holdings, to exercise voting rights, receive dividends and participate in
liquidating distributions." Thus, there seems no prohibition against a corporation's issuing all of its shares as fractional shares (e.g., instead of a
certificate for 5 shares, one would be issued for 20/4 shares). The corporation could then repurchase these shares from stated capital, a disastrous
result for both shareholders and creditors, and a complete circumvention of
the limit on share repurchases, except in "extraordinary" situations, to
surplus. The bill as introduced (S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, § 5.09) attempted to
prevent this, albeit not as clearly as is desirable, by limiting issuance of
fractional shares to the corporation's shareholders, i.e., persons already
shareholders, thus precluding an initial issue of such fractional shares. The
limitation has been deleted.
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though it works a technical impairment of capital. However,
133
the phraseology of the section may give rise to abuses.
In any event, the stated capital of the corporation is
designed to assure that there will be financial capital 134 around
for the benefit of creditors and shareholders, and therefore,
anything which allows corporate distributions below the level
of stated capital is to be viewed with suspicion.
If the new law has shown a retrogressive attitude with
regard to distributions directly from stated capital, it has
on the other hand made one small advance over present
law in regard to distributions from surplus. The bill does
not go as far as the Model Act which restricts ordinary
13 5
It permits any dividend 136
dividends to earned surplus.
and ordinary share repurchases' 3 7 to be made from any
type of surplus, but it does require that where a dividend
is paid from other than earned surplus written notice must
This change
be given to the shareholder of the fact.1 3
represents an improvement over present law which permits

dividends to be paid to a shareholder out of what may well
Kessler, supra note 131, at 656-58.
Whence, probably, the confusion in terms.
13 MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION ACr ANN. §40(a) (1960).
But see
MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRAToN Acr ANN. §41 (1960).
136 An exception is also made for "wasting assets" corporations, expressly
allowing ordinary dividends out of stated capital. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 510(a) (1).
1"7N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §513(a).
133

134

1asN.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW

§510(a)(2).

The statute extends the notice

requirement to a number of other financial transactions in addition. Notice
of the effect on stated capital and earned and capital surplus of share redistributions and reclassifications must also be given (N.Y. Bus. CoaP. LAW
§511(f)), of the amount of stated capital reduction on the cancellation of
reacquired shares (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §515(d)), of a reduction of
stated capital where accomplished by board action (N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§516(c)-which may be done with regard to no-par stated capital, and
amounts transferred from surplus to stated capital), of the elimination of
an earned surplus deficit by transfer of capital surplus (N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 517(a) (4)-fortunately, such a creation of a spurious "earned surplus" requires shareholder approval), and of the effect of a share conversion
on stated capital (N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 519(f)). Liability is imposed for
failure of the corporation to comply in good faith with these requirements
"for any damage sustained by any shareholder in consequence thereof."
(N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 520.) This "penalty" is defective for two reasons:
(1) the innocent corporation rather than the wrongdoing directors is held
responsible, and (2) the shareholder will ordinarily be unable to prove any
actual damages and will hence be remediless. A fixed penalty might be
more likely to coerce the directors into doing their duty.
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be part of his investment contribution to the corporation,
since capital surplus is ordinarily merely diverted capital,
without warning him that what he thinks is profit is merely
a hoaxer's trick of putting money which has been taken from
one of his victim's pockets into another pocket of the same
victim.
However, the statute imposes no corresponding obligation where the distribution from other than earned surplus
takes the form of share repurchases. Such notice is perhaps
not so important for the person being bought out (since if
all of his shares are repurchased he no longer has any interest
in the good financial management of the corporation). It
is, however, important that the other shareholders know
how their money is being spent. For simplicity of draftsmanship a notice to all shareholders should be required when
any shares are repurchased, and especially if other than
earned surplus is used. 139 Even this would be insufficient
to give full shareholder protection. Certainly, in view of
139

This defect is noted in the JOINT REPORT oF NEw YORK STATE BAR
AssocrATiON, CommiIrE ON CORPORATION LAW AND THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMIrrnx ON CORPORATE LAW
oN PROPosED NEW YoRK BusirNss CORPORATION LAW 16-17 (1961).

The Report, however, objects to the disclosure requirements entirely. Id.
at 13, 15, 17. The Bar Committees feel that: "Publicly held corporations
are already adequately regulated by stock exchange and S.E.C. rules, and
the supposed advantages of the disclosure requirement are largely inapplicable
to small and closely held corporations." Id. at 13. This criticism seems
inapposite for three reasons: (1) Although the New York Stock Exchange
requires all corporations to sblicit proxies, and hence bring themselves under
the S.E.C. proxy rules (N. Y. SToCK EXCHANGE MANUAL at A-134, as
amended April 3, 1959), not all public issue corporations are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange; (2) Corporations which do not solicit proxies
are not required to furnish an annual report under the federal law, even
though they are "public issue" corporations listed on a stock exchange
(LAmN, CORPORATIONS 313 (1959)), and no such annual report is required
from public issue corporations even though they solicit proxies as long
as they are not listed on an exchange. Thus under federal law corporations
whose shares are traded on the over-the-counter markets need furnish no
financial report to their shareholders even though they solicit proxies (BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 416 n.71 (rev. ed. 1946); therefore, even many
public issue corporations are not required to make the advisable disclosure;
(3) The real reason why the disclosure requirements are "largely inapplicable
to small and closely held corporations" can only be because they are less
likely to indulge in improvident dividends and share repurchases, since less
apt to be familiar with the intricacies of the corporation law. Where close
corporations do resort to such dividends and share repurchases from other
than corporate earnings their shareholders would seem as entitled to notice
of that fact as are the shareholders of any other corporation.
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the grave dangers inherent in allowing a corporation to
repurchase its own shares, 140 the shareholders have a right
to expect at least such disclosure.
Unfortunately, even in the situations where notice is
required, the enforcement provision is so drafted as to be an
1
invitation to non-compliance.

14

The bill as originally introduced also forbade share repurchases by a corporation which "would .

.

. reduce its net

assets below the aggregate amounts payable to the holders
of shares having prior or equal preferential rights upon
involuntary liquidation." 142
This change would have been a distinct improvement
over present New York law, which, by its silence, allows a
corporation to buy up junior stock even though this means
that there will not be enough surplus left to discharge the
liquidation preferences of superior issues. It can be argued
that such a provision is not absolutely essential where the
senior shares are par value shares, since their liquidation
preference will rarely be much more than par,143 and hence
the general rule against share repurchases (other than the
extraordinary ones which are not covered by this section
anyhow) out of stated capital will prevent purchases of
junior shares which seriously impair their involuntary liquidation preferences.14 4 However, the provision would still
seem advisable, since there is nothing to prevent a corporation from issuing par value shares with a significantly higher
liquidation preference than par, and, in any event, some
guarantee should be afforded that the full liquidation preference will be on hand for the benefit of the shareholders to
whom the corporation has promised it.
See generally Kessler, supra note 131.
See note 138 supra.
A. Int. 885, Pr. 885, § 5.13 (1961).
14s See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947),
in which the par value of the preferred stock was $100, and both the
voluntary and involuntary liquidation preference was $105 per share.
144 "Surplus," it will be recalled, is "the excess of the net assets over
"Stated capital" is
stated capital." N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 102(a)(13).
the sum of the par value of all issued par shares. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW § 102(a)(12).
Thus there can be no share repurchase out of surplus
which does Pot leave the par value of all shares intact.
140
141
142
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Where, on the other hand, the senior shares were nopar, the omission was a significant one under the old law,
since the stated capital of such shares could have been much
less than their liquidation preference. 45 Fortunately, under
the new law only that part of the consideration in excess of
the liquidation preference may be allocated to surplus where
the shares have a "preference in the assets of the corporation." 146 Oddly enough, from having almost no protection,
senior no-par shares have now become favored over par
preference shares, since the latter do not necessarily have
their full liquidation preference protected while the former
now do. In order to make a corporation keep its word
when it gives a liquidation preference the new statute should
have added a provision forbidding share repurchases and
dividends impairing the liquidation preferences of all shares
to which it grants such preferences. The act as passed,
however, omits this wise safeguard of shareholder rights.
The new law -with regard to surplus distributions is
better than the old law. The only criticism is that it doesn't
go far enough. Although such a provision might scare
off a few unscrupulous corporations from incorporating in
New York, full shareholder protection would seem to demand
a limitation on distributions to earned surplus alone.
This seems especially true since under the new law it is
even easier to create a paper surplus than it is under
present law.
Under present law and the new statute surplus may be
created in a number of ways. The only real surplus, of
course, is the accumulated result of the corporation's successful operations. This "earned" surplus is the result of good
business and, obviously may be created under any law.
There are, however, many other forms of surplus. For
example, a "no-par surplus" may be created, where the
145 Under N.Y. SToCK CoP. LAW § 12(4) (A) even preferred stock could
be sold for $100, and have a liquidation preference of $105, but a capital of
only $1. The new statute requires that the amount of stated capital at least
equal the liquidation preference. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 506(b). This is
another improvement.
146N.Y. Bus. Coiu. LAW §506(b).
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corporation chooses, by sale of no-par stock at a higher
price than the amount allocated to "capital" for each share.
Under present law, at least one dollar must become capital
where the corporation seeks to take advantage of this artificial surplus builder, and its election to resort to this
manner of spurious-surplus creation must be noticed in the
certificate of incorporation. 1 47 Under the new statute, however, not even a dollar of the consideration received need
be allocated to capital, 148 and the decision of the exact
amount is left to the directors. 149 The only restriction is
that the liquidation preference of no-par preferred stock be
preserved.' 5" Thus, under the new statute, as opposed to
the old law, a common stock may, e. g., sell for $100, although
only 10 is allocated to capital, and the rest, $99.99, becomes,
in the sole discretion of the directors, surplus.
Under the present law "revaluation surplus" is another
form of paper surplus which is possible.1 5' Whenever the
asset side of a balance sheet goes up the liability side must
also go up, since perhaps unfortunately, by definition, a
balance sheet must always balance. Surplus is the "accordian" factor on the liability side. Where economic inflation justifies a higher evaluation of the corporate assets
an appropriate correction may be made in the dollar "value"
at which these assets are carried. Although often criticized,152
147 See N.Y. STocK CoaP. LAW §§5(3), 12(4) (A).
The present New
York no-par provisions are unique, but not in allowing a spurious "paid-in"
surplus. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE AN. tit. 8, §§ 153(a), 154 (1953).
148N.Y. Bus. CORp. LAw §506(b). However, there is an exception where
no-par preference shares are involved.
149Ibid. Even in England, where no-par is not permitted, Gower notes
a corporation which has a par value of only 1/4d. per share, and a total
capital of only 1/2d. Gower, The English Private Company, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROn. 535, 545 (1953). There is nothing to prevent such grossly
"thin capitalization" under the proposed no-par provision where no-par common is involved even though the shareholders' cash investment may be quite
significant; thus a gross deception may be practiced on shareholders and
creditors alike under the new law.
150 See note 145 srupra.
151 Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd mern., 262
App. Div. 844 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942).
1s5 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 541 (rev. ed. 1946); LATmN, CoapoRATioNS 477 (1959) ; STEvENS, CORPORATIONS 451 (2d ed. 1949).
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this unsound accounting practice which originated in158case
law is apparently still possible under the new statute.
Paper surplus may also be created by the method of
reacquiring shares at less than the capital allocated to them,
or at least the surplus may be left unimpaired despite expenditure of corporate cash to reacquire such shares, where
they are retired at no more than the capital allocated to
them. 15 4 The new law continues this Medusa.
The final means for creating a spurious surplus is by
capital reduction. The "capital" of a corporation under
is the sum of the par values of its issued
present law 5'
par shares plus the aggregate consideration received for its
no-par shares, or the product of the total number of no-par
shares times an arbitrary amount (at least one dollar) for
each of such no-par shares, 55 plus such amounts as the
directors decide to transfer to capital.
Under present law a reduction of capital to eliminate
amounts previously transferred to capital by resolution of
the board of directors requires majority shareholder approval.' 57 Capital reduction through reduction of the par
value of par shares, or through reduction of the capital
allocated to no-par shares presently requires two-thirds shareholder approval,5 8 with a class vote (even though the shares
whose capital is being reduced are normally non-voting)
where par shares are involved.'5 9
Under the new statute "capital," or as the same thing
is called in the new act, "stated capital," may be reduced
appreciation of assets shall not be included in earned surPresumably, therefore, unN.Y. Bus. Coip. LAW § 102(a) (6).

253 'nrealized

plus."

realized appreciation of assets may be included in the other branch of surplus--capital surplus. See N.Y. Bus. Coup. LAW § 102(a) (2).
154See Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws.

28 FoRDHAm L. REv. 637, 641 n.15 (1960).

Fortunately, redeemable shares

may not be purchased at higher than their redemption price stated in the

certificate of incorporation. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §513(c).
155N.Y. SToca Coup. LAW § 13.

156N.Y. SToCK CoRP. LAW § 12(4) (A).
157 N.Y. STocK CoRp. LAW §§35(4)(a), 37(C)(1)(d).
158As to par stock, see N.Y. STocK Coat'. LAW §§ 35(2) (C) (4), 35(4)

(b) (i), 37(1) (C) (2); as to no-par stock, see N.Y. SToci
§§ 35(2) (C) (6), (9), 35(4) (b) (ii), 37(1) (C) (2).
15 9 N.Y. STOca CoRP. LAW §§35(3), 37(1) (C) (3), 51.
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by a mere majority vote of the shareholders in one of these
situations, namely, where par stock is involved, and without
any shareholder action at all in the other two situations. 16 0
Class vote is preserved in the one situation where now
allowed, i. e., reduction of the par value of par shares.' 6 '
The result of capital reduction is, of course, what is called
under the new act "capital surplus." 162 Because of the
lowered requirements for approval under the new corporation
statute it is much easier to create such a surplus. Capital
surplus is, however, by and large merely a paper surplus,
16 3
a "snare and delusion" to both creditors and shareholders.
The notice requirement where distributions are made from
such a paper, as opposed to real, surplus is not an adequate
safeguard, especially where this paper surplus may be more
readily produced.
The danger of the new provisions, despite the notice
addition, is emphasized by the fact that such capital surplus
may be converted into an earned surplus where the majority
of shareholders and directors approve and notice -of the
transfer is given. As the statute provides:
Whenever under this chapter it is necessary for a corporation
to determine the amount or availability of its earned surplus,
the following rules shall apply:
(4) A corporation may apply any part or all of its capital
surplus to the elimination of any deficit in the earned surplus
account, upon approval by vote of the shareholders. The application of capital surplus to the elimination of a deficit in the earned
surplus account shall be disclosed in the next financial statement
furnished by the corporation to its shareholders or in the first
notice of dividend or share distribution that is furnished to shareholders between the date of such elimination of a deficit in the
130 As to reduction of stated capital behind par shares, see N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§801(b)(10), 802 (a)(1), 803(a). As to reduction of stated capital

by eliminating amounts transferred thereto from surplus, or by reducing the
stated capital behind no-par shares, see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 516(a).
161 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 804(a) (2).
12 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 102(a) (2), 517(a) (3).
163 An exception is "equalization surplus," discussed supra note 122.
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earned surplus account and the next financial statement, and in any
164
event within six months of the date of such action.
Once the elimination of the deficit in earned surplus
has been approved, the renamed paper surplus then becomes
for all purposes "earned surplus," with the deceptive significance that that new term connotes. 165
Of course, the Model Act is much worse in this regard.166
On balance, present New York law may, however, be better,
if for no other reason than the possibly erroneous impression
that the "earned surplus" is really an earned surplus.
There are, of course, many other changes in the financial
provisions of the new law. This article would turn out to
be a book if all of them were discussed at length. A few
are at least worthy of passing note. For example, the
new statute abrogates the authority to issue partially paid
shares, 16 7 clarifies the law with regard to subscription agreements' 68 and contracts by a corporation to repurchase its own
shares, 6 9 makes it clear that convertible securities must be
convertible at the option of the holder and not at the option
of the corporation, i. e., that there can be no forced conversion, and that such convertible shares may not be convertible into securities senior to them, 70 and forbids repurchase of redeemable shares at more than the redemption
price.Y" All of these innovations are good.
An unexplained deletion of a worthwhile provision incorporated in the Study Bill also justifies comment. With
regard to redemption of some but not all of its redeemable
shares that earlier version of the law required that the
264 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 517(a).
165As such it is available for dividends (N.Y. Bus CoRP. LAW § 510)

without the cautionary notice, after the first dividend. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 517(a) (4). See note 166 infra.
'66 Section 64 of the MOIDES BUSINESS CORPORATIoN AcT allows transfer
of capital surplus to earned surplus by action of the directors alone, and
without notice to the shareholders.
Compare N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW

§ 517(a) (4).
167 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 504(h).
'1s N.Y.

Bus. CORP. LAW §503.

N.Y. Bus. CORP.
17N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
169

LAW
LAW

§ 514.
§519(a); 1961 N.Y.

Supp.), Comment to § 522(a).
171 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(c).
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redemption be either pro rata or by lot.1 2 Such a provision
seems absolutely necessary in order to prevent favoritism
towards some shareholders over others. Redemption may
be a means of discriminating in favor of mana gement's
friends in a declining corporation, 7 3 or against management's
74
enemies in a flourishing one.'
The New York Stock Exchange, recognizing these dangers, requires such pro rata or by lot redemption for shares
traded on the Exchange. 7 5 There would seem to be no
reason for New York to impose a lesser standard of morality.
On the contrary, there is every reason for the state to offer
its support to the Exchange's fight for corporate morality,
a movement which, because of increased investor confidence,
will ultimately inure to the benefit of all American
business. This omission from the proposed statute is thus
a most unfortunate one.
Another alteration of present law, 1'6 which (even though
no longer as ambiguous as in the Study Bill) 17 may none172 S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316, § 5.17(c) (1960) provided: "When a corporation
shall call for redemption a part, but not all, of one or more classes or
series of its redeemable shares, the particular shares to be redeemed shall
be either a pro-rata portion of the shares of such class or series held by
each holder, or shall be selected by lot or by some similar equitable method
as shall be prescribed by the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws or
the directors."
173 See Kessler, Share Returchases Under Modern Corporation Laws,
28 FORDHAm L. REv. 637, 667-73 (1960). Many of the objections to share
repurchases therein detailed apply with equal force to share redemptions.
174
1 See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
'N.Y. STOCK EXcHANGE COMPANY MANUAL § 1(9), at A-24.
176 Present case interpretation of N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 59 forbids
issuance of stock for promotional services. See, e.g., Herbert v. Duryea,
34 App. Div. 478, 54 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1898), aff'd, 164 N.Y.
596, 58 N.E. 1088 (1900).
177N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 507 provides: "The reasonable charges and
expenses for formation or reorganization of a corporation, and the reasonable
expenses of and compensation for the sale or underwriting of its shares may
be paid or allowed by the corporation out of the consideration received by
it in payment for its shares without thereby impairing the fully paid and
nonassessable status of such shares."
The provision of the Study Bill was substantially identical. S. Int. 3124,
Pr. 3316, § 5.07 (1960).
The Consideration for Shares section of the Study Bill provided: "Consideration for the issue of shares shall consist, in whole or in part, of money
or other property, tangible or intangible, or labor or services actually performed for the corporation or for its benefit or in its organization or reorganization. In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of
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theless be an unfortunate one, is the apparent authorization
to the corporation to issue shares of stock to its promoters
not only in reimbursement of their cash outlays in the
formation of the corporation, but also for their services
in its organization.'7
Certainly promoters should be reimbursed for their
actual expenses in formation of the corporation. Probably,
they are also entitled to receive stock in exchange for their
necessary services performed for their corporation even though
prior to the actual filing of the certificate." 9 "[S]ervices
.,.. performed ...

in its formation ... 180 is a very vague

term, however, and the qualification that the directors' assessment of their value may only be upset where "fraud in the
transaction" 181 is present is probably not a sufficient safeguard against the danger of a newly legalized "stock

watering."

182

Clearer limitations on the power of a corporation to
issue stock in exchange for pre-incorporation services are
necessary to prevent imposition on shareholders and creditors.
Here again the new law is inadequate.
What estimate should be made then of the financial
provisions of the new act? Clearly the requirement of
notice to a shareholder when he is receiving not corporate
profits, but really part of his initial capital investment,
the directors or shareholders, as the case may be, as to the value of the
consideration received for shares shall be conclusive." S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316,
§5.04(a) (1960).
N.Y. Bus. Coiu. LAW § 504(a) provides: "Consideration for the issue
of shares shall consist of money or other property, tangible or intangible,
actually received or labor or services actually performed for the corporation
or for its benefit or in its formation or reorganization, or a combination

thereof.
board or
received
The

In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the
shareholders, as the case may be, as to the value of the consideration
for shares shall be conclusive."
Study Bill was thus ambiguous as to the extent of compensation

allowable to promoters by way of stock issuance.

Apparently not only cash

outlays but the value of promotional services could be recompensed by stock
issuance. The new law seems to intend this.
178 N.Y. Bus. CoaR. LA-w § 504(a).
See note 177 supra.
179 Kessler, Promoters' Contracts:
A Statutory Solution, 15 RuTaMs
L. Ra,.
566 (1961).
0
1s N.Y. Bus. Coni. LAW § 504(a). See note 177 supra.
181 Ibid.
18sSee BALLANnNE, CORPORATIONs

792-95 (rev. ed. 1946).
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is a worthwhile innovation. The greater clarity of the
Article over present law is also commendable. Weighed
against the increased possibilities of capital diversion and
stock watering, however, the financial provisions of the
new act can hardly be said to be an improvement over
1 83
present law.
TREATMENT OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION

UNDER THE

NEw LAW

The "close" corporation, typified by the "incorporated
hot dog stand," 184 has a number of special problems, and
hence a number of special answers which it expects an
adequate corporation statute to give to them.
Unfortunately, the present law, at least as it has been
interpreted by the courts, has not given too many really
satisfactory answers.
A "close corporation" is really merely a chartered
partnership 185 and desires to operate as such, and, despite
unfriendly laws, often attempts to do so.
Three basic needs follow from this partnership nature
of the close corporation: the first, a need to mold the
corporate form to make its operation as much as possible
like that of a genuine partnership; the second, which follows
from the first, freedom from unnecessary technicality or
"paperwork"; and the third, also essential wherever the
first need is satisfied, adequate provisions for breaking
deadlocks, which are very likely to arise.
Unfortunately, the principal task of drafting any corporation law which will be adequate to meet these needs
183 The philosophy of the new act is generally similar to that of the federal
securities laws: allow a corporation a maximum of freedom of action as
long as full disclosure is made to interested parties. The wisdom of such a
policy is disputable in a corporation law, especially with regard to such
a popularly unknown subject as corporate finance. Increasing the freedom
of action with no adequate assurance of the prescribed disclosure seems

especially ill-advised.
184 Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 453 (1956).
185 Ripin v. U.S. Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 856
'(1912).
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of the New York close corporation consists in making it
unequivocally clear that the legislature intends to overrule all of the leading decisions of the Court of Appeals
in this area.
The New Statute and the Close Corporations Need to
Mold the Corporate Form to its Needs
The close corporation desires to operate like a partnership. However, in New York, at least four apocalyptic
horsemen, in the form of Court of Appeals decisions, emerged
to block the way of this desired partnership operation. They
ranged themselves in opposition to all small business in the
corporate form.
These horsemen go by the names of the Benintendi18"
MeQuade' 8 7 Maonson 8 8 and Long Park 189 cases.
Benintendi outlawed unanimity requirements for shareholder and director action, McQuade forbade majority shareholders to "control the directors" by agreeing to keep themselves as corporate officers at stated salaries. Manson forbade
the majority shareholders to agree to "sterilize" the board
by giving corporate management to one of their number.
Long Park extended this prohibition to forbid such divestment of the board's powers even where all of the shareholders approve.
They, and the effect of the new statute on them, will
all be discussed more fully in terms of the close corporation's specific needs for particular aspects of partnership
organization.
(a)

Equal Managenient Participation

Perhaps one of the most obvious aspects of a partnership
(apart from its basic contractual as opposed to statutory
280 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
187 McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
188 Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
182 Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174,

77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
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nature) is the equal management power normally conferred
upon all the individual participants. 190 Inherent in this
equal management power is possession by every participant
(in the absence of a contrary agreement) 191 of a "veto"
power over decisions of all the co-partners, unless the partners themselves (as opposed to the state for them) elect the
"default law" alternative of majority rule.1 92
The close corporation desires partnership operation.
One desideratum for it is thus obvious. The participants
in a close corporation are usually "undemocratic," in the
sense that they dislike the rule that subjects a minority to
domination by a majority of the shares, or persons on the
board of directors. They prefer the partnership, or U.N.
Security Council arrangement, to the Congressional one in
vogue in large corporations. In short, they, too, usually
desire this "veto power." High, or unanimous, vote and
quorum requirements give them such an effective veto over
the decisions of their associates. As a result of -the restrictive Benintendi decision, New York became a pioneer
in legislation designed to expressly grant to a corporation
the right to set high vote and quorum requirements for
shareholder and director action. 19 3
Section 9 of the Stock Corporation Law expressly
legalized such arrangements, and, fortunately, its provisions
94
have been carried over into the new law.1
(b)

Direct Management Participation and Freedom of
Management Allocation

In a partnership, management is conducted directly by
the participants without the intermediation of any other
Acr § 18 (e).
Acr § 18, which sets out the rights and
duties of partners subject to any agreement between them.
192 See UNIFORM PARTNERSHip AcT § 18(h).
190 See UNiFoRm PARTNERSHIP
191 See UNrFORm PARTNeRSHIP

193 See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors:
A 19Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. thv. 697, 711 (1960).
4 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (as to high vote and quorum requirements
for shareholder action); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 709 (as to high vote and

quorum requirements for directorial action).
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body, or, but only if they so choose, by one or more of
their number. The close corporation desires to parallel this
aspect, too, of partnership operation as closely as possible.
There is, however, the statutory requirement of a board of
directors.
A second desideratum for the close corporation is,
therefore, the ability to "sterilize the board of directors." 195
Even under the new law a corporation will still be required
to have three directors. 196 All ordinary business decisions
are confided to the board under present law,19 7 and this
power will be continued under the new law. 198 Decisions
of the board are normally by a mere majority.'9 9 Obviously,
in a one or two man corporation the additional one or two
dummy directors pose a problem. The best solution would
be to allow the close corporation to do away, completely
with the board and operate the corporation through any
other instrumentality, including if they chose, -operation
by unanimous action of the "shareholders," i. e., the corporate
partners. Present New York law forbids the shareholders
to act in supercession of the board, and, of course, does
not allow the abolition of the board, although, for the
close corporation, that would considerably simplify corporate
organization, making it more like the partnership management structure wanted.20 0 Fortunately, the permitted unanimity requirements accomplish the desired result, albeit in
a roundabout fashion, in most cases.
However, in many situations, e. g., where the financial
participation is to be unequal or there is a desire to avoid
the possibility of deadlock, or not all of the shareholders
agree to require it, unanimity may not be chosen. For
example, six shareholders having eight directors on a board
195Manson v. Curtis, szpra note 188, is the source of the expression;

Kessler, supra note 193, at 710.
196See N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw §702(a), which, it is submitted, is an unfortunate disadvantage; Kessler, supra note 193, at 729.
'9 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 27.
'19 N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw § 701.
199 More accurately speaking, the board's decisions are usually made by
a majority of a quorum, i. e., a majority of a majority. SvaVENs, CoRPORATiONS 750-51 (2d ed. 1949).
200 See Kessler, supra note 193, at 714-29.
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of fifteen may want their directors to vote as a bloc thus
controlling the board. The very object of the plan may
be to allow their dominant stock position to be reflected
in corporate decisions (which, as will be remembered, must
be made by the board) in the face of an unfriendly minority
stock interest. 20 1 Or three shareholders may desire to give
a fourth (e. g., a creditor) equal control of the corporation
with them even though he only has a twenty-five percent
financial interest in the organization. 2 2 In either situation,
in order to secure the desired result, there must be some
assurance that the directors will carry out the wishes of
the shareholders who have elected them. While other methods
of circumventing the usual rule of directorial autonomy
are available, the simplest method is an agreement between
the shareholders and directors involved whereby the directors
agree to vote in a way desired by their principals. Buch
an agreement might well be void under present New York
law. The new statute would not seem to legalize the above
arrangements either, despite the desirability of so doing.
Section 701 of the new law provides:
Subject to any provision in the certificate of incorporation
authorized by paragraph (b) of section 620 (Agreements as to
voting; provision in certificate of incorporation as to control of
directors), the business .of a corporation shall be managed by its
board of directors ...
Taken alone the section might seem to authorize abolition
of the board of directors, entirely. However, the section
incorporates by reference section 620, the Shareholders'
Agreements provision. That section is important enough
to set forth in full: 203
See Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1957).
Nickolopoulos v. Sarantis, 102 N.J. Eq. 585, 141 Atl. 792 (1928).
203 Although, ag indicated, the section as enacted is not free from ambiguity, it is a distinct improvement over the bill as originally introduced.
S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, § 6.20 (1961), although generally similar to the section
as enacted, provided in lieu of the beginning of subsection (b): "A provision in the certificate of incorporation may control the discretion or powers
of the directors in their management of corporate affairs as provided in this
chapter, but only: .... "
Manifestly, the extent of permissible encroachment on the powers of the
201

202
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(a) An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in
writing and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in
exercising any voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted
as therein provided, or as they may agree, or as determined in
accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them.
(b) A provision in the certificate of incorporation otherwise
prohibited by law as improperly restrictive of the discretion or
powers of the directors in their management of corporate affairs
as provided in this chapter shall nevertheless be valid:
(1) If all the incorporators or holders of record of all outstanding shares, whether or not having voting power, have authorized such provision in the certificate of incorporation or an amendment thereof; and
(2) If, subsequent to the adoption of such provision, shares
are transferred or authorized shares are issued to one who did
not have knowledge thereof, and such person consents in writing
to such provision.
(c) Such a provision shall be valid only so long as the shares
of the corporation are not traded on a national securities exchange
or regularly traded in an over-the-counter market by one or more
members of a national or affiliated securities association.
(d) An amendment to strike out a provision authorized by
paragraph (b) shall be authorized at a meeting of shareholders by
vote of the holders of two-thirds of all outstanding shares entitled
to vote thereon or by the holders of such proportion of shares
as may be required by the certificate of incorporation for that
purpose.
(e) The effect of any such provision authorized by paragraph
(b) shall be to relieve the directors and impose upon the shareholders consenting thereto the liability for managerial acts or
omissions that is imposed on directors by this chapter to the extent
that and so long as the discretion or powers of the directors in

board of directors was much less certain, since "control" is a very ambiguous
word. With a sympathetic court, close corporations may, under the new
law, be able to emasculate the board of directors, if they desire to do so.
It would have been simpler to have taken the full step, allowing a corporation

to do away with the board completely where it chose to do so. If the statute
had done this there would be no lingering doubt as to the permissible extent
of limitations on the discretion and powers of the directors.
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their management of corporate affairs is controlled by any such
20 4
provision.
It would seem, therefore, that the combined effect of the

204 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620. Subdivision (b) (2) of this section seems
unfortunate (or at least ambiguous). It would seem to allow destruction
of a close corporation agreement for partnership management by any dissatisfied associate desiring to do so through the sale of his shares to an
outsider who does not have actual notice of the arrangement. (It is obvious
from the language of the statute that constructive notice from incorporation
of the provisions in the certificate will not constitute such "knowledge.")
Clearly, the seller cannot be expected to give notice to his vendee when it is
not in his interest to do so, and the other participants may not learn of the
transfer until after it is made when it is apparently too late under the
statute to protect their management program. Unless the share certificates
contain a comprehensive description of the special management provision,
a loophole is thus created for rendering nugatory the entire close corporation
plan any time 'one of the participants decides to ruin his co-"partners."
A provision similar to that of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1105 requiring notice
on each stock certificate and then binding all transferees would have been

wiser.
(Of course, such a notice would seem to be sufficient to give
knowledge, and, hence, is advisable for any lawyer who wants to draft the
papers for a close corporation adequately under the new law.)
The JOINT REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSoCIATIoN, ComMIrTEE ON CORPORATION LAW, ANID THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, CommiTTE ON CORPORATE LAW, ON PROPoSED NEW
YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 22 (1961), referring to the identical predecessor of §620(d) criticizes the fact that at least a two-thirds vote is
required to delete a certificate provision controlling the powers of directors.
Such a requirement, unless a higher (or lower) percentage is required in
the certificate, would seem necessary to prevent the carelessness of counsel's
draftsmanship from creating an additional loophope for overthrow of the
management plan by a dissatisfied shareholder.
In addition to the two sections set forth above, the General Powers
section of the statute (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §202(a)(11) bears on the
subject. It provides: "Each corporation, subject to any limitations provided
in this chapter or any other statute of this state or its certificate of incorporation, shall have power in furtherance of its corporate purposes:
(11) To adopt, amend or repeal by-laws relating to the business of the
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its shareholders, directors or officers."
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601 (b) is also revelant. It provides: "The by-laws
may contain any provision relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its
shareholders, directors or officers, not inconsistent with this chapter or any
other statute of this state or the certificate of incorporation."
The Joint Report noted at page 22 an "inconsistency" between the almost
identical predecessors of these sections and the provisions of the predecessor
of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §620(b). It would appear, however, that no
real inconsistency exists, nor do sections 202(a)(11) and 601(b) add anything to the permission granted to close corporations to mold their operations
in the pattern desired, since the authority to make by-laws restricting directorial powers is in both instances expressly qualified by the requirement
that such restrictions not be inconsistent with the statute. See N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§202(a), 601(b). The only significant provisions, therefore,
are those discussed in the text.
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to legalize shareholders'

"pooling

two provisions is: (a)

agreements" binding themselves to vote together as shareholders-this is merely a codification of present law; and
(b) to legalize agreements binding the corporate participants
in their capacities as directors, but only so long as the
corporation remains close, i. e., until such time as its shares
are traded on a stock exchange or regular over-the-counter
market (a good criterion for separating a "public issue"
corporation from all others), and only where all of the stockholders (or incorporators) 205 agree to the arrangement,

and it is incorporated in the certificate of incorporation.
The exact extent of encroachments on the functions of

the board of directors permitted by these sections is, however,
hardly clear. Just how far may the shareholders go in their
control of the "discretion" and "powers" of the directors?

Obviously, they may not abolish the board completely.

May

they, nonetheless strip it of all of its powers, or is this going
20 6
too far? Unfortunately, perhaps only litigation will tell.
The 'Comment to the predecessor form of section 620
suggested that the purpose of the directorial portion (subsection (b)) was merely to codify the decision in Clark v.
205 Fortunately, the statute, as opposed to the bill as introduced (S. Int. 522,
Pr. 522, §6.20(b)(1) (1961)) seemingly allows the provision to be included in the certificate of incorporation as originally filed, rather than
(apparently) requiring a subsequent amendment by insisting upon consent
of "the holders of record of all outstanding shares", as the original bill did.
It would have been still clearer to provide simply that the certificate of incorporation might contain the provisions.
206 It should be observed that the new New York provisions with regard
to shareholders' pooling agreements are more liberal than the much-vaunted
Delaware law on the subject. Although the New York courts have already
given indication of greater liberality than Delaware on the subject of such
shareholder agreements (see Storer v. Ripley, 1 Misc. 2d 235, 125 N.Y.S.2d
831 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 950, 125 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep't
1953); and Ripley v. Storer, 309 N.Y. 506, 132 N.E.2d 87 (1956)), the
new allowance of irrevocable proxies where provided for under a shareholder
agreement (N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §609(f)(5); compare N.Y. STOCK CoRP.
LAW § 47-a) insures that New York will not fall victim to the anti-close
corporation Delaware decision in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), which
rejected the lower court's decision that an irrevocable proxy had been given
to the party willing to abide by a shareholder's pooling agreement allowing
her to vote the share of the recalcitrant signatory.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VoL. 36

2 0 7 The Revised
Dodge.
Comment to the section as enacted
states:

The powers given to the shareholders by this paragraph vary
the usual statutory norm of board management as expressed in
§ 701; accordingly that section explicitly makes exception for arrangements valid under this section. Paragraph (b) expands the
ruling in Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 637 (1936), and,
to the extent therein provided, overrules Long Park, Inc. v. TrentonNew Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948),
Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1919) and
McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). 208
Thus, the statute is intended to affect all three of the
remaining unvanquished four horsemen. 20 9 We are, in fact,
told that subsection (b) of section 620 of the new statute
"overrules" all of them. Unfortunately, however, the overruling is qualified. These cases are only overruled by the
new section "to the extent therein provided." The effect
of the new law on these monsters is, therefore, still equivocal.
The McQuade case invalidated an agreement by less
than all of the shareholders whereby they agreed that they
would not only as shareholders but as directors use their
best efforts to keep one another in certain corporate offices
at certain agreed salaries. The Court of Appeals struck
down the agreement as contrary to public policy. There
207 This section was § 6.13 in the 1960 Study Bill. The Comment appended
(1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, at 36 (Supp.)) expressly stated that the
provision was "intended to codify the decision in Clark v. Dodge. . ....
The non-revised Comment to the law (1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 40
(Supp.)) omits these words but continues the same discussion of Clark v.
Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936), thus indicating no greater
liberality. (Quaere: the meaning of the revised Comment to the statute as
enacted? See discussion in the text accompanying note 208-09 infra.)
Compare, however, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 6 2 0(e) which provides:
"The effect of any such provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be to
relieve the directors and impose upon the shareholders consenting thereto
the liability for managerial acts or omissions that is imposed on directors
by this chapter to the extent that and so long as the discretion or powers
of the directors in their management of corporate affairs is controlled by any
such provision." Unless the functions of the directors may be taken over
completely by the shareholders, there would seem to be no justification for
imposing directorial liability on them.
208 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 40 (Rev. Supp.), Comment to § 620.
209 See text accompanying notes 187-89 supra. As to the vanquishing of
Benintendi, see text accompanying notes 193-94 supra.
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would seem to be no good reason why such an agreement
should not be upheld. Apparently the new statute is not
designed to do so, however, since on its face it requires,
in the absence of a provision in the original certificate
of incorporation, that all of the shareholders must agree.
Such an agreement as this is very important for the close
corporation, since the participants will, for tax reasons,
usually want to take their share of the profits in the form
of salary rather than dividends.2 10 Obviously, if they can
be fired from their offices they are no longer entitled to
the salaries appurtenant. 21 1 Thus this decision, which held
the agreement between the plaintiff and two other stockholders who together held a majority of the stock of the
National Exhibition Company, owner of the old New York
Giants, to all "use their best efforts" to keep the plaintiff
as treasurer of the corporation at an annual salary of
$7500 (later increased to $10,000) unenforceable, was a real
blow to close corporations.
In the Manson case the two largest stockholders agreed
to give one of them, who, however, only owned a minority
of the total shares outstanding, control and management of
the corporation, and in order to insure this control also
provided for a subservient board of directors and president.
The court, although supporting the validity of ordinary
shareholder agreements which merely call for pooling of
their votes as shareholders, invalidated the agreement sub
judice on the ground that it would have "sterilized the
board of directors."
Here again less than all of the shareholders were involved, and, on that score alone, the new statute would
require the same result as in that case.
On the face of the statute the decision in the Long
Park case would seem to be overruled by the new section
210 Such an arrangement also enables the corporation to pay the "idea"
man more than his capital contribution in shareholdings would justify
without resorting to different classes of stock and complicated provisions
for their respective dividend rights.
211 This is in the absence of a contract with the corporation which, despite
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 716(b), must still probably be for only a reasonable
time. See 19 C.J.S., Corporations §§ 1047-48 (1938).
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(provided, of course, the certificate of incorporation is
amended to incorporate the agreement). 1 If section 620 is
interpreted as only slightly expanding the holding in Clark
v. Dodge, however, it will apparently leave unaltered the
13
anti-close corporation decision in the Long Park case,
which invalidated an agreement giving the management of
the corporation's theatres to one of its shareholders, the
B. F. Keith Corporation, for a nineteen year period, even
though that agreement had been approved by all of its
shareholders.
Where all of the shareholders agree to delegate the
corporate management either to themselves or to one of their
number or even to an outsider there should be no objection,
and the corporation law should certainly not stand in their
way. After all, it is their corporation, and not the property
of the state, and they should be allowed to do as they
want with it.
Similarly, any group of the shareholders should be
allowed to agree to exert whatever power they possess in
212 Sed quaere: the statute literally only allows a provision in the certificate
of incorporation which is "restrictive of the discretion or powers of the
directors." Does it allow a complete supercession of those powers?
213 Clark v. Dodge upheld an agreement between the two sole stockholders
of two corporations whereby the defendant majority stockholder not only
agreed to vote his stock in accordance with the agreement, but also agreed
to vote as a director that the plaintiff (ousted minority shareholder) should
(a) continue as a director, (b) continue as general manager so long as he
remained "faithful, efficient and competent," (c) receive for life one-fourth
of the net income of the corporations either as salary or dividends, and
(d) not have his profits affected by unreasonable salaries to other officers
and agents. Although manifestly portions (b), (c) and (d) of the agreement impinged on the powers of the board of directors, the agreement was
held valid apparently on two grounds: there was no harm to anyone
(creditors, minority shareholders or the public), and "the invasion of the
powers of the- directorate" was so slight as to be negligible. The Long
Park case rejects the significance of the harm test, and interprets Clark v.
Dodge as only permitting "a slight impingement or innocuous variance
from the statutory norm. . .

."

Thus, an agreement calling for "the de-

privation of all the powers of the board insofar as the selection and supervision of the management of the corporation's theatres, including the manner
and policy of their operation, . .

."

was condemned, despite the fact that

all shareholders approved and there was no showing of harm to creditors
or the public. If Clark v. Dodge is interpreted to go no further than to
authorize a "slight impingement" upon the powers of the directors, as the
Long Park case interprets it to hold, and the new statute goes no further,
then the new statute is hardly sufficient to meet the needs of close
corporations.
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their capacity as directors as well as shareholders without
hindrance from the corporation law.
It should be noted that under the new statute, the
actual result in all four of the anti-close corporation cases
discussed above would be the same as in those decisions,
since in none was the management arrangement placed in
the certificate of incorporation. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that either the Manson or McQuade agreements would be
set forth in the certificate even under the new law, since,
as will be recalled, unanimous shareholder consent is required
for such action (or unanimous incorporator consent, which,
even if only one incorporator is used, will as a practical
matter mean agreement by all of the initial participants),
and neither agreement included all of the shareholders. It
would seem unlikely that the excluded shareholders would
be anxious to give their consent to legalize agreements that
were of no benefit to them.
They might, perhaps at the time of incorporation, be
willing to give a kind of blanket permission to all shareholder arrangements, foreseeing the possibility of later entering into such agreements themselves. Unfortunately, however, the statute is silent on the sufficiency of such general
authorizations.
Furthermore, it will be noted that, even if all the participants do originally agree to incorporate it in the certificate of incorporation, the arrangement not only terminates
when the corporation transmutes from "close" to "public
issue' 2 4 (which, of course, is unexceptionable), but whenever any transferee of the stock "who did not have knowledge" of the arrangement refuses to consent in writing to be
bound by it. 21 5 Will a reference on each stock certificate
to the stockholder arrangement be sufficient to constitute
"knowledge" to every transferee, or can any shareholder
agree to sell his stock to an outsider without actually
informing him of the agreement, and, thus, at any time he
214 This is the effect of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
2
15N.Y. Bus. Cosp. LAW § 620(b) (2).

§620(c).
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chooses, destroy the entire close corporation arrangement?
Unfortunately, again, only litigation will tell.
If the new statute is designed to go beyond a mere
codification of present law, which is an unduly restrictive
law, it does so in a fashion ambiguous enough to give courts
imbued with a mistaken Platonic-guardian idea of the natuie
of the board of directors sufficient support for holding corporations to their present legal straitjacket.
The new secti6ns dealing with permissible incursions
on the power of the board of directors by shareholder agreement are thereafter condemnable on two grounds: first,
they fail to go far enough in allowing the close corporation
to mold itself to fit its needs, and second, the exact scope
of the permission granted is so ambiguously expressed that
it cannot but lead to uncertainty, and consequent litigation.
It should be added, however, that, despite its language
and Comments, the new statute may, at least in the hands
of a sympathetic court, and with competent draftsmanship
of the necessary papers by their attorneys, go further in
supporting close corporations than would at first seem. For
example, the McQuade case, 2 16 discussed above, which held
that an agreement by less than all of the shareholders which
had as its object the control of the board of directors in
their selection of officers and the fixing of the salaries which
would be paid to them was void as against public policy,
may be circumvented by careful drafting provided again
(unfortunately) that all of the participants concur in
placing the appropriate provision in the certificate of
incorporation.
Under the new law, as indicated above, an agreement,
after incorporation, controlling the discretion of the directors
requires unanimous shareholder consent. 217 Thus, if as
under present law,2 18 the appointment of officers is a matter
confided to the board of directors, the McQuade case would
214 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
21? Except for new corporations where the provision may be inserted in the
certificate of incorporation by the incorporator. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 620(b) (1).
218 N.Y. STOCKc CORP. LAW § 60.
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still be good law, and the agreement as void under the new
law as it was when that case was decided.
However, section 715 (b) of the new law states:
The certificate of incorporation may provide that all officers or
that specified officers shall be elected by the shareholders instead
of by the board.
Thus, New York has become like Delaware,2 19 and
approximately one-quarter of the American states, 220 in
allowing a corporation, if it chooses, to remove the power
to appoint corporate officers from the board of directors.
If the power to appoint officers resides in the shareholders
there is no forbidden interference with the board of directors,
and hence the agreement should be valid, where the corporation takes advantage of the permission granted, and
provides that the corporate officers may be chosen by the
22 1
shareholders.
Thus, by careful drafting a close corporation should be
able, under the new statute, at least to avoid two of the
apocalyptic monsters arrayed against it: the McQuade and
Benintendi cases. It is regrettable, however, that the remaining demons, Manson and Long Park, with their prohibition against "sterilizing" the board of directors have
not also been more definitely and forever laid to rest.
Unaccountably, however, the Committee on Corporate
Laws of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
composed of the most experienced corporate law practitioners
in the country, apparently feels that the law already goes
too far in its favoritism towards the close corporation in
22 2
this regard.
2

19Dm GEN. Coap. LAW § 142.
0 BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CoROpoA-oNs

22

282 (3d ed. 1958).

It is to be noted that, in addition, such officers are only removable by the
shareholders, although they may be suspended by the directors (N.Y. Bus.
Coai. LAW §716(a)), providing an additional safeguard. Such an agreement, because then only a "shareholder" agreement, seems valid even though
not incorporated in the certificate of incorporation. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
221

§ 620(a).

222 Rohrlich, New York's Proposed Busriness Corporation Law, 15 Rzcoan
o1 N.Y.C.B.A. 309, 310 (1960).
Mr. Rohrlich states "our committee on
corporate law has misgivings as to the wisdom of permitting such possible
emasculation of the board of directors"
This comment was addressed to the
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Freedom from Unnecessary Technicality or "Paperwork"
One consequence of the failure of the proposed statute
to go far enough in meeting the needs of the close corporation, through a frank espousal of all the means necessary
to the end of partnership operation for such corporations,
will be the continuance of evasion of the corporate requirements through taking advantage of technicalities. For example, those shareholders in the above example who desire
to give the fourth a fifty percent control of the corporation
despite his only having a twenty-five percent share interest
may probably achieve their desire under the new law, or,
for that matter even under present law, through setting
up two classes of stock each of which will elect an equal
number of directors, despite the fact that the value and
dividend rights of one class will only be one third as great
as that of the other.2 23 They will not, however, be able
to do what they want by a simple shareholder agreement.
Instead, technicalities and paperwork will have to be resorted
to.
Technicalities and paperwork are, however, certainly
nothing for a statute to be proud of, in general, and are
anathema to the close corporation.
Even after the technicalities of corporate organization
in the desired mold are overcome, the day-to-day operation
of the corporation poses additional formal problems.
There is no reason why the shareholders have to behave
like Congress when they all are in agreement on a proposed

Study Bill. However, that bill was even less generous to close corporations
than the law as finally enacted.
223 "Classification" of directors in the sense of having directors whose
terms would expire at different times was permitted by N.Y. STOCM CORP.
LAW § 55.
"Classification" of directors in the sense of having certain
directors elected by certain classes of stock would seem to have been authorized by N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §5(4). Although N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 704 places greater restriction on directorial classifications in the former
sense, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 402(a) (5), 617 would seem to carry over
the implied permission of previous law to classify directors according to the
shares capable of electing them. An unsympathetic court might, however,
hold on the basis of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 704(a) that such a classification
is no longer allowed.
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Present New York law 2 2 4 allows informal action

by the shareholders; and this liberality is continued in the

new enactment. 225

As the Comment to the new section,

which consolidates

the present dispersed permission

for

unanimous written shareholder consent in lieu of a duly
convened meeting, aptly states:
The principle embodied in paragraph (a) is particularly appropriate
to meet the exigencies and common practices of small corporations. 226

The only criticism of the present and the new law is
227
the requirement for unanimity in the ordinary case.
If the shareholders by a lesser percentage acting at a
meeting may consent to an action there would seem no

good reason (even though the certificate does not expressly
permit it)

228

why the same percentage cannot consent in

writing without such a "meeting," which is often in reality,
nothing more than a few extra typewritten pages.

The "exigencies and common practices" of such small
corporations also demand a similar informality with regard

to action by the associates in their director as well as
their shareholder capacities. Case law, to a limited extent,
recognizes the validity of directorial action despite the
224N.Y. Grn.

91(3)
(a), 105(4).
22

Coap. LAw

§40;

N.Y. STocK CORP. LAW

§§35-37, 86,

5 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 615. The new statute appears to be more liberal
in this regard than the present law, in that it seems to allow less than
unanimous shareholder consent but only, however, where the certificate of
incorporation so permits.
The provision is somewhat ambiguous.
N.Y.
Bus. CoRp. LAw §615(a) provides: "Whenever under this chapter shareholders are required or permitted to take any action by vote, such action
may be taken without a meeting on written consent, setting forth the action
so taken, signed by the holders of all outstanding shares entitled to vote
thereon. This paragraph shall not be construed to alter or modify the
provisions of any section or any provision in a certificate of incorporation not
inconsistent with this chapter under which the written consent of the holders
of less than all outstanding shares is sufficient for corporate action." The
Comment to the section is not helpful on this point. 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc.
No. 12, at 37 (Rev. Supp.).
226 1961 N.Y. La. Doc. No. 12, at 37 (Rev. Supp.).
227
See notes 224-25 .pra.
22
8 It is, of course, not perfectly clear (and for some New York courts
perfect clarity is required) that even such a provision ifi the certificate
allowing a lesser percentage for approval will be sufficient, since N.Y. Bus.
Coap. LAW a615(a) requires that such a provision be "not inconsistent with
this chapter." This leaves an opening for unsympathetic courts to invalidate
even certificate provisions for less than unanimous consent.
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fact that no formal board meeting has been held. 229 There
would seem no good reason for imposition on innocent third
parties dealing with any corporation (the real effect of a
requirement for formal directorial action), and this would
seem especially true in the case of close corporations which
habitually ignore such formalities. Unanimous written cbnsent as a substitute for a formal meeting would seem the
very minimum concession necessary. Many other states have
granted this. 230 Yet the new statute even denies this minor
concession to the "exigencies and common practices" of small
corporations.
While not a real substitute for express recognition of
separate consent as the equivalent of a formal meeting, it
should be observed that New York does under both present
law 231 and the new act permit written waiver of notice of
both directors' 232 and shareholders' 233 meetings by the person entitled to such notice either before or after the meeting.
Present law also automatically waives notice of directors'
meetings where all directors are present. 23 4 The Business
Corporation Law makes each director's presence a waiver of
notice as to him, 23 5 and extends the waiver-by-attendance
rule to apply to shareholders.23 6 These concessions are all
to the good. They simply do not go far enough, however.
Deadlock-Breaking Provisions
Where, as is often the case in close corporations,
unanimous consent of all of the participants is required
before any action may be taken, the possibilities of stalemate
on any disagreement are multiplied. One "partner" wants
to do it one way. Another has a different idea. As a
result nothing gets done. The corporation is paralyzed.
229 See Kessler, The Statutory Requirements of a Board of Directors:
A 2 Corporate
Anchronis.m, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696, 718 n.101 (1960).
30
Id. at 724-25.
231 N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 31.
232 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 711(c).
2s3N.Y. Bus. Coiu. LAW § 606.
234 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 28.
235 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 711(c).
23
6 N.Y. Bus. Coup. LAW § 606.
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for such a
There are two principal legal 23remedies
7
dissolution.
and
arbitration
deadlock:
Shareholders' contracts agreeing to form close corporations often provide that disputes will be submitted to an
impartial arbitrator for solution. Arbitration is, of course,
a non-judicial proceeding. However, enforcement of the
award must be by the courts, and where one party feels
that a matter should be arbitrated under the agreement,
while another does not want such arbitration, the courts
must decide whether or not the matter is an arbitrable
one. Accordingly the subject is regulated by law.
There is no provision in the old corporation law with
regard to arbitration. The new law likewise does nothing
to fill this lacuna. Whether or not a matter will be ordered
submitted to arbitration under an agreement calling for
this method of resolving conflict is, however, regulated by
the Civil Practice Act.213
Section 1448 provides that:
* . " two or more persons may submit to the arbitration of one
or more arbitrators any controversy existing between them at the

time of the submission, which may be the subject of an action,
or they may contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. .

239

The provision has been interpreted to require that the
controversy between the parties must be a justiciable one
before it can be an arbitrable subject.2 40 Thus, whether
a director should be removed from office, 241 or whether a
237Of course, there are at least two other alternatives: where there has
been wrongdoing by one of the director-participants, a shareholder's derivative
suit is possible; where the shares are not subject to transfer restrictions,
the shareholder may also follow the "Wall Street rule" and sell his stock.
See BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPo1RATioNs 301 (3d ed. 1958). There is
also another alternative available in two jurisdictions, the appointment of a
"provisional director." CAL. CORP. CODE §819; Mo. AxN. STAT. §351.323

(1949).

23s N.Y. Crv. P.Ac. Acr §§ 1448-69.
239 Quaere: The effect of the amendment to this section in N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1959, ch. 232?
240 In the Matter of the Arbitration of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 579, 136 N.E2d
862,
2 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956).
41lIbid. Even without any change in the New York Civil Practice Act
allowing arbitration of non-justiciable disputes, the removal of a director for
disloyalty will become arbitrable, since under N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 706(d)
it will become the "subject of an action." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 706(d)
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corporation's real property should have been sold, 242 have
been held not to be arbitrable questions.
Obviously, the Civil Practice Act could be amended to
allow arbitration of any dispute, including such so-called
"policy" disputes. 243
However, arbitral awards must be enforced in order
to be effective. This might result in the necessity of the
court's running the corporation. This is unsatisfactory
for a number of reasons, the simplest of which is that
judges are not businessmen and businessmen are apt to be
(properly) dissatisfied with their attempts to play that
role.
Although it might be better to leave the consideration
of these factors until time for enforcement of the arbitration
award came up, i. e., to require arbitration, initially, of all
disputes which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitral
decision, the new business corporation statute cannot be
too severely criticized for not so doing.
There is, however, a good substitute for arbitration of
such policy deadlocks, which has been adopted in two
provides: "An action to procure a judgment removing a director for cause
may be brought by the attorney-general or by the holders of ten percent
of the outstanding shares, whether or not entitled to vote. The court may
bar from re-election any director so removed for a period fixed by the court."
The Comment makes clear the intent to overrule the Burkin decision.
1961 N.Y. LE. Doc. No. 12, at 47 (Rev. Supp.) states: "The power of
the attorney-general to procure a judgment ousting a derelict director,
currently provided by Gen. Corp. L. §§60(4) and 136, is retained,
and a new provision has been added authorizing the holders of at least
ten percent of the total number of outstanding shares of the corporation
to initiate judicial proceedings for the removal of a director for cause.
This latter provision was included in furtherance of minority shareholder
rights and in reaction to the holding in Matter of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570
(1956)."
The provision is an exception to the "veto" powers afforded by N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 614, 709, but would seem a justifiable one.
242In the Matter of the Arbitration of Katz, 283 App. Div. 1092,
131 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1954), aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 789, 125 N.E.2d
433 (1955).
243 The proposed Civil Practice Act would have overruled these cases:
"A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising or any
existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without regard to the
justiciable character of the controversy and confers jurisdiction on the courts
of the state to enforce it and to enter judgment on an award." S. Int.
26, Pr. 26, § 7501 (1960).
The bill was not, however, enacted.
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states, and which should have been incorporated in toto
in the New York Act. It is known as the "provisional
director," a court-appointed, and therefore, impartial director who is to serve just to break a tie on the board.
The California Act provides:
(a) If a corporation has an even number of directors who are
equally divided and cannot agree as to the management of its
affairs, so that its business cannot longer be conducted to advantage
or so that there is danger that its property and business will be
impaired and lost, the superior court of the county where the
principal office of the corporation is located may, notwithstanding
any provisions of the articles or by-laws of the corporation and
whether or not an action is pending for an involuntary winding
up or dissolution of the corporation, appoint a provisional director
pursuant to this section.
Action for such appointment may be filed by one-half of the
directors or by the holders of not less than 33 1/3 per cent of
the outstanding shares.
(b) The provisional director shall be an impartial person, who
is neither a shareholder "nor a creditor of the corporation, nor
related by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree to any
of the other directors of the corporation or to any judge of the
court by which he is appointed. The provisional director shall
have all the rights and powers of a director, and shall be entitled
to notice of the meetings of the board of directors and to vote at
such meetings until the deadlock in the board of directors is
broken or until he is removed by order of the court or by vote
or written consent of the holders of a majority of the voting
shares. He shall be entitled to receive such compensation as may
be agreed upon between him and the corporation, and in the
absence of such agreement he shall be entitled to such compensation
2 44
as shall be fixed by the court.

It will be observed that such a provision overcomes two
objections to arbitration of policy disputes, namely the
difficulty of enforcing an award calling for action, and the
related objection that arbitration in effect puts the court
244 CAL CoRp. CoDE §819.
The Missouri act (Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.320
(1949) is practically identical.
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in business. The provisional director should be, and probably will be, a good businessman, and his decision, like that
of any other corporate director, will not be a judicial one
but that of a businessman, and will therefore not involve
the court in supervising the affairs of the corporation.
Although the 1960 Study Bill provided for such a
provisional director, at least where a petition for dissolution
had been filed,2 4 5 the provision has unaccountably been
completely omitted from the bill as finally approved. Needless to say, this is unfortunate.
The second major method for resolving the problems
of close corporation stalemate is dissolution. Present corporate law provides three methods for voluntary dissolution
of a corporation.2 46 That under General Corporation Law,
section 103 is the most important for close corporations.
It allows a petition for dissolution by one-half of the
shareholders (or where there are high vote requirements
pursuant to Stock Corporation Law section 9, less than a
majority, so long as there are more petitioning shares
than the difference between the total number of shares
entitled to vote for dissolution under the certificate and
the number which would be authorized by the statute to
dissolve without judicial proceedings) where the corporation
has an even number of directors who are deadlocked or the
24
stockholders are so divided that they cannot elect a board. T
Int. 3124, Pr. 3316, § 11.06 (1960).
246 Under N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW §§ 105-06, where authorized by twothirds of the stockholders of record; under N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW
§§ 101-02, where the majority of the directors, or a majority of the
shareholders entitled to vote on the subject, desire to petition for such
dissolution on the ground that the assets are insufficient to discharge
liabilities, or the dissolution would be "beneficial to the interests of the
stockholders"; andd under N.Y. GEw. Coin. LAW § 103, where a deadlock
exists. Of course, actions for involuntary dissolution may also be brought.
See N.Y. GEN. Corn'. LAW §§ 71, 72.
24rN.Y. GaNr. Coin. LAW § 103 provides:
"Unless otherwise provided
in the certificate of incorporation, if a corporation has an even number of
directors who are equally divided respecting the managment of its affairs,
or if the votes of its stockholders are so divided that they cannot elect
a board of directors, the holders of one-half of the stock entitled to vote
at an election of directors may present a verified petition for dissolution
of the corporation as prescribed in this article.
"When, pursuant to section nine of the stock corporation law, as enacted
by chapter eight hundred sixty-two of the laws of nineteen hundred forty2,15S.

1961]

N. Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW

63

Unfortunately, a petition for dissolution is not the
same as a dissolution, and the courts have shown extreme
reluctance to grant dissolution, despite the fact that the
statutory requirements of deadlock are met, where the
corporation has continued to operate at a profit.
The leading case on the subject is In Re Radon?
Neidorff, InO.2 48s in which the petition of a fifty-percent
shareholder, who was also sole manager of the business,
against the respondent owner of the balance of the stock,
was dismissed without even the taking of testimony, despite
the fact that the corporation was unable to elect a board
of directors at the previous shareholders' meeting, the petitioner had been subjected to suit by the respondent,
charging that he had falsified the corporation's records
and converted its assets, and the petitioner had, as a
result of the respondent's unwillingness to sign his salary
checks, not been paid "a penny of his salary" since the
respondent became equal shareholder with him (through
inheritance), and even corporate debts remained unpaid.
The majority of the Court of Appeals in upholding the
eight or as amended, a corporation has provided in its certificate of incorporation or other certificate filed pursuant to law that the number of
votes of directors required for action by the board of directors, or the
number of votes of stockholders required for the election of directors, shall
be greater than that otherwise required by law, if the directors are divided
respecting the management of the corporation's affairs in such a way that
the requisite number of votes for action by the board of directors cannot
be obtained, or if the votes of the stockholders are so divided that the
requisite number of votes for election of directors cannot be obtained, such
a petition may also be presented by the holders of such number of shares
as, in accordance with the provisions of the certificate of incorporation or
other certificate filed pursuant to law, represent more than the difference
between the total number of outstanding shares, the holders of which are
entitled to vote on the question of dissolution of the corporation without
judicial proceedings and the number of such shares, the votes of the holders
of which are necessary to authorize filing of a certificate of dissolution
of the corporation without judicial proceedings."
The new law offers a distinct improvement in clarity over the second
paragraph of N.Y. GEN. Coai. LAW § 103. N.Y. Bus. Coaz. LAW § 1104(b)
provides: "If the certificate of incorporation provides that the proportion
of votes required for action by the board, or the proportion of votes of
shareholders required for election of directors, shall be greater than that
otherwise required by this chapter, such a petition may be presented by
the holders of more than one-third of all outstanding shares entitled to vote
on dissolution under article 10 (Non-judicial dissolution).
248 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
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Appellate Division's dismissal of the petition, without even
a hearing on the merits, stated:
Clearly, the dismissal of this petition was within the discretion
of the Appellate Division. .

.

. There is no absolute right to dis-

solution under such circumstances. Even when majority stockholders file a petition because of internal corporate conflicts, the
order is granted only when the competing interests "are so discordant as to prevent efficient management" and the "object of its
corporate existence cannot be attained." . . . The prime inquiry

is, always, as to necessity for dissolution, that is, whether judiciallyimposed death "will be beneficial to the stockholders or members
and not injurious to the public." . . . Taking everything in the

petition as true, this was not such a case, and so there was no
need for a reference, or for the taking of proof, under sections 106
and 113 of the General Corporation Law. 249
The court relied heavily on the fact that "not only
have the corporation's activities not been paralyzed but
that its profits have increased and its assets trebled during
the pendency of this proceeding .... )) 250
Such a fear of corporate death is morbid. When the
shareholders of a corporation can no longer act together
harmoniously then the corporation, just as a partnership
2 51
would be, ought to be dissolved.
Although the new statute does not guarantee dissolution, it does forbid the court from refusing to decree
such a dissolution solely on the ground that the corporation
has not yet started to lose money as a result of the impasse
in its management.
The Business Corporation Law expressly provides, in
its section on criteria for determining when dissolution
should be granted:
In a special proceeding brought under section 1104 (Petition in
case of deadlock among directors or shareholders) dissolution is
249

Id. at 7-8, 119 N.E.2d at 565 (citations omitted).

260 Ibid.

2-1See
TION

TINGLE,

THE STOCKHoLDa's

70-76, 111, 118, 119, 126 (1959).
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the corporate
not to be denied merely because it is found that
2 52
business has been or could be conducted at a profit.
It is to be hoped that this language is clear enough to
overrule the Radon decision.
Another improvement over present law on the subject
of corporate dissolution is the adoption of the IllinoisWisconsin provision 253 which allows a petition for dissolution by even a single shareholder, 25 4 despite any provisions in the certificate of incorporation to the contrary,
when, as the Comment to the new provision states, ".
the hopelessness of the deadlock is indicated by the fact
that two annual meetings have passed without electing
directors." 25

This section of the Illinois and Wisconsin Acts has
been lauded as establishing the clearest standard for deadlock or stalemate as a ground for dissolution.2 56 This provision is a welcome addition to New York law.
,Casebooks on corporations257 like to pose the additional
problem, as yet unanswered by the New York Court of
Appeals, 2 8 whether or not the court will enforce a shareholders' agreement calling for dissolution under certain
specified circumstances. Present statute law, of course,
makes no provision in this regard. The new law attempts
to cover this problem.
Section 1105 of the new statute provides:
The original certificate of incorporation may contain, or if
authorized at a meeting by vote of the holders of all outstanding
shares, whether or not entitled to vote thereon, the certificate of
incorporation may be amended to contain a provision that any
252
253

N.Y. Bus. Conp.

LAW

§ 1112(b)(3).

ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.771
(1957). The provisions are very similar.
254
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1104(c).
ILL. ANN. STAT.

1961 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 12, at 67 (Rev. Supp.).
Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence, Problems of Deadlock
257 and Dissolution, 19 U. CHi. L. REv. 778, 786 (1952).
See BAXR & CARY, CAss oN ConPoAv.ioNs 308 (3d ed. 1958).
258 But see Application of Hega Knitting Mills, 124 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup.
255
256

Ct. 1953); 1961 N.Y. LEz. Doc. No. 12, at 68 (Rev. Supp.), Comment to
§ 1105.
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shareholder, or the holders of any specified number or proportion
of outstanding shares may enforce dissolution of the corporation,
at will or upon the occurrence of any specified event. Each
certificate for shares must bear, on the face or back thereof, a
reference to such provision.
This provision represents a distinct improvement over
the Study Bill which provided that, where called for by
a shareholders' agreement, "a verified petition for an order
dissolving the corporation" might be filed.2 59 That provision did not guarantee dissolution in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, but presumably left the question
of whether or not dissolution should be granted within
the court's discretion.
The desired result is to carry out the will of the
participants as written, leaving no discretion to the judge,
who may well carry over his fear of personal death to such
artificial entities as corporations, 26 0 and hence refuse dissolution where the matter is discretionary, even though this
is contrary to the unambiguous terms of a shareholder
agreement.
The statute as enacted seems to make clear the legislative intent that such a shareholders' agreement for dissolution will be enforced according to its terms. According
to the Comment to the section this probably represents
26 1
present New York law.
The only objection to the provision is that it requires
the agreement for dissolution to be placed in the certificate
of incorporation.
Thus, assuming that the Reviser is
correct, the new statute is less liberal than present law.
Entombing the agreement in the certificate is probably
designed to protect transferees of the stock who would not
otherwise have notice that their corporation may be dissolved under them. 26 2 How much simpler, however, to
259S. Int. 3124, Pr. 3316, §11.07(b)
(1960); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
§ 1112(a).
260 See TINGLE, Op. cit. supra note 251, at 50.

LAW

261 "A shareholders' agreement for dissolution would probably be held
valid in the absence of statutory recognition of its validity." 1961 N.Y.
LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 68 (Rev. Supp.).
202

Fortunately,

the statute

also requires

notice

on each certificate

of
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enforce any unanimous shareholder agreement, but make it
void against an objecting transferee without notice!
Nonetheless the provision is a distinct improvement over
the section as originally introduced, and the laws of many
263
other jurisdictions.
What final assessment should be made of the close
corporation provisions of the proposed statute? On balance,
they undoubtedly represent a real improvement over present
New York law. It can be asserted with equal confidence
that they are not enough of an improvement to fully satisfy
the needs of such corporations, which, after all, represent
the overwhelming majority of corporations for which the
new statute is being enacted, but then of course, perhaps
no one can ever be perfectly satisfied in this life.
PUBLIC ISSUE CORPORATIONS AND

SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS

Most shareholders in public issue corporations are firm
believers in the so-called "Wall Street law": If you're not
satisfied with the way the corporation is being run, which
generally means the adequacy of the stock's dividend and
"growth" position, sell it.
A small minority are dissenters from this defeatist rule.
They possess the "reforming instinct," and feel that public
issue corporations have certain duties to their minority
shareholders. Since in most such corporations every shareholder is a minority shareholder, their appeal is to the

stock through

reference to the certificate provisions.

LAW § 1105.
263 See TINGLE,

N.Y. Bus.

CoRP.

op. cit. supra note 251, at 136, citing only four similar
statutes.
Compare the section as originally introduced in New York.
S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, §11.05 (1961) states: "If authorized at a meeting
by vote of the holders of all outstanding shares, whether or not entitled
to vote thereon, the certificate of incorporation may contain a provision
that any shareholder, or the holders of any specified number or proportion
of outstanding shares may enforce dissolution of the corporation, at will
or upon the occurrence of any specified event. Each certificate for shares
must bear, on the face or back thereof, a reference to such provision."
The section as originally proposed, therefore, seemed to forbid insertion of the provision in the certificate, requiring instead a later amendment of the certificate, a costly and unnecessary procedure.
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entire anonymous body of people who are ultimately the
2
owners of most of American business. ,1
The activities of the partisans of minority shareholder
rights in such corporations have made two principal thrusts.
The first may be characterized as the "movement for corporate democracy," the second as the "movement for corporate morality."
The "movement for corporate democracy" 265 is basically
designed to secure greater shareholder participation in corporate management. In the public issue corporation, every
shareholder is ordinarily a minority shareholder. Corporate management is usually in the hands of a board of
directors composed of a professional managerial group, often
dominated by the executives of the corporation, a self-perpetuating oligarchy often possessing little or no financial interest, in the sense of stock ownership, in the corporation.
The aim of the supporters of corporate democracy is
to have greater representation of the corporate "owners,"
i. e., the minority shareholders, on the board. The principal
vehicle for this shareholder representation is what, for those
familiar with old New York City politics, would be called
"P.R." or Proportional Representation. In corporate affairs
this is known as cumulative voting.
As has been indicated elsewhere, 2 66 a person's attitude
toward "corporate democracy" is based on whether he espouses a Platonic guardian theory of corporate government,
or on the other hand, feels that the "town meeting" analogy
is more appropriate. This is fundamentally a political
philosophy question, and is probably out of place here.
20

4 BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 257, at 15, states: "In 1947 there
were 243 non-financial corporations with assets over 100 million dollars,

and 260 with more than 10,000 employees. Statistics seem to indicate that
the largest 200 corporations account for one-eighth of the total civilian
labor force and one-fifth of all employees of private business outside of
agriculture. They held over 40 percent of all corporate assets."
A chart indicates that the 15 largest of these corporations together
have almost three million shareholders. Ibid. Any one poor shareholder
must get lost in such a crowd.
265 See Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors:
A 2 Corporate
Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 696, 716 n.86 (1960).
6

61d. at 715-16.
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Suffice it to say that present New York law makes
cumulative voting discretionary: a corporation may choose
to have it or not.26 7 Advocates of corporate democracy feel
it should be mandatory. 268 The Commerce and Industry
Association of New York, Inc. recommended that cumulative
voting should be absolutely prohibited. 269 The new law
continues the present option under which a corporation may
2 10
choose for itself whether or not it wants cumulative voting.
Even where cumulative voting is required by statute
or constitutional provision, 271 it is possible to render the
effectiveness of the provision nugatory if classification of
directors is permitted. As the court in the leading case
of Wolfson v. Avery,2 72 which invalidated the Illinois statute
allowing classification of directors 273 as in conflict with the
constitutional provision requiring cumulative voting, pointed
out, ten percent plus 1 of the shareholders of Montgomery
Ward will be able to elect a member to the board if all
nine of the directors are elected at one time. If the directors'
terms are staggered, i. e, if there is classification of directors
whereby only three are elected annually, the vote necessary
to elect one director would be twenty-five percent plus 1.214
The object of cumulative voting, minority representation
on the board of directors, can be completely circumvented,
therefore, by arranging the number of directors to be elected
at a number just low enough so that the minority votes even
though cumulated will be insufficient to elect anyone. Thus,
in a New York corporation like Montgomery Ward even
267 N.Y. SToCK CoRP. LAW § 49.
268 See Steadman & Gilbson, Should Cumulative Voting For Directors
Be Matdatory?, 11 Bus. LAW. 9 (1955); WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING

DnmcTcns 182-85 (1951); Young,, The Case for Cumulative Voting,
1950 Wis. L. REV. 49 (1950).
269
1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17, at 39 (Suggestion 25).
2
70.y. Bus. CORP. LAW §618.
271See, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE §2235; ILL. Co sT. art. XI, §3; PA.
CONST. art. XVI, § 4.
2726 Ill. 2d 78, 125 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
Compare Janney v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956), which holds that the corresponding Pennsylvania classification statute did not violate that state's
FOR

constitutional provision requiring cumulative voting.
273
274

11. Laws 1933, p. 308, § 35, repealed, Ill. Laws 1957, p. 2192, § 2.
Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 81, 126 N.E.2d 701, 704 (1955).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 36

if the minority shareholders can muster one-quarter of
the voting shares (very unlikely in a public-issue corporation
unless a well-financed full-scale proxy fight is in progress),
and even though cumulative voting is required, the majority
(and the majority usually votes as management solicits them
to) can effectively disenfranchise this significant minority
by simply providing in the by-laws that three of the nine
directors be elected each year, rather than all nine at the
same time. 275
The present law places no limitations on the classification of directors except to require that at least one-quarter
of them be elected each year and that any new directorships
created be apportioned among all the classes. 6 The new
law, despite the fact that the Comment to the section states
that its provisions "will prevent serious attenuation of
cumulative voting rights through the device of classification,) 2 7 does nothing more than limit the number of classes
to four, and require that each class shall be "as nearly equal
in number as possible," and that no class include less than
three directors. 27 8 Obviously neither the present iior the
new law would make cumulative voting effective in the
situation posed.
In fact, the new law is no more favorable to cumulative
voting than the repealed requirement that at least onequarter of the directors be elected each year; rather it is,
actually, merely a more complicated way of requiring the
same thing, unless a corporation is generous enough to have
less than four classes of directors.
Furthermore, a mere majority of shareholders may authorize the board to create new directorships, 279 and to fill
the vacancies thus created, themselves. 28 0 This should insure
the ineffectiveness of cumulative voting, by guaranteeing
sufficient majority-shareholder directors either originally or

275

See Kessler, supra note 265, at 730.

§ 55.
1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 46 (Rev. Supp.), Comment to § 704.
78 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 704.
279 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 702(b).
280N.Y. Bus. Coin. LAW §705(a). N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §704(c) would
276 N.Y. STocx CORP. LAW
277
2

not seem to prevent this result.
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repreby their own later creation to outvote any minority
28 '
voting.
cumulative
by
board
the
on
put
sentatives
Of course, except for corporations which desire to deceive
their shareholders into thinking that they have effective
cumulative voting rights, the problem is largely hypothetical,
anyhow: cumulative voting is not required, and accordingly
it will not be chosen by most corporations desiring to incorporate in this state. The movement for shareholder democracy has not been successful in New York.2 8 2

The second facet of shareholder attempts to protect their
interest in public issue corporations is the "movement for
corporate morality." This movement takes the form of two
demands: a high fiduciary standard for corporate agents,
and easy access to the courts to redress wrongs done by
those agents. The rationale is, of course, that if the corporation is to be run by an unimpeachable aristocracy, these
people should at least behave as true aristocrats.
281One concession to the cumulative voting advocates is, however, the
guaranty that where cumulative voting prevails, the minority directors may
not be ousted, even for cause, by a mere majority of the shareholders.
Where such ouster is possible, cumulative voting becomes nugatory, since
any minority director may always be removed when the majority decides
he is interfering with their running of the corporation. Yet such removal,
despite the fact that it means that although a minority may elect a
director a majority vote is required to keep him on the board, has been
permitted. See Campbell v. Loews, 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957). N.Y. Bus.
"The removal
CORP. LAw §706(c), on the other hand, wisely provides:
of directors, with or without cause, as provided in paragraphs (a) and
(b) is subject to the following: (1) In the case of a corporation having
cumulative voting, no director may be removed by the shareholders when
the shares voted against his removal would be sufficient to elect him
if voted cumulatively at an election at which the same total number
of votes were cast and the entire board were then being elected, nor
may a director be removed by the board; and (2) When by the provisions
of the certificate of incorporation the holders of the shares of any class
are entitled to elect one or more directors, any director so elected may be
removed only by the applicable vote of the holders of the shares of -that
class, voting as a class:'
282The new statute's provision (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 715 (b)) for
election of officers directly by the shareholders, discussed above in connection with close corporations, may, if availed of by a corporation be
a significant step toward shareholder democracy. However, it is unlikely
that public issue corporations will avail themselves of this provision any
more than they will of cumulative voting. Certain protection is afforded
the minority shareholders against removal of their directors by N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAw § 706(c). See note 281 .nqpra. This is a concession to corporate
democracy, but only where the corporation desires to grant it by placing the
necessary provisions in the certificate of incorporation.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 36

The fiduciary standard of directors and officers has,
in turn, two facets: the "duty of care," as it has been
called, or the duty not to be negligent, and the "duty of
loyalty," or the duty not intentionally2 83to harm their corporation, its stockholders and creditors.
The negligence standard is not prescribed under present
statutory law. Early case law, however, established a high
standard of care for corporate agents. In the case of Hun
v. Cary 284 the court laid down the rule that it is the duty
of directors to exercise "the same degree of care and prudence
that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their
own affairs."

285

That case also held that a director gives an implied
warranty of fitness for his job. The court added:
One who voluntarily takes the position of director, and invites
confidence in that relation, undertakes, like a mandatary, with
those whom he represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses
at least ordinary knowledge and skill, and that he will bring
them to bear in the discharge of his duties.2 88
Although a more recent case 2 8 7 has indicated a tendency
to relax this strict standard, Hun v. Cary has never been
overruled, and may still represent New York law.
The new statute, however, substitutes the standard of
the "reasonable director" for this standard of the "reasonable
man." The new section provides:
Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence,
2 83

BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPoRATIoNs 403, 432

(3d ed. 1958).

N.Y. 65 (1880).
See Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co.,
223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918).
28482

285 Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880).
In the Hun case, the directors
of a bank were held liable in a suit by a receiver for loss to the
bank when a mortgage was foreclosed on a building which they had had
erected at a cost of $27,000 on a lot which they had purchased at a cost
of $29,250, at a time when the bank's assets were only $13,000, while its
liabilities to depositors were $70,000.
28
Id. at 74.
2
87 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
See also Barnes
v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions ....288
Avowedly this is a less strict standard.
ment to the section states:

As the Com-

The prevailing rule in this state with respect to the standard
of care required of directors has been stated judicially as the
duty "to exercise the same degree of care and prudence that men
prompted by self interest generally exercise in their own affairs"
(see, Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 233 N.Y. 103
(1918)). However, it has been recognized that the standard of
care may vary according to the kind of corporation involved and
the particular circumstances in which the director is called upon to
act (see, Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (not otherwise reported)). The suggestion has been made that the standard of
care should be that of an ordinary director not an ordinary man.
The adoption of the standard prescribed by this section will
allow the court to envisage the director's duty of care as a relative
concept, depending on the kind of corporation involved, the par289
ticular circumstances and the corporate role of the director.
Whether this semantic difference will have any practical
effect upon the triers of the facts who will determine whether
or not a director has been negligent is a matter of some
conjecture. Certainly it should not result in any widespread
relaxation of diligence on the part of corporate managers,
and may in some instances prevent liability from being
imposed where under the circumstances it would be morally
unjust to hold the defendant. Especially considering its
dubious practical effect the provision would not seem so
dire as to merit condemnation, especially since it apparently
2 90
represents the majority rule in the country.
288N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §717. This would seem to be the standard
of the "ordinarily prudent director."
See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
158-59 (rev. ed. 1946); Rohrlich, New York's Proposed Business Corporation Law, 15 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 309, 317 (1960).
Ballantine
seems to treat his "just rule," substantially the same as that set forth in
the new statute, as establishing the standard of an "ordinarily prudent
director." Rohrlich states, however, that the bill (the law as enacted is the
same as the provision upon which he commented) rejects the standard of
the "ordinary director." The difference would seem merely semantic. It is
at least clear that the standard of Hun v. Cary has been rejected.
289 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 51 (Rev. Supp.).
290 Ibid.
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The other branch of fiduciary duty is the "duty of
loyalty." 291 This duty has a number of sub-branches. It
may thus be divided into the following categories: (1) interested directors' contracts; 292 (2) contracts between corporations having interlocking directorates; (3) duties to
creditors, 293 including purchase of corporate obligations at
a discount and improper distribution of corporate assets;
(4) pre-emption of corporate opportunities; 294 and (5)
purchases of shares from individual stockholders without full
disclosure.
There are, of course, other duties which a corporate
director or officer may breach, but generally these are duties
which are not restricted to directors and officers in their
capacities as such, but which even shareholders have to their
fellow shareholders.

29 5

With regard to (1) interested directors' contracts, and
(2) contracts between corporations having interlocking directorates, New York presently has no statutory provision.
As Indicated above,2 96 the new statute changes this and
clarifies New York law by adopting the so-called "liberal"
rule with regard to interested directors' contracts, 297 the
same rule as that presently the majority rule with regard
to contracts between corporations having interlocking directors; i. e., neither type of contract is automatically voidable despite the fact that the "tainted" director's presence
is necessary to a quorum or even that his vote in favor
of the contract is required for its approval. The only
proviso is, of course, that the contract be fair and reasonable.
There is nothing wrong with such a rule, since the really
important thing is that all corporate contracts be fair, and,
& CARY, op. cit. supra note 283, at 432.
A subsection of this provision would be the problem of "Executive
Compensation." See BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 283, at 432.
293 See BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 283, at 624.
294 See BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 283, at 538.
295 See, e.g., BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra note 283, at 515 (as to duties
of majority to minority shareholders), 590 (as to sale of control at a
profit or to looters).
296 See textual discussion in this article under section entitled Birdseye View of the New Law.
297 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(a) (3).
See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
173 (rev. ed. 1946).
291 BAKER

292
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if they are, it is immaterial whether or not an interested
director participates in their adoption.
The statute also -validates interested and "interlocking"
contracts where there is disclosure of the interest and a
majority of the shareholders ratify the transaction.2 98 This
represents the majority rule 299 and is also unexceptionable.
However, the statute goes further. It adds another
means of validating such contracts, namely by disclosure
coupled by approval by a directoral vote not requiring
counting of the interested directors.30 0 True, the validation
is not a conclusive one. All three means of upholding such
contracts are qualified by the statement that no such interested or interlocking contracts shall be voidable "for this
reason alone," 301 thus implying that the contracts may be
invalidated on other grounds.
However, paragraph (c) of the original bill which provided that the validating provisions shall not "relieve the
directors from responsibility (if any) imposed under this
article for loss, or injury suffered by the corporation as a
result of such a contract .

302 has been deleted.

According to the Comment to the omitted provision,
this latter statement was:
* * * intended to make clear that this section does not validate a
contract or transaction between an interested director and his
corporation for all purposes but merely provides that Such contract
or transaction is not automatically void or voidable by reason alone
30 3
of the director's interest.
29

sN.Y. Bus. CoaR.

LAW §713(a)(2).
Op. cit. mtpra note 297, at 176. See also 19 C.J.S.
Corporations §783 (1938).
Compare HENN, CORPORATIONs 376 (1961),
who states: "Most of the cases, however, take the position that less-thanunanimous shareholder ratification does not bar avoidance. . . ." Actually
the new statute is somewhat stricter than the majority rule in that it
disqualifies the interested directors from voting as shareholders to ratify
their contracts. The statute, however, omits the requirement of good faith
which Ballantine states is part of the majority rule.
300N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW §713(a)(1).
Although superficially similar,
this is a departure from the majority rule, in that it allows the interested
director to be counted for a quorum, and thus encourages his presence,
and hence increases the possibility of domination.
3o N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAW § 713(a).
302A. Int. 885, Pr. 885, §7.13(c) (1961).
303 1961 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 12, at 49 (Supp.).
2 99

BALLANTINE,
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Now, it is not so clear how conclusive the validation
will be.30 4
The only danger from the statutory provision authorizing such contracts where approved "by a vote sufficient for
such purpose without counting the vote or votes of such
interested director or directors" is that the interested director may be able to dominate the others and thus have
an unfair contract approved. This was the situation in
a well-known New York case.3 0 5 Probably the qualifications
in the statute and its Comment will be sufficient to preserve the rule that an unfair contract will be invalidated
even where adopted without the interested directors' vote.
It might be advisable to make it clear that at least where
domination is shown the burden of proof will be upon those
seeking to uphold the contract. 0 6 The new statute may well
be held to place the burden of proof in every case on the
party seeking to upset the contract. At least in this situation it seems unwise to do so.
The major defect from the point of view of those interested in holding corporate guardians to a standard commensurate with their perquisites, however, is in the subsection on interested directors' contracts which allows the
directors to fix their own compensation, 0 7 an admitted in304

The Comment to the section as enacted, despite the omission of the

clause in the statute expressly qualifying the effect of validation of
interested directors' contracts, states: "It should be noted that the function
of this section is not to validate for all purposes a contract or transaction
between an interested director and his corporation, but simply to establish
that such contract or transaction is not automatically void or voidable
by reason alone of the director's interest. A director who does not make
a full and fair disclosure of his interest, or members of the board
who breach their duty as defined in §717 in approving such a contract
or transaction may be held responsible for such conduct despite a technical
compliance with the section." 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 49 (Rev.
Supp.). Language in the statute more clearly justifying the Comment
would have been appropriate.
305 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E.
378 (1918).
306 Ballantine interprets Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E2d 18
(1942), as placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff where a charter
provision purports to validate interested directors' contracts. BAILANTIn,
op. cit. supra note 297, at 184 n.83. The statute would seem to have
a similar effect.
307 "Unless
otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or
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novation in New York law.3 08 This provision is absolutely
unqualified except for the right of the certificate or by-laws
to forbid such self-dealing. The new law is therefore a
significant relaxation of the fiduciary duty of corporate
directors. Even where their compensation is approved by a
majority of the shareholders, there are sufficient dangers
to merit the requirement that that compensation be reasonable.3 0 9 Even if it be accepted that a man can sometimes
serve two masters, himself and his corporation, satisfactorily,
there is no justification for giving a carte blanche in the
most dangerous area of self-dealing, the fixing of his own
salary. Certainly, the very least that is necessary is to
expressly subject such a power to the same conditions as
other interested directors' contracts. The provision as it
now stands is either a shocking example of poor draftsmanship, or of callous disregard for the rights of corporate
shareholders, out of whose pockets, it is obvious, tis money
will come.
A more minor relaxation in the fiduciary standard is
the substitution of a prohibition of loans to directors s10
for the present prohibition on loans to shareholders,81 1
which the Comment to the new section suggests is out-ofdate. 31.2 Loans to shareholders will thus be perfectly legal.
Even loans to directors will be valid if approved by a

the by-laws, the board shall have authority to fix the compensation of
N.Y. Bus. Cosp. LAW §713(c).
directors for services in any capacity."
30s 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc No. 12, at 49 (Rev. Supp.).
309 See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933), in which payments under
an executive bonus arrangement became in later years so excessive that
the Supreme Court ordered the district court to inquire into its reasonableness, even though the plan had initially been approved by the shareholders
and not merely the recipient directors.
If even a shareholder approved plan can lead to abuse, how much
more likely is it that where only the recipients themselves need approve,
the compensation they set for themselves will be excessive.
"A loan shall not be made
310 N.Y. Bus. CoaP. LAW § 714 provides:
by a corporation to any director unless it is authorized by vote of the
For this purpose, the shares of the director who would
shareholders.
be the borrower shall not be shares entitled to vote. A loan made in
violation of this section shall be a violation of the duty to the corporation
of the directors approving it. but the obligation of the borrower with
respect to the loan shall not be affected thereby."

311N.Y. STocx Coap. LAW § 59.
312

1961 N.Y. LEG. Dom No. 12, at 49 (Rev. Supp.).
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Many cogent reasons

can

undoubtedly be given for sanctioning loans to both directors
and shareholders. On the other hand, the danger to creditors
through withdrawal of the assets on which they have a right
to rely as security for the corporation's indebtedness presents
an even more compelling reason for forbidding loans both
to shareholders and to directors. 318
In the third field or
sub-branch of fiduciary duty, that of duties to creditors, this
change in the law therefore hardly reflects an improvement.
This field of fiduciary duty, that of the directors' duties
to creditors, is by and large the only one regulated by
statute under present New York law. In addition to the
loan prohibition there is the general prohibition against preferential transfers to its officers, directors or shareholders
of any corporate assets when the corporation is insolvent, 314
31 5
and the prohibition against dividends impairing capital.
The new section 316 carries over in substance the latter of
these prohibitions, and adds provisions for liability for improper share repurchases 317 and distribution of assets after
corporate dissolution without adequately providing for all
known liabilities. 318 Unaccountably, however, it omits the

313It

should be noted that despite the intention of N.Y. PEN. LAW

§ 664(4), there would seem t6 be nothing to prevent use of this as a device
to enable a shareholder to obtain a return of the consideration paid for
his stock, whenever friends on the hoard of directors desire to allow him
to do so, by lending him back the amount he has paid for his stock and
then accepting his shares back in compromise of his indebtedness even
though the corporation has no surplus and could therefore not repurchase
those shares.
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §513(a).
A clever loophole
is thus created for circumvention of N.Y. Bus. Coifp. LAW §§513, 514,
restricting repurchase of shares by a corporation.
314N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §15.
Although present New York law
ordinarily relies on a bankruptcy insolvency test, N.Y. STocK CoRP. LAW
§ 15 also imposes the equity insolvency restriction, which is utilized in
the new statute. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(a) (8).
315N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 58.
316N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §719(a)(1) imposes joint and several liability
on directors for dividends declared in violation of N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 510.
317 N.Y. PEN. LAW §664(5) makes repurchases of shares from other
than surplus a misdemeanor.
However, symmetry requires that a provision for director liability be placed in the corporation law. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §719(a)(2) does so.
118N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §719(a)(3).
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prohibition against preferential transfers to insiders although
forbidden in the act as originally proposed.3 1 9
By and large, the new section mirrors the Model Act
but with one significant difference. The Model Act, which
has, incidentally, been criticized as being too favorable to
the management group, 320 exonerates a director if he relied
in good faith upon the financial statements of the corporation
32
as does the new New York statute. '
Not content with such a specific exculpation, however,
the Business Corporation Law even outdoes the Model Act

in providing excuses from liability to corporate managers.
It provides that if a director violates one of these provisions,
he will not be liable if, "in the circumstances, he discharged
his duty to the corporation." 32
This provision is very ambiguous. It might well be
interpreted to exonerate any director who had grounds to
believe that even the specifically interdicted distributions
were not improper. 32 3 And it will be noted these grounds
319S. Int 522, Pr. 522, §§7.19(a)(1), 7.19(b) (1961), respectively made
directors "who vote for or concur in" a transfer of property in violation
of § 5.10, and officers who "participate" therein, jointly and severally liable
"to the corporation for the benefit of its creditors and shareholders," to
the extent of any injury suffered by them. All three provisions have now
been deleted. Oddly enough, however, N.Y. Bus CoRp. LAW § 720 allows
suit "against one or more directors or officers" to compel the defendant
"to account' for "the acquisition by himself, transfers to others, loss or
waste of corporate assets due-to any neglect of, or failure to perform, or
other violation of his duties." It also allows suit "to set aside an illegal
conveyance, assignment or transfer of corporate assets, where the transferee
knew of its illegality," but the section only applies to director or officer
transferees. See opening words of.N.Y. Bus. Cor,. LAW § 720(a), set forth
infra, note 324.
320 See Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Initation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 1, 5, 15 (1955).
32,N.Y. Bus. Cons. LAW § 717. MODEL BUSINESS CDRPoRATiox AcT
ANN. §43 (1960) provides: "A director shall not be liable under subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) of this section if he relied and acted in good
faith upon financial statements of the corporation represented to him to be
correct by the president or the officer of such corporation having charge
of its books of account, or stated in a written report by an independent
public or certified public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to
reflect the financial condition of such corporation, nor shall he be so
liable if in good faith in determining the amount available for any such
dividend or distribution he considered the assets to be of their book
value."
322N.y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §719(e).
323 Study Bill §7.16(h) provided: "A director or officer, as the case
may be, shall not be liable under any paragraph of this section if, in

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 36

are not restricted to good faith reliance on the corporation's
financial statements. They might include a mere failure
to investigate. Further, the corporate agent is exonerated
if he performs his duty to the corporation. Is the obligation
to the corporation coextensive with the obligation to shareholders and creditors for whose bdnefit the section is enacted,
or may it not be significantly less broad? The "corporation,"
especially if it is already insolvent, may well not be harmed
although creditors and shareholders may be pauperized.
The statute also fails to impose any specific liability
on officers who participate in these few proscribed violations
of duty, despite the fact that previous New York law, in
three out of the four situations which the new provision
replaces, 2 4 and indeed the new act as originally introaccordance with the standard prescribed by section 7.15 (Duty of directors
and officers) of this article, he had reasonable grounds to believe and did
believe that the acts or conduct imposing' liability, as defined by the
paragraph under which he is charged, had not occurred."
Whether the change in verbiage in the new law is designed to have
any significance or is merely an attempt at greater conciseness is not clear.
The Comment to the predecessor of the section as enacted is unenlightening on this score. The bill as finally enacted adds the "conclusiveness
presumption" with regard to financial statements. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 717 provides: "Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of
their respective positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence,
care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions. In discharging their duties, directors
and officers, when acting in good faith, may rely upon financial statements
of the corporation represented to them to be correct by the president or
the officer of the corporation having charge of its books of accounts, or
stated in a written report by an independent public or certified public
accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial
condition of such corporation."
324N.Y. STocx CoRP. LAW §§15 (preferential transfers), 59 (loans to
stockholders), 61 (false reports). A sympathetic court may justify the
imposition of liability on the basis of N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 720 (a)
which provides: "An action may be brought against one or more directors
or officers of a corporation to procure a judgment for the following relief:
"(1) To compel the defendant to account for his official conduct in the
following cases:
"(A) The neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of
his duties in the management and disposition of corporate assets committed
to his charge.
"(B) The acquisition by himself, transfer to others, loss or waste of
corporate assets due to any neglect of, or failure to perform, or other
violation of his duties.
"(2) To set aside an illegal conveyance, assignment or transfer of
corporate assets, where the transferee knew of its illegality.

"(3)

To enjoin a proposed illegal conveyance, assignment or transfer
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duced, 32 5 and the Study Bill3 6 extended at least partial
liability to them. Since in a large corporation the officers
are more likely to "know what's going on" than many of the
directors, it seems unwise not to include them under the
already limited liability provisions applicable to directors.
The last concession to the demands of the opponents
of corporate morality made by the new act also represents
a change from the Study Bill. As indicated above,32 7 the
new statute is an improvement over present law in requiring
disclosure of the source of corporate distributions where
that source is other than earned surplus. Obviously, to
be effective the notice requirement must include appropriate
sanctions to prevent its violation. The Study Bill provided:
Directors or officers who fail to forward to the shareholders
of the corporation the written notice required by sections 5.11

(Dividends in cash or property) or 5.12 (Share distributions to
shareholders) of this chapter shall be jointly and severally liable
to any person who becomes or remains a creditor or shareholder
of the corporation by reason of the failure to give such notice

to the amount of the debt contracted which is not paid when due
in the case of a creditor and to the amount of any damage sustained
by reason of such failure in the case of a shareholder.3 28
This subsection is deleted in the law as finally enacted.
In its stead a new provision has been added to the Corporate Finance article making the corporation liable "for
any damage sustained by any shareholder" in consequence of
3 29
the failure to make the disclosures required in that article.
This is a totally unsatisfactory substitute. It is rather like
providing that persons who commit suicide will be punished
by death.

of corporate assets, where there is sufficient evidence that it will be made."
The section is, however, basically procedural, and it is uncertain what
"violation of duties," and "illegality" mean when there is no substantive
prohibition against previously forbidden actions. See also note 319 supra.

325 S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, § 7.19(b) (1961).
(f), (g).
the textual discussion in this article under the section entitled
The Financial Provisions of the New Law.
323 Study Bill § 7.16(g).
328 Study Bill § 7.17(e),
327See

329

N.Y. Bus. Coa6. LAw § 520.
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As stated above, when a corporation pays dividends
or makes other distributions from capital surplus, rather
than earned surplus, it is usually a sign that the corporation
is not in the best of financial health. This is the reason
for the notice. And it is just when the corporation is
sickest, and hence will be unable to pay the "damage sustained," that the incentive to conceal this fact by failure
to provide the notice will be greatest. If they are not
personally liable, unscrupulous directors will not hesitate
to omit the notice at the very time when it is most needed,
just before insolvency. After they have salvaged their
investment through distributions, they will undoubtedly have
no objection to the duped shareholder's procuring his worthless judgment against the empty corporation.
The protection offered by the new notice requirements
of the act has thus been rendered completely nugatory, by
30
3
failure to impose any effective sanctions.

The Model Act has been called "an invitation to
irresponsibility." 331 If such a characterization aptly applies
to that moderate proposal, the only appropriate description
of the fiduciary provisions of the new New York statute
would seem to be a "command to irresponsibility."
It is fortunate that the other two areas of fiduciary
duty, pre-emption of corporate opportunities, and purchases
of shares from individual stockholders, are both, like the
remaining aspect of duties to creditors, i. e., purchase of
330 Undoubtedly the drafters of the act were concerned
lest they hold
directors liable for an honest mistake in the accounting computations
required. This is no excuse for exonerating them from all liability. As
indicated above, the new act allows a director to escape liabilty for improper distributions where he has done his "duty." N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAW
§719(e).
This, and the provision exculpating him where he can show
good faith reliance on the accounts of the corporation, would seem to offer
sufficient protection to honest directors, who, of course, should be protected.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717.
At the very least, wilful failure to send the appropriate notice should
be added to the list of directorial misdemeanors in N.Y. PEN. LAW § 664.
With neither civil nor penal liability of the directors, the notice requirements of the new law are like the high-sounding guarantees of the
Russian Constitution, mere words.
331 Harris, The Model Buitness Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U. L. REy. 1 (1955).
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corporate securities at a discount, left to case law under
the new statute, as they were under the old law.
It is obvious that in those areas of fiduciary duty
into which the new statute has intruded, the first demand
of the movement for corporate morality, a high fiduciary
standard, has not been met.

Fortunately, one significant relaxation in the fiduciary
standard of directors found in the bill as originally introduced failed to become law. That bill abandoned the
principle that non-dissenting directors are equally liable with
those who happen to vote in favor of an illegal distribution. 3 32 Under present law directors may only escape lia-

bility for improper dividends by such a dissent or by an
affirmative showing "that they had reasonable grounds to
believe, and did believe, that such dividend or distribution
would not impair the capital. . .

.,, ... The Study Bill,

on the other hand, had extended the presumption of assent
from failure to disavow the action to all of the fiduciary
duties under the new act.3 34 Unaccountably, this provision
was dropped from the bill as originally proposed. Under
it only directors "who vote for or concur in" 335 the action
S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, § 7.19 (1961).
STOCK Cons.' LAW § 58 provides: "No stock corporation shall
declare or pay any dividend which shall impair its capital, nor while its
capital is impaired, nor shall any such corporation declare or pay any
dividend or make any distribution of assets to any of its stockholders,
whether upon a reduction of the number or par value of its shares or
of its capital, unless the value of its assets remaining after the payment
of such dividend, or after such distribution of assets, as the case may be,
shall be at least equal to the aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities,
including capital. In case any such dividend shall be paid, or any such
distribution of assets made, the directors in whose administration the
same shall have been declared or made, except those (1) who may have
caused their dissent therefrom to be entered upon the minutes of the
meetings of directors at the time or (2) who having been absent when
such action was taken may have communicated in writing their dissent
to be entered on the minutes within a reasonable time after learning
of such action, or (3) who affirmatively show that they had reasonable
grounds to believe, and did believe, that such dividend or distribution
would not impair the capital of such corporation, shall be liable jointly
and severally to such corporation and to the creditors thereof to the
full amount of any loss sustained by such corporation or by its creditors
respectively by reason of such dividend or distribution."
332

333N.Y.

334 Study Bill § 7.16(i).

335What acts evidenced concurrence in the illegal distribution were
not spelled out. The Comment was also no help. 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc.
No. 12, at 52 (Supp.).
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were to be liable. A loophole for circumvention of liability
by the corporate prime movers through use of naive and
judgment-proof directors to make illegal distributions was
thus created.3 36
The bill as finally passed returns to the philosophy of
the Study Bill, and thus represents a bright spot in the
otherwise dim picture of management duties under the new
law.

33 7

What of the other demand of the movement for corporate morality, easy access to the courts to redress those
wrongs which, despite the lenient legal standard, are redressable offenses?
Present law is hardly generous to a shareholder desiring
to bring a derivative suit. There are an almost insuperable
number of obstacles to success. Assuming he can get
jurisdiction over the real wrongdoers and all the beneficiary
corporations, often an insurmountable barrier, 338 he still
has three formidable hurdles under present New York law.
The first is the contemporaneous ownership requirement, or
336 Of course, if the unscrupulous absent directors were the recipients
of the improper distributions the corporation (or its trustee in bank-

ruptcy) could still have recovered them, but it was saddled with the
burden of proving that the defendant knew of the illegality. S. Int.
The burden of proof should be
522, Pr. 522, § 7.19(d) (2) (1961).
on the absent director, as is true under present law (N.Y. SToCK CoRP.
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
LAW § 58), and, fortunately, the law as passed.
§ 719(b).
337N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 719(b)
provides:
"A director who is
present at a meeting of the board, or any committee thereof, at which
action specified in paragraph (a) is taken shall be presumed to have
concurred in the action unless his dissent thereto shall be entered in the
minutes of the meeting, or unless he shall submit his Written dissent to
the person acting as the secretary of the meeting before the adjournment
thereof, or shall deliver or send by registered mail such dissent to the
secretary of the corporation promptly after the adjournment of the
meeting. Such fight to dissent shall not apply to a director who voted
in favor of such action. A director who is absent from a meeting
of the board, or any committee thereof, at which such action is taken
shall be presumed to have concurred in the action unless he shall deliver
or send by registered mail his dissent thereto to the secretary of the
corporation or shall cause such dissent to be filed with the minutes of
the proceedings of the board or committee within a reasonable time after
learning of such action."
N.Y. Bus. Coax. LAW §719(a) forbids improper dividends, share
repurchases and dissolution distributions.
33s See Kessler, Corporations and the New Federal Diversity Statute:
A Denial of Justice, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 239, 258-61.
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the rule that he must have been a shareholder at the time
of the wrongs complained of, or have inherited his shares
from someone who was.339 Secondly, he must have made
a demand on the directors to bring the suit, or possess
some sufficient excuse for not so doing.3 40 Thirdly, and the
most onerous of all, is the requirement for posting "security
for expenses" of the defendants which may only be escaped
under present law if the plaintiff (or combined plaintiffs)
holds a total of 5% of the outstanding shares of some class
of the corporation's stock, or if the value of the stock held
is over $50,000.341 An Appellate Division decision has even
required that all of the plaintiffs necessary to make up this
required amount meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement, i. e., that they also have been shareholders at the
34 2
time of the wrongdoing complained of.
The conditions precedent for bringing a shareholder's
derivative action are found in sections 626 and 627 of the
new statute. All three of the old requirements are retained:
contemporaneous ownership, 843 demand on the directors, or
legitimate excuses, 344 and the security for expenses
requirement. 34" With regard to the latter, however, section
627 allows the corporation to compel the security deposit
"if the plaintiff or plaintiffs hold less than five percent of
the outstanding shares or hold voting trust certificates or a
beneficial interest in shares representing less than five percent of such shares" unless they have a value in excess
of $50,000. The express acquittance of equitable owners
of the requisite percentage of shares is a welcome clarification. The omission of the words "of any class" found
in old New York General Corporation Law Section 61-b

339N.y. Gmr. CoRp. LAW § 61.
840BALL&TiNE,

COPOrATIoNS

345-46

(rev. ed.

1946);

LATrIN,

Con-

PoRArToNs 352-55 (1959); STEvENs, CoRpoRATioNs 800-03 (2d ed. 1949).
3"4N.Y. GEN. CoaR.

LAW §61-b.

The short statute of limitations is,

of course, yet another obstacle. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 48(8).
842

Richmond v. Felmus, 8 App. Div. 2d 985, 190 N.Y.S2d 920 (2d Dep't

1959). This case was criticized in Prunty, Business Associations, 34
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1425, 1427 (1959).
343N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §626(b).
3-N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §626(c).
345 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 627.
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as a qualification upon the requirement of five percent
share ownership, would seem, on the other hand, to mean
a significant increase in the burden imposed on all shareholders in a corporation with more than one class of stock.
It appears, however, that this omission was one of inadvertence, rather than design, and hence will be corrected.
It is on this assumption that no additional criticism of
this omission will be made. Of course, if the change is
not made a terrible blow will have been dealt to the
movement for corporate morality.
One bright spot of the bill as introduced was the overruling of the ill-conceived decision 346 which required that
all the shareholders necessary to make up the requisite 5%,
or over $50,000 in value, to avoid posting security, meet
the contemporaneous ownership requirement.847 The purpose of the security for expenses provision was to discourage
"strike" or blackmail suits where the plaintiff brought the
action merely to harass, or worse, to be bought off.3 48

The

exception dispensing with the necessity for posting security
where the plaintiff, or plaintiffs together, owned 5% of
the stock, or stock worth over $50,000, was a recognition of
the fact that where the stockholdings of the litigants were
significant the danger of such strike suits was small. Obviously, the guarantee of reasonable cause is present where
the holdings are significant, no matter when the stock was
bought. Abrogating the case decision that all of the stockholders necessary to make up the required holdings must
S46 Richmond v. Felmus, supra note 342.
347A. Int. 885, Pr. 885,
§6.26(d) (1961) provided: "Shareholders or
holders of voting trust certificates of the corporation or of beneficial interests in such shares may be permitted to intervene as plaintiffs in such
action, whether or not they were holders thereof at the time of the
transaction complained of, and the number and value *of such shares or
shares represented by such interests may be counted for the purposes of
section 6.27 (Security for expenses in shareholders' derivative action
brought in the -right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its

favor) ."

The reference to Richmond v. Felmus in 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12,
at 43-44 (Supp.), Comment to §6.26, was omitted in the Revised Comment,

1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 12, at 43 (Rev. Supp.), for obvious reasons.
34 See Governor's Memorandum filed with Senate Bills 1314, 1315, dated
April 9, 1944.
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meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement was, therefore, a good change.

Unfortunately, the statute as passed 349 deletes the
specific provision of the original bill, leaving the matter

again to case law decision, or worse, perhaps indicating a
legislative rejection of the wise rule that the security for
incorporate the contemporaneous
expenses section does not
50
3

ownership requirement.
In this respect, and generally, the new statute mirrors
present law, rejecting changes made in the bill as originally
introduced.3 51

This is unfortunate, because taken with the

349

See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §§ 626, 627.
Nevertheless, a sympathetic court is given some support if it
chooses to interpret the statute as abrogating the Felmus rule, by the fact
that N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §627 requires the "plaintiff or plaintiffs" to
meet the ownership requirements to avoid the necessity of a security
deposit, while N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §626(b), imposing the contemporaneous ownership requirement, merely commands that the "plaintiff" be
such
35 1 a holder. This is carrion comfort, however.
The bill as introduced made a significant change in the availability
of the security deposit, to the reimbursement of the defendant corporate
officers and directors for their expenses in defending the action. Present
law provides for a security deposit sufficient to cover the expenses of
the individual defendants, for which the corporation may become liable
pursuant to the indemnification provisions of present law, and provides
that the corporation shall have recourse to that deposit in satisfaction of
its indemnification obligations. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b. The bill as
introduced granted resort to the deposit only on condition that the court
made "a finding that the action was brought without reasonable cause."
The obligation of the corporation,
A. Int. 885, Pr. 885, §627 (1961).
under its statutory duty to indemnify, may, however, be broader, since
it may have to pay the accused director or officer even where he is only
350

technically successful.

N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 724 grants a statutory right of indemnifica-

tion "to the extent provided
"...
LAW § 725(a) provides:

.

.

. in section 725.

.

.

."

N.Y. Bus. CORP.

a director or officer who has been wholly
successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of a civil or
criminal action or proceeding shall be entitled to indemnification, subject
to subparagraph (g) (2).'
"No indemnification shall be made
Subparagraph (g) (2) provides:
under this article where it appears:
"(2) That the indemnification would be inconsistent with a provision
of the certificate of incorporation, a by-law, a resolution of shareholders
or directors, an agreement or other proper corporate action, in effect at
the time of the accrual of the alleged cause of action asserted in the
threatened or pending action or proceeding in which the expenses were
incurred or other amounts were paid, which prohibits or otherwise limits
indemnification. .. "
The bill as introduced had almost identical provisions. See S. Int.
522, Pr. 522, §§7.24, 7.25(a), 7.25(g)(2) (1961).
Such success of the real defendant presumably is not the same as a
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indemnification provisions, to be discussed below, it apparently means that the plaintiff may be compelled to pay
the indemnification expenses of guilty directors who are
technically successful, e.g., through pleading the statute of
limitations. 3 52 This is unjust, in no way serves the purpose
of security deposit requirements (to prevent unfounded
shareholder suits), and, hence, should not be allowed under
any good corporation statute.
There is, however, an innovation, in the new statute,
and one to which no one really interested in shareholder
rights, as distinguished from the possible blackmail value
of shareholders' suits, can object. It is the provision that
no derivative suit may be discontinued, compromised or

"finding that the action was brought without reasonable cause." A defendant may be wholly successful, e.g., where he pleads the statute of limitations, even though he is clearly guilty, and the plaintiff would thus seem
to have "reasonable cause" for bringing the action against him. Thus the
liability of the corporation might have been broader than the liability of
the plaintiff's security deposit, a clear favoritism to the shareholder
bringing the action, but one which is ambivalent from the point of view
of the advocates of the shareholder's suit as a vehicle for guaranteeing
corporate morality, since after all, the money used for the balance of the
required indemnification ultimately comes from the pockets of other
shareholders, and is used to reimburse those who morally may have no
right to such assisiance. This is, however, basically a question of the
adequacy of the indemnification provisions, which will be discussed below,
and not of the security for expenses sections of the statute. Suffice it to
say here that conditioning the loss of the plaintiff's security deposit on a
finding that he has brought the action without reasonable cause would have
been a significant improvement over the present law which has justified a
court in forcing a plaintiff to pay the expenses of a dishonest director who
was successful only because he found some legal technicality to bar an
otherwise just recovery against him. The only possible objection is to the
vagueness of the term "without reasonable cause." Probably a flagrant case
of harassment or outright blackmail would be required before a shareholder's
suit would be considered to be brought without reasonable cause. Certainly,
where a defendant does not win on the merits the suit should never be considered to have been brought without reasonable cause. The courts could
probably have been relied upon to give a correct interpretation to the phrase.
However, the term has been completely deleted in favor of a return to the
old law.
352 This was the case in Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div. 1010, 106
N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th Dep't 1951) (memorandum decision). The result seems
assured in view of the language of N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw § 725 (a), which
grants statutory indemnification to "a director or officer who has been wholly
successful on the merits or otheruise." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the legislature has given a rebuff to the judicial trend away from benefiting the guilty,
which is manifested in the recent case of Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y.
263, 120 N.E2d 819 (1954).
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settled without court approval and on such notice to the
other shareholders as the court may direct.3 5 Under present
law there is no express requirement for court approval of
a settlement, and thus nothing to prevent an out-of-court
settlement to the profit of the individual plaintiff, with
nothing going to the rest of the shareholders, for whose
benefit, theoretically, the suit has been brought. The result,
in the language of the street, is merely that the "crooks"
have to "kick in" part of their "take" for protection, to the
stockholder who has been clever enough to catch them
"with their hands in the till." 354 True, the ,Court of Appeals

has held that any moneys thus received by the plaintiffs
may be recovered by the corporation,3 55 but this requires
a second shareholder's. suit, by a plaintiff who presumably
must meet all the requirements for a shareholder's action.
The requirement for notice, borrowed as was the previous prohibition of out-of-court settlements from the federal
rule,356 is also well designed to minimize collusive suits and
collusive settlements. It codifies a wise custom of the lower
New York courts, 357 courageously adopted despite the lack
of statutory authorization under present law.
Both of the above borrowings from the federal rule are
all to the good.
s353.Y. Bus. Cons. LAW §626(d) provides: "Such action shall not be
discontinued, compromised or settled, without the approval of the court having
jurisdiction of the action. If the court shall determine that the interests of
the shareholders or any class or classes thereof will be substantially affected
by such discontinuance, compromise, or settlement, the court, in its discretion,
may direct that notice, by publication or otherwise, shall be given to the
shareholders or class or classes thereof whose interests it determines will be
so affected; if notice is so directed to be given the court may determine
which one or more of the parties to the action shall bear the expense of
giving the same, in such amount as the court shall determine and find to
be reasonable in the circumstances, and the amount of such expense shall be
awarded as special costs of the action and recoverable in the same manner
as statutory taxable costs."

354 See Manufacturers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 176 Misc. 220, 25
N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd inem. 262 App. Div. 731 (1st Dep't 1941),
aff'd, 288 N.Y. 668, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
355
See Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
3
56 FED. P, Crv. P. 23(c).
357 See BALLANTiNE, CoRpoRATIoNs 364 n.7 (rev. ed. 1946); Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders" Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L. R.v. 1, 20
(1947).
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Fortunately, the bill as finally passed does not borrow
another provision of the federal rule although this was
originally incorporated in the Study Bill. Section 6.25 (c)
of the Study Bill was based on Federal Rule 23(b), and,
accordingly, not only required the plaintiff to set forth with
particularity the efforts he had made to secure action by the
directors, but also "if necessary, by the stockholders." 858
Such a provision is perfectly all right in a federal procedural rule, since the object of the federal courts since
Erie v. Tompkins has been to produce conformity of result
in the federal court with that in the appropriate state court.
To do so it is obviously necessary to assimilate state substantive law. If a demand on the shareholders is necessary
in the particular state of incorporation it would conflict
with the policy of Erie v. Tompkins to dispense with such
a demand merely because the action were being brought in
a federal court. 'Such a requirement is important enough
to be considered "substantive." 359 Hence, the provision, "if
necessary," i. e., if necessary under the appropriate state
law.
Unfortunately, when the states themselves have swallowed the federal rule whole, these words have produced
a good deal of confusion. Designed as they were merely
to adapt to state substantive law, they have nonetheless been
held in New Jersey to change that substantive law by requiring a demand on the shareholders where one was not
previously necessary.3 10 The Delaware Chancery Court made
a similar error, which was fortunately corrected by the
Delaware Supreme Court. 6 '
It is obvious that in a large, or even medium-sized
corporation, the expense and inconvenience involved in
making a demand on every shareholder will be so great
that the suit will never be brought where such a demand
is a necessary condition precedent.
358 Study Bill § 6.25(c).

359 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
360 Escoett v. Aldecress Country Club, 16 N.J. 438, 109 A.2d 277 (1954).
361 Mayer v. Adams, 135 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1957), rev'd, 141 A.2d 458
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1958).
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The present New York rule is clear, and logical: no
demand need be made on the shareholders where they would
not have the power to ratify the transaction.3 62 Fraud on
the part of the directors is non-ratifiable.3 63 Hence, no
demand need be made where such fraud is alleged. There
can be no good reason under such circumstances for requiring a shareholder demand, unless allowing the wrongdoers to escape liability because the plaintiff will not have
enough money to proceed, is considered a good reason.36 4
Yet the Delaware Chancery Court, and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey decided that such a demand was
necessary. Perhaps the New York courts would have been
wiser. It is better, however, to omit the provision altogether, as has been done in the final draft.
There would seem no very cogent reason for a demand
on the shareholders under any circumstances. The statute
would seem to dispense with it completely, and thus 365
assure that no new hurdle will be erected as an addition
to the significant barriers already in the way of the shareholders in their struggle to enforce corporate morality.
Fortunately, too, another obstacle that was almost
erected, getting as far as the Study Bill,36 6 has also been
removed from the Business Corporation Law as finally passed.
The Study Bill, perhaps attempting an uneasy compromisq
between present New York law and the provisions of the
California statute, which only requires posting of security,
regardless of the size of the plaintiff's shareholdings, where
"there is no reasonable probability that the prosecution
Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
363 Ibid.
362

364 The reasons advanced by the majority in the leading case to the contrary, Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955), do not
seem persuasive. A distinguishing feature of the case is that under Ohio
law, as opposed to the sounder New York rule, a disinterested majority of
shareholders may ratify directors' frauds. Even so, this unwise decision
was overruled by an amendment to the Ohio statute. OHio Rnv. CoDE ANN.
§ 2307.311 (Baldwin 1960).
365 See 1961 N.Y. Luc. Doc. No. 12, at 43 (Rev. Supp.), Comment to § 626,
which reads: "Paragraph (c) is new and is based on Federal Rule 23(b)
but the necessity of making a demand upon the shareholders as well as the
directors has been omitted.'
366 Study Bill § 626(b).
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of the cause of action . . . will benefit the corporation or
its security holders," or the moving defendant "did not
participate in the transaction complained of . . .," 67 apparently did not make the posting of security mandatory
even where the combined shareholdings of the plaintiffs were
less than 5% or $50,000 in value.8 6 8
No shareholder seeking to vindicate corporate rights
could object to such a provision. However, this boon to
stockholders' suits" was coupled with a provision allowing
the court to compel plaintiffs who had not been required
to post security to pay the reasonable expenses of the defendants where the court found that the action was brought
"without reasonable cause." 869
The entire section was not without ambiguity. However, even a face interpretation of it would allow assessment
of the defendant's expenses not only against plaintiffs owning a small amount of stock, who nevertheless, in the discretion of the court had not been required to post the
security deposit, but even against plaintiffs owning 5% of
the stock, or those whose stock was worth over *50,000.
The very purpose of these limitations was to allow those
whose shareholdings were significant enough to guarantee
that their suits would not be without foundation to bring
their action without imposition of the burden designed
merely to discourage strike suits. Although courts would
probably be rightfully reluctant to hold that suits instituted
by persons with such a considerable stake in the corporation,
as $50,000 or even 5% of the shares signifies, it cannot be
367 CAL. CORP. CODE § 834.
368 Study Bill § 6.26(a) allowed only a "petition" by the corporation where
the 5% or $50,000 requirements were not met. Every New York practitioner
knows that a "petition" is no guarantee of a remedy. See textual discussion
in this article entitled Deadlock-Breaking Provions.
369 Study Bill § 6.26(b) provided: "In any such action hereafter instituted,
where the plaintiff or plaintiffs have not been required to give security as
provided in this section, the court having jurisdiction, upon final judgment
and a findng that the action was brought without reasonable cause, may
require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by the corporation in connection with such action
and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which the
corporation may become liable pursuant to article 7 (Directors, officers and
employees) of this chapter."
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denied that uncertainty about the outcome might well have
deterred a shareholder's suit by those least apt to use such
a suit for its "strike" or blackmail value; those with the
greatest honest incentive to attempt to redress wrongdoing
even in cases of doubtful liability. The severely criticized 37 0
provision has fortunately been deleted.
On the whole, then, although the second demand of
those who desire corporate morality, easy access to the
courts to redress corporate wrongs, has not been met by
a lowering of the already formidable barriers to a successful
shareholder's suit,7 1 the new act has at least not raised
those hurdles, and has added provisions which will further
insure that shareholder suits are used for the purpose for
which they were intended, the vindication of corporate rights
against disloyal officials for the benefit of the entire body
of shareholders, and not solely for the advantage of the
shareholder bringing the action. 7 2
Another important aspect of any corporation law as it
370

See Brief circulated by Milton Paulson, a New York City attorney.

371 Of course, strike suits must be discouraged, but, as Professor Hornstein

has suggested (Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
47 COLUtm. L. R-v. 1 (1947)) the methods adopted by present New York
law are already too severe. A more appropriate solution even than that
finally chosen would be to abandon completely the arbitrary percentage and
value test of present New York law and substitute a test of reasonable
likelihood of success as the standard for determining whether or not the
security deposit must be posted. Once that question has been decided in
favor of the plaintiff he should be exposed to no liability for the expenses
of the defendant directors or officers, merely because they have later proved
that what on their face appeared to be legitimate grounds for complaint
ultimately turned out to be unfounded. On the other hand, where the preliminary determination of probability of good cause is adverse to the plaintiff,
the court can require a deposit which will be ample to adequately indemnify
all the defendants, and which will, by the same token, discourage unfounded
strike suits, no matter by how large a bloc of shareholders they are brought.
The requirement for posting the security will give advance notice of
the likelihood of failure, and the extent of the "penalty" which will have
to be paid if the plaintiffs are unable to establish their dubious case.
Clearly, this is enough of a deterrent to unfounded suits, and the
plaintiff's liability should accordingly be limited to the amount of the required
deposit. Since he already has notice of probable liability it is not necessary
to condition later use of the fund on a finding of lack of reasonable cause.
372N.y. Bus. Coin. LAW §626(d) expressly forbids out-of-court settlements. See also N.Y. Bus. CoRn. LAw § 626(e) which provides that the
court may direct the successful plaintiff to account to the corporation for
all but his reasonable expenses where anything has been received by the
plaintiff even though as a result of a compromise or settlement.
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impinges on public issue corporations and the rights of their
shareholders, and one at least peripherally related to the
movement for corporate morality, is the subject of indemnification of corporate officers and directors for expenses
incurred by them as a result of litigation commenced against
them for acts done in their capacities as such corporate
officials.
In such situations the shareholders' interest is ambivalent: whatever is paid for the defense of these officials
obviously comes "out of their pockets," in the sense that
it means less corporate profits available for dividends. On
the other hand, a guarantee that the corporation "will stand
behind them" when they act in what they consider the
corporation's best interests may well help to secure better
qualified personnel, and thus, ultimately, mean greater profits
available for these shareholders. The appropriate balance
between these two seemingly conflicting interests is difficult
to draw.
Clearly when he acts for his own benefit, as opposed
to that of his corporation, a corporate official should not
be reimbursed for either the judgment against him or his
expenses in defending the suit. Where, on the other hand,
be acts in what he honestly believes to be the best interests
of that .corporation, the corporation should protect him
as far as possible from financial loss whether the action
against him be a civil or even a criminal one. The proposed
statute represents a significant departure from present law.
Under current law, New York allows a corporation
voluntarily to indemnify an officer, director or employee for
litigation expenses incurred where he is a defendant in a
shareholder's derivative suit, unless he has been "adjudged"
liable for negligence or misconduct. 7 3 Thus, where it wants
to, a corporation may indemnify such a director or officer,
even though guilty, if he wins on some technicality or settles
the action against him.
Even where the corporation does not voluntarily agree
to indemnify its defendant agent, he is nonetheless entitled
373N.Y.

GEN. ComR.

LAW §

63.
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to reimbursement (statutory indemnification) where he has
been found to be "successful in whole or in part," or the
action against him has been settled with court approval.
Thus, again, guilty directors must be reimbursed unless they
are wholly unsuccessful, or have only "won" by buying
31 4
themselves release through an out-of-court settlement.
No indemnification is due, however, where the corporation refuses to grant it, and the defendant, instead of
being a defendant in a shareholder's derivative suit, is, e. g.,
accused of a crime as a result of activities in behalf of his
corporation.3 5
of
Although the voluntary indemnification provisions 376
the new bill as introduced were not wholly unambiguous,
it would seem that, even where it desired to do so, a corporation could not reimburse a defendant director or officer
in a shareholder's derivative suit where he had, in fact,
"breached his duty to the corporation," even though he had
e. g., on the defense of the
been technically successful,
3 77
limitations.
of
statute
Certainly this change was advisable. It accorded with
the real purpose of such indemnification provisions: to stand
behind the innocent, but not to protect the guilty.
The law as finally enacted, however, returned to the
language of present law, allowing indemnification "except
in relation to matters as to which such director or officer
is adjudged to have breached his duty to the corporation
under section 717 ....

," 3'1

This reintroduces the possibility

of voluntary indemnification even for guilty directors as
long as they succeed in avoiding an actual adjudication of
breach of duty.
374N.Y. Gax. Coin. LAW §§ 64, 67.

3 Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d
533 (1953).
376 For example, they seemed inconsistent with the statutory indemnification
provisions of S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, §.7.25 (a) (1961). The law as finally
passed is identical with this latter provision. N.Y. Bus. CoP. LAW § 725 (a).
377 S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, § 7.22(a) (1961).
378N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §722(a) (emphasis added). N.Y. Gmw. CoRP.
LAW § 64 required indemnification of directors "except in relation to matters
as to which it shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding that
such officer, director or employee is liable for negligence or misconduct in
the performance of his duties."
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The one slight improvement in the new over the present
law is the requirement that before the expenses of a director
or officer in settling a pending derivative action may be paid,
a distinterested quorum of directors must resolve to make
the payment "upon a finding that such director or officer
has not breached his duty to the corporation . . ." 379 or, in
the absence of such a disinterested quorum, there must be express shareholder approval of the indemnification, 3 80 or, at
least, an "opinion in writing of independent legal counsel
that indemnification is proper in the circumstances because
the applicable standard 81of conduct . . . has been met by
such director or officer."M
In addition, no expenses may be paid "in disposing of
any such pending action without court approval,138 2 nor
may amounts paid in settling (the "payoff") any such
even though the action is settled with
action be reimbursed
8
court approval.
Thus, neither voluntary indemnification (nor, of course,
indemnification by the court) may be granted in a derivative
action for (1) amounts paid in settling any such pending
action, (2) expenses incurred or amounts paid in settling
or defending a threatened derivative action, or, (3) expenses
incurred or amounts paid in discontinuing, compromising 3or4
settling any such pending action without court approval. 1
This is some improvement over present law, at least in
specificity. It will still allow indemnification, at least for
litigation expenses, of some guilty directors.
The new statute also expressly extends voluntary ins7 N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAW §722(a) (1).
Quaere: Must the directors be
generally disinterested? The statute literally only requires a quorum "conwho are not parties to such action. . . ." N.Y. Bus.
sisting of directbrs
Cons. LAW § 7 2 2 (a)(1). The same language is used in the sections authorizing reimbursement in non-derivative actions (N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§7 2 3(a)(1)(A)) and advances of expenses in both types of suits (N.Y.
Bus. Coap. LAw §725(b)(1)).
8o N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §722 (a) (2). Oddly enough, the law would seem
to permit such shareholder approval only where a disinterested quorum of
directors is not possible.
381N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAW §§ 722(a)(2), 725(e).
382 N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAW § 725(f) (3).
383 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 725(f) (2).
384N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LA'y § 725(f).
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demnification to cover officers and directors where they are
made defendants in non-derivative actions, including criminal
ones, and the
director or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation
and, in criminal actions or proceedings, in addition, had no reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful .... 385
The right to indemnify includes also the payment of
the judgment or fine, and may be granted where the defendant has pleaded nolo contendere to a crime, or even
has been convicted after trial.3 8 6 Even expenses of defending threatened non-derivative civil litigation may be reimbursed. 8 7' And even amounts paid (the "payoff") in settling
pending or even threatened non-derivative civil actions or
proceedings may be paid.38 8 The only condition imposed in
either case (other than the general conditions imposed above)
is that the reimbursement be individually authorized by a
disinterested quorum of directors, or, in the absence of that,
by the shareholders or the directors (even though not
disinterested), as long as they secure a written opinion by
independent counsel that the indemnification has met the
38
above standard of conduct. 0
A doubt left unresolved in Schwarz v. General Aniline
& Film Corp., is also expressly covered.39 0 An adverse judgment, plea of nolo, or even a criminal conviction will not
create any adverse presumption against the defendant seeking reimbursement. 391
Expenses in any type of action may be advanced but
must be repaid by him "in case the director or officer is
ultimately found . . . not to be entitled to indemnification.
• 392 The court may also order such an advance, under
38 N.Y. Bus. Coap.
3s6N.Y. Bus. CoRp.

LAW
LAW

§ 723(a).
§ 723(a)(2).

387N.*Y. Bus. Cop. LAW §723(a)(1).
3
88 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 723(a) (1).
389N.Y.

Bus. CoRP.

LAW

§§ 723(a)(1), (2), 725(e).

390305
N.Y. 395, 113 N.E2d 533 (1953).
39
1N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 723(a) (3).
392 N.Y. Bus. Coapx. LAW § 725(d).
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a similar obligation to make reimbursement, where the court
"shall find that the defendant has by his pleadings or
during the course of the litigation raised genuine issues of
fact or law." 393
Where voluntary indemnification in any type of action
is made, other than with court or shareholder approval,
notice must be given to voting shareholders of the persons
paid, the amounts paid, and the nature and final disposition
of the litigation or threatened

litigation.3

94

This is a

wise carryover from the present law.3 95 The shareholders
should have a right to know how their directors are spending
their money, so that if they find the expenditure unjustifiable
they may take action at the next shareholders' meeting, at
least by denying management's usual vote of confidence.
However, as with other notices required, no penalty against
noncomplying directors is imposed. This, of course, is an
unfortunate omission.
So far, there is nothing to criticize in any of the new
provisions except their failure to rectify defects in the present
law, and their possible over-generosity to defendants in nonderivative actions. In many situations, the service to the
corporation may justify payment of the offending director's
or officer's fines, (although it is difficult to conceive of any
person intelligent enough to be selected as an officer or
director meeting the requirement that he "had no reasonable
cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful"). However,
there would seem to be no better reason for a corporation's
reimbursing one of its officials for the amount of his "payoff" to terminate a non-derivative civil action than there is
for it to repay amounts in settlement of derivative ones.
This authorization might, for example, result in the
anomaly of reimbursement of a disloyal director for his
expenses or even the amount of the recovery against him
in an action brought by the corporation itself against him. 96
393 N.Y. Bus. Coxu. LAW § 725 (c). This provision also applies to derivative
actions.
394 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 725(h).
395 N.Y. GEN. CORp. LAW § 63.

396 For example, the directors might decide to bring an action against a
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Even stranger results may follow from the provisions
for involuntary indemnification.
In addition to indemnification by voluntary action of the
corporation, the defendant director or officer is also entitled
to "statutory indemnification" in both derivative and nonderivative actions (civil or criminal), and even though the
corporation attempts to deny it to him, "to the extent
provided in [the voluntary indemnification] sections and in
section 725 ..
2, 3" unless (1) he is an official of a foreign
corporation the law of the state of incorporation of which
forbids such indemnification, (2) a shareholder agreement;5
certificate or by-law provision, or a shareholder or director
resolution, etc., in force at the time of the alleged wrongdoing forbids or limits such indemnification, or, (3) the
indemnification would violate the terms of a court-approved
settlement. 8 "
The problem arises from the quoted words, not from the
exceptions which seem clear and reasonable. While the
cross reference to the voluntary indemnification sections
probably means that indemnification may be allowed under
the circumstances there outlined, without, of course, the
requirement of shareholder or director approval, the incorporation of section 725 introduces an unsettling element.
As will be recalled, voluntary indemnification in derivative
actions may not be granted where the corporate official
"is adjudged to have breached his duty to the corporation," 3
and in non-derivative actions where he fails to meet the
requirements of good faith, and reasonable belief that his
acts were in the best interests of the corporation. 40

disloyal director or officer.

Since this is a non-derivative action, voluntary

indemnification is governed by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723. There is nothing
to prevent a later board or, perhaps, the majority of shareholders from
granting reimbursement, therefore, even in an action brought by order of the
directors. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 723(a) (1). See, however, note 380 supra.
The conditions for approval of voluntary indemnification in non-derivative
suits are the same as those found in N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) for
derivative actions.
397
N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW § 724(a).
398 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §725(g).
390 N.Y. Bus. CoiP. LAW § 722(a).
400 N.Y. Bus. Coin. LAW § 723(a).

See text accompanying note 385 .supra.
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However, section 725 (a) provides:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision in [the sections on
voluntary indemnification] a director or officer who has been
wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of a
civil or criminal action or proceeding shall be entitled to indemnification ...

401

This is a very different test. The words "or otherwise"'
seem clearly to require indemnification even where the
defendant, although guilty, i. e., where he has "breached his
duty to the corporation," or has acted in bad faith and
consciously against the interests of his corporation, has somehow been 'wholly successful." The provision thus compels
the court to allow indemnification where the disloyal official
has been successful because the short statute of limitations
has run 402 or the plaintiff is unable to meet the security
40 3
deposit requirements.
This carry-over of present law 404 is certainly a waste
401N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 725(a).
This section concludes "subject to subparagraph (g) (2)." Subparagraph (g) (2), however, merely forbids indemnification where it appears: "That the indemnification would be inconsistent with a provision of the certificate of incorporation, a by-law,
a resolution of shareholders or directors, an agreement or other proper
corporate action, in effect at the time of the accrual of the alleged cause
of action asserted in the threatened or pending action or proceeding in
which the expenses were incurred or other amounts were paid, which
prohibits
or otherwise limits indemnification. .. 2'
402
See Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th
Dep't 1951) (memorandum decision) (allowing indemnification under present
law where the defendant is successful on the basis of the statute of limitations
(N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §48(8)).
40
See Tichner v. Andrews, 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N.Y.S2d 760 (Sup. Ct.),
appeal dismissed, 275 App. Div. 749, 90 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1st Dep't 1949)
(allowing indemnification under present law where the defendant is successful
because
of plaintiff's failure to comply with the securities-for-expenses law).
40 4
See notes 402 and 403, supra. The language of the section, requiring
that the indemnitee be "wholly successful on the merits or otherwise,"
seems to assure this result as much as former N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAw § 67
which required that he be "successful in whole or in part, or that the
action against him has been settled with the approval of the court. .. ."
However, these unfortunate decisions are not inevitable, since the statute
does not directly affect the decision in Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263,
120 N.E.2d 819 (1954), which denied statutory indemnification to a wrongdoing director who had been successful in the derivative action (on the
grounds of acquiescence and ratification by the plaintiff, the only other
shareholder), even though there had been no formal adjudication of the
defendant director's (admitted) guilt. It is to be hoped that the courts
will not take the new statute as a rebuff to this small judicial concession
to a proper policy interpretation of indemnification laws.
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of the shareholders' money since it can hardly be contended
that such indemnification is well-calculated to secure personnel whose loyal service will offset the out-of-pocket cost
to the shareholders of defending them.
The ambiguity of the statute might even authorize a
court to order a corporation to indemnify a guilty director
or officer not only for his expenses but also for amounts he
paid to the corporation in settlement of a suit against him
brought by the corporation itself 40 5 -a manifest travesty
on justice.
It is difficult to believe that any of this could have
been intended, and much more likely that the defect is
one in draftsmanship rather than philosophy. Whichever
is at fault, however, the error should be corrected.
With regard to the effect of the new statute on public
issue corporations and shareholder rights, then, as with
most other features of the new statute, there are some
things to be commended, others to be condemned. The
movement for shareholder democracy has not gained a
victory, although at least an attempt is made to insure
greater shareholder enlightenment, 40 6 so that whatever voting
power they do possess may be utilized more intelligently.
The standard of corporate morality has been relaxed, but
the means for enforcing it, through the shareholders' suit,
have been improved somewhat. The provisions for voluntary
indemnification of the defendants in such actions are im405 Such an action would be non-derivative, and hence the limits of
N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW §725(f)(2) and (3) would not apply. The pro-

vision of N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §724(a), ordering the court to indemnify
"to the extent provided in [§723] and in section 725," taken with the
general provision of N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 725(a)

granting a right to

indemnification to any successful defendant, and N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 723(a) (1) authorizing payments of "amounts paid in settling or defending"

such actions would seem to authorize, if not require, reimbursement even
under such circumstances.

406See the notification requirements of N.Y. Bus. CoaP. LAW §626(d)
in the case of settlement of shareholders' actions and N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw

§ 725(h) in the case of indemnification payments.

See also the notice requirements where distributions or financial adjustments are being made. N.Y.
Bus. CRP. LAW §§510(a)(1),

(2),

511(f),

515(d),

516(c), 517(a)(4),

519(f). But compare the possible adverse effect on shareholder information
in N.Y. Bus. CoaP. LAW §624, discussed in text accompanying note 78
supra.
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proved only slightly to prevent waste of the shareholders'
money in the defense of disloyal directors. The general limitations on voluntary indemnification in non-derivative
actions may not be sufficient to prevent such a waste in
those cases, too. The provisions for judicial, or involuntary,
indemnification are either designed to carry-over the excessively generous present law, or are merely poorly drafted,
a significant fault in either event.
CONCLUSION

What shall we say now of the statute as a whole?
Such a question is as obvious as it is impossible to answer.
It is rather like asking what one thinks of life, and can
only be answered in the same way. Some of it is bad, some
not so bad and, even for a perfectionist, some of it at least
is good enough to give us complete satisfaction.
Of course, apart from mere consideration of appropriateness of form to accomplish the ends chosen, i. e.,
whether or not its provisions are ambiguous, one's assessment
of any statute is based on his philosophy, that is, whether
or not its aims are acceptable to him, or accord with his
ideas of what is right. Clearly, therefore, anyone who
judges the new statute will have to judge it in terms of his
own philosophy of what a corporation law should be like.
I have outlined my philosophy on a number of previous
occasions. 40 7 Although names have little meaning, I should
like to characterize it as the "liberal" position, although
I am afraid that in corporation law jargon the terms are
often the reverse of their political counterparts, and hence
the characterization will be disputed. 40 8
A corporation,
407

Kessler, Promoters Contracts: A Statutory Solution, 15 RUTGERS L.

REV. 566 (1961) ; Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation
Laws, 28 FORDHAm L. REV. 637 (1960); Kessler, The Statutory Requirement
of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronismn, 27 U. Cni. L. REv.

696 (1960).

408 The term "liberal" as applied to corporation statutes today usually means
"permissive," i. e., that the corporation and its directors may do what they
want without worry about shareholder and creditor rights. See BAKER &
GARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 9-11 (3d ed. 1958).
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I think, is basically no more than a legally sanctioned vehicle
for the betterment of the economy. It is a recognition that
the welfare of the people as a whole may best be served
by encouraging people to take the risk of developing new
products (or making old ones better) without having to risk
everything they have on the success or failure of the venture.
The interest of the state is, as is always true in a democracy,
merely the interest of the people, that is, the common
welfare. Obviously, once it has decided that the general
welfare is best served by conferring limited liability on some
individuals, the state must concern itself with the welfare
of those most intimately concerned with each individual
corporation: its employees, shareholders, creditors and customers. The primary interest of all, but especially of the
first three, is the survival of the enterprise as a going concern. The interest of the customers is adequately provided
for by tort and contract law, both case and statutory, to
assure them that their dealings with the corporation are fair.
The interests of the employees and shareholders conflict
only on the question of their relative shares in the profits
of the enterprise. This is, today, by and large, a subject
for negotiation between the representatives of the two groups,
regulated by labor laws. The basic concern of corporation
laws today is, therefore, the shareholders and the creditors.
The welfare of these two groups, consonant with the
public welfare and the welfare of the corporate employees
and customers, seems therefore, to be the. only interest of
the state in enacting corporation laws. The state has no
interest, in the sense of legitimate concern, in the form or
operation of the limited liability vehicle as long as the
individuals in these two groups are protected, without injury
to anyone else.
Complete flexibility, where no harm is done by the
corporate structure or operations desired, is therefore a
desideratum. The idea of "statutory norms" of corporate
organization from which no deviation, or "only a slight infringement" 409 upon, will be permitted is therefore anathema
409 See Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y.
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unless it can be shown that someone will be harmed by
such experiments. Testing the close corporation provisions
of the proposed law by this standard it is clear that they
are an improvement over present statutory law, which except
for the addition of section 9 of the Stock Corporation Law,
as a reaction against narrow judicial construction, has not
made clear enough its permissive scope. It is equally
obvious that the proposed law does not go far enough
since it still places limits on the extent to which the shareholders may mold, by their own agreement, the operational
structure of their business.
Shareholders and creditors of large corporations are
peculiarly unprotected in this country. Creditors have,
ordinarily, no say in the operation of the corporation. 410
Their only protection usually comes from a requirement of
sound financial management of the corporation. Since they
have no voice in this, the law should step in to protect their
interest through prohibition of improvident corporate
distributions. Under present New York law, and- under
the laws of most American states, it has done little to
prevent such harmful distributions, until actual insolvency
has taken place. This is why the financial provisions of
a corporation law are so important. The financial provisions
are also a potential means for protection of the shareholders who, unless they are themselves the recipients, have
a like interest in preventing such improvident distributions.
The new law has done little to help either group. The most
significant change is the requirement that notice be given
to the shareholders, when they receive such an improvident
distribution, that it is from capital or capital surplus.
Even granting that they understand the significance of this
notice, it is not much protection to the shareholders, and
certainly none to the creditors.
However, after the great permissiveness of present law
174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641
(1936).
410 In contrast to the laws of American states, England requires creditor
approval for corporate recapitalizations.

551 (2d ed. 1957).

See GowER, MODERN COmPANY LAW

1961]

N. Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW

105

in this regard, it is probably too much to hope for adoption
of a strict rule restricting distributions, with but a minimum
of exceptions, to earned surplus, and requiring creditors'
consent to "quasi-reorganizations," as they are called, but
which are really diversions of corporate capital into a
spurious surplus category.
Partly for the same reasons one cannot have too many
sanguine hopes for "corporate democracy." Even if minority
representation on the boards of large corporations is desirable (and I have some misgivings about that) cumulative
voting alone will not guarantee it. Even for minimal guar
antees of effectiveness of that device the provisions requiring
it would probably have to enter New York law as a
constitutional amendment, rather than through the corporation law.411 Even there, there would be little assurance
of its success in attaining its end, 412 and the long-standing
contrary rule in this state gives little hope that such a
constitutional amendment would be enacted.
Even apart from the overrated panacea of cumulative
voting, pleas for greater shareholder participation generally
in corporate affairs seem rather impractical. The "town
meeting" analogy of corporate government is as inappropriate
to the running of a large corporation as it is to a national
election. Perhaps, it would be nice to have direct national
presidential primaries, perhaps also it would be a good thing
to have more shareholder control of public issue corporations.
I am not convinced that the results in either sphere would
represent any considerable improvement. Even granted that
they would, apathy and the practical difficulties involved in
taking such a poll, if it is not to degenerate into the same
type of thing we now have, would seem to foredoom the
411 In Illinois, the constitutional provision guaranteeing cumulative voting
was held to invalidate a statute allowing classification of directors, an obvious
device for circumventing the effectiveness of cumulative voting. Wolfson v.
Avery, 6 Ill.
2d 78, 126 N.E2d 701 (1955).
Despite its constitutional provision, however, Pennsylvania upheld the validity of the "loophole" of director
classification. Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76
(1956).
If even a constitutional provision is not a sure guarantee of the
efficacy of cumulative voting, the ineffectiveness of a mere statutory provision

is obvious.
412 See Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., supra note 411.
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effort to failure. At any rate, the new statute does carry
over the permission to have cumulative voting, should enough
of the shareholders feel it desirable to force it upon the
corporation, 413 and the number of shares required to do so
has been reduced to a bare majority "I rather than the
almost unattainable two-thirds of present law. 4 15 Furthermore, on the same terms, the shareholders may retain to
themselves the power of electing officers. 416 This is some
concession to the movement for greater shareholder participation in corporate management.
While the shareholders of large corporations probably
do not have a vital need for more shareholder democracy,
they do have a legitimate right to demand proper corporate
management, and means at their disposal for enforcing this
demand. The state should act in this area since to abstain
here in favor of permissivism means definite harm to the
corporate shareholders. The standard of corporate morality
set by the new statute is much lower than that of the old
law. The means provided for enforcement of the standard,
the shareholder's derivative suit, was already under that
old law, a seriously limited policeman of that norm.
As is usual in statutory draftsmanship the matter requires a balancing of conflicting interests. The real interest
of the shareholders is as much opposed to "strike" suits as
it is to requirements so onerous as to prevent legitimate
shareholder suits. Both mean a loss of money to them:
the cost to the corporation, and, therefore, to them, in
defending unfounded suits, and the loss to the corporation,
and also to them, in being unable to recover on justifiable
claims. Admittedly, the balance that must be struck is a
delicate one: "strike" suits must be prevented, legitimate
derivative actions must be encouraged. Under present law
too much weight has been given to preventing "strike" suits.
The legitimate interest of the shareholders in the legitimate
shareholder's suit has not, in my opinion, been properly
recognized. Fortunately, however, under the new law the
413N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 618.
414 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803(a).
415
416

N.Y. SToCK CORP. LAW § 37(1) (c) (2).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 715(b).
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situation is made no worse, and the settlement provisions
are somewhat of an improvement. Unfortunately, however,
the indemnification provisions leave something to be desired,
since they appear overly-generous to corporate wrongdoers.
It must be remembered, however, in criticizing any
statute like this, which represents a recension of basic law
in the country's most populous, and second greatest corporation state, 417 that the act is bound in many respects
to involve compromises in an attempt to satisfy the competing demands of those who must live under the statute.
And this is entirely proper, since any corporation act, as I
have suggested above, should be designed as much as possible
to satisfy the needs of those who will utilize it, consistent
with the proper protection of the public.
Since corporations are more and more ambulatory,
large corporations, at least, have a tendency to incorporate
in those states which they feel are most sympathetic to
corporate problems. Even if they do not intend to take
advantage of their shareholders or the public they may
still prefer incorporation in states which are not too concerned with shareholder and creditor rights, since the laws
of "strict" states, such as New York is at present, are
bound to be more technical and hence more burdensome
to comply with, in order to accomplish their end of adequate
shareholder and creditor protection, than are the laws of the
states which take a more old-fashioned laissez-faire attitude
to those interests.
Clearly, New York could exclude all foreign corporations
if it chose, or require their reincorporation under local
law as a condition to doing business. 4 18 The loss in business
4 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17, at 18.
41s Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). Subjecting foreign corporations to the
same standards as local corporations to some extent accomplishes the same
results. The new statute attempts to do this in a number of areas. See
N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW §§ 1318-20.
However, in an attempt to avoid discouraging foreign corporations from
doing business in New York, the bill as enacted has made a significant change
in its coverage of foreign corporations with regard to directorial liability,
and failure of a corporation to give the notices, discussed under the Financial
Provisions portion of this article. Under the statute as enacted only "domiciled foreign corporations" are subject to these requirements. N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAW §§ 1318, 1319; ef. S. Int. 522, Pr. 522, §§ 13.17, 13.18 (1961).
The object of this distinction is basically the same as that of the new
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to the state which might follow such a course, however, would
be a clear injury to the public interest which it is the duty
of the legislature to protect. The only practical alternative
is a certain amount of competition for the incorporation
business. Again the balancing of interests is a difficult
one: the statute must be "liberal" enough not to drive
away big corporate business, while at the same time "strict"
enough to give protection to the shareholders and creditors.
One thing I can say without hesitation is that the Joint
Legislative Committee has earnestly attempted to balance
all of these conflicting interests, reflected in divergent proposals, in a way which will adequately protect the public
interest in aiding business, and at the same time afford
sufficient protection for the special needs of shareholders,
creditors, and organizers of close corporations.
But compromise rarely satisfies everybody, and, no
matter how sincere the effort to do the best, opinions will
always differ as to whether or not it has been accomplished.
Is the new law better than the old? Yes, if for no
other reason than that it is simpler in many respects not
affecting substantial rights, as indicated in my bird's eye
view. Is it as good as it should be? That I leave to
your philosophy of what a good corporation law should be
like.
federal diversity statute's provision which makes foreign corporations citizens
of the state in which they have their "principal -place of business": to accord
spurious foreign corporations the same treatment as domestic ones. N.Y.
Bus. Coni. LAw § 1317 provides:
"(a) As used in this chapter an authorized foreign corporation
or a foreign corporation doing business in this state is a 'domiciled
foreign corporation' if:
(1) At least two-thirds of all its outstanding shares, with or
without voting rights, are owned, either beneficially or of record, by
residents of this state, or
(2) At least two-thirds of all its outstanding shares with voting
rights are owned, either beneficially or of record, by residents of this
state, or
(3) At least two-thirds of its business income or its investment
income is allocable to this state for franchise tax purposes under the
tax law."
The New York provision is less likely to give the interpretive difficulties
present under the new federal statute. See Federal Diversity JurisdictionThis is fortunate,
"Principal Place of Business," 23 CoP. J. 83 (1961).
at least, although the provision means that not all foreign corporations doing
business in New York will be held to the New York standard of conduct.
See, as to the federal statute, Kessler, Corporations and the New Federal
Diversity Statute: A Denial of Justice, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 239, 243, 272.

